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Contributions gratefully received in photographic interpretation.

THE UNIDENTIFIEDS

Dino A. Brugioni

No matter how well-trained and experienced a photographic interpreter may be, there are frequent occasions when he simply cannot identify some object, installation, or activity, and when initial research efforts by collateral support personnel fail to provide an answer. In such cases the target is labeled as an "Unidentified." The problem of identifying the "unidentifieds" is the subject of this article.

Photographic interpretation has become highly complicated since World War II. Only a modest number of military or industrial targets had to be considered in the previous era, and interpretation was based on an equally limited number of "indicators" and "signatures." In the language of photographic interpretation, a feature or pattern of features suggesting the presence or the function of a target or activity is called an indicator, and a unique combination or pattern of indicators which permits positive identification is called a signature. Storage sites for weapons, for instance, may have many indicators in common such as security fences and well-spaced, revetted storage buildings, but a building with a specific type of roof and ventilators may be the signature that confirms identification of chemical warfare storage.

In today's world, the scope of the interpreter's responsibility has expanded to include practically all the land surface of the globe, and the number of indicators and signatures to be remembered is far greater than any one individual can possibly master.

Photographic coverage has increased because few land areas in our day are without some relationship to modern weaponry. Deserts and remote islands are missile, nuclear, and chemical warfare proving grounds. Arctic wastelands are frontiers for electronics defenses. Farmlands and forests are missile deployment areas. Airfields are constructed in remote areas. Submarines and warships are found in

isolated anchorages. Canyons and heavily eroded or strip-mined areas are ideal for rocket, missile, and jet-engine testing, and mountains are tunneled for weapons storage or testing of nuclear devices.

The number of indicators and signatures to be remembered has also greatly increased because of the introduction of new weapons systems in this age of atomic fission, electronics devices, jet engines, and missiles. Our problems in this respect are further complicated by the increased scope of photographic coverage. When scanning photography, an interpreter is not only searching for new targets; he is also concerned with discovering any unusual object, installation, or activity at known complexes which may be related to a new weapons system or which may otherwise attract attention as an item of potential interest to intelligence. Sifting the unusual from the usual, however, becomes a highly complicated task when the interpreter is dealing with a part of the world with which he is unfamiliar. The process of interpretation depends in part on immediate recognition of cultural features peculiar to the locality under consideration. Cultural features are manmade changes to the natural environment such as cultivated areas, houses, roads, industrial establishments, religious structures, and cemeteries. An analyst who was born and raised in rural America immediately recognizes a barn, a silo, or a windmill on an Iowa farmstead. His parameters for Iowa (and the United States in general) are well-established, and he wastes no time on well-known cultural features that have no bearing on his mission. The same analyst, however, might spend hours trying to identify fishnets drying on poles in Thailand because they resemble antenna arrays at certain electronics sites in the west, even though drying fishnets are as common in Thailand as windmills in Iowa. This is simply to state the obvious fact that cultural patterns vary greatly in different parts of the world, and parameters that apply to one culture often do not apply to another. A domed building in a remote area of the western world is at once suspect as a radar site, but a domed building in an area inhabited by Moslems is usually a mosque. Radars are often built on hilltops, but in the Orient a hilltop structure is often a Buddhist shrine.

Through his training and from experience, the photographic interpreter has catalogued in his memory and reference files hundreds of patterns of signatures that relate to specific weapons systems. Many signatures consist of geometric patterns such as circles, triangles,

ellipsoids, squares, trapezoids, or cones, and some are combinations of several patterns such as a type of surface-to-air missile site which appears on photography to be a Star of David within a circle.

A large and growing body of literature is available on the theory and technique of pattern recognition, but no study is known to this author dealing with the photographic interpreter's mental processes of categorizing and retrieving pattern information.

Because of the many complexities of photographic interpretation, the profession has become highly specialized. Individuals concentrate on specific weapons systems, activities, and cultural features of limited portions of the earth's surface and become highly trained and experienced experts in limited fields. They are, in turn, supported by equally specialized and experienced collateral research personnel. Now and then, however, even the most experienced interpreter has no choice but to report on some object, installation, or activity as "unidentified."

Any unidentified image that provides the slightest evidence of being significant from an intelligence standpoint becomes the subject of research in depth. The photograph is circulated for study by a variety of specialists, and the film is subjected to intensive technical analysis by laboratory and photogrammetric technicians. In almost all cases an identification is eventually made. Some turn out to be highly significant. Many others are found to be innocuous and of no interest to intelligence—except that the files gain another "pattern" which may be of help to others in the future.

In many cases, a target long unidentified by the professionals and their supporting personnel is finally identified by a person who has some special knowledge gained from travel, from residence in a foreign country, or perhaps from an interest in some esoteric branch of the arts or sciences. Most of the people making up the intelligence community qualify in some of these respects as amateur interpreters of the "unidentifieds," and any individual who can solve an identification problem is urged to pass the word through appropriate channels. The professional welcomes assistance from any amateur when confronted by an unidentified object.

The rest of this article is devoted to discussions and illustrations of selected cases of unidentified objects or installations which were deemed significant enough to justify study in depth. All of these cases

were solved, mostly by persevering research and the application of scientific techniques, but in at least one case the solution came from a person with special knowledge gained from travel. As it happened, identification in these cases resulted in little that was of interest to intelligence. In other instances, however, the same techniques have also resulted in highly significant (and often highly classified) identifications.

When scanning aerial photography, the watchword could well be "expect the unexpected." Atmospherics, soil conditions, mechanical performance phenomena, aberrations, sun angles, winds, time of exposure, image acquisition materials, and other factors often provide information over and above that normally expected in the design characteristics of the system. This phenomenon has been labeled the "serendipity effect" by the Director, NPIC.

Modern transportation and communications have resulted in cultural exchanges leaving unusual imprints even in the remotest parts of the world. Every so often photographic interpreters are surprised by finding something which appears out of place. Recently, while scanning photography of East Germany an interpreter was surprised to see Indian teepees, a covered wagon, and the gate of a western cavalry fort. What he saw is shown on Figure 1. The photo interpreter rechecked his location, since this was obviously a movie set. Despite the initial disbelief that the East Germans were making western-type films, supporting collateral researchers provided information that the German Film Corporation, an East German government monopoly, does in fact produce western films.

The first aerial photography of Tibet presented many enigmas. None was more baffling than structures that appeared to be guard posts situated on roads or trails at the tops of hills or on mountain passes. These structures were usually flanked by mounds or ridges, and at first it was assumed that these were military strong points with attendant bunkers and protective revetments. A second guess was that the structures were toll collection booths. Neither theory held up when questions were raised as to why the posts were in such remote areas and why they were exposed to the worst of the Himalayan weather.

Research into Tibetan culture eventually paid off in the case of the Himalayan "guard posts," and a ground photograph of one of the



FIGURE 1. This shrine to Chenresik, god of travelers, resembles a military strongpoint on overhead photography.

structures shown on Figure 2, was found in a travel book. The posts turned out to be religious shrines, each containing an image of Chenresik, the god who protects travelers. In keeping with local religious practice, a Tibetan traveler approaching a hill or pass appeals for divine protection by picking up a stone in the valley and carrying it to the shrine. There the traveler makes the proper invocation to Chenresik and deposits the stone before the shrine. Over the years large piles of stones have accumulated at the shrines along heavily traveled routes, accounting for the military appearance of the posts on aerial photography.

To a photographic interpreter, circular excavations seen from above are suspect as gun positions. If several excavations form a circular pattern, an antiaircraft role may be indicated. Linear arrays of ex-

cavations suggest a ground defense system. In arid parts of the Middle East, however, care must be taken to avoid interpreting a line of excavations as a row of foxholes or gun positions since it may be evidence of a centuries old yet ingenious system for tapping underground water called a *qanat*. Such a system consists of an underground conduit which brings water from a water-bearing bed or earth stratum (acquifer) in the highlands to the surface at a lower level where the water is used in households and for irrigation. Shafts are in a line at regular intervals, and the conduit is excavated from the bottom of one shaft to the next, the spoil being dumped on the surface around the top of the shaft. Seen on aerial photography, as on Figure 2, a series of parallel *qanats* resembles a defense-in-depths series of fortifications. The inset on Figure 3 shows a ground view of the spoil around the tops of a line of *qanat* shafts.

Identifying the function of an installation during initial stages of construction is often difficult. Clearings, ground scarring, excavations, and foundations seldom provide enough indicators. The signature enabling identification is often slow in emerging, and in some cases a known signature does not develop, even though familiar indicators may be present. Periodic coverage of the target, perseverance, and attention to detail often provide an answer.

Cuba has been and is searched continually for new installations, and special vigil is maintained to detect the construction of electronics installations which could monitor missile activity at Cape Kennedy or military activity in the United States. A large, circular installation observed under construction in Cuba in 1964 attracted immediate and continuing interest because a circular scar usually connotes the construction of a direction finder. Reported initially as an "unidentified," the progress of its construction was followed closely. Suspicion that it would become an electronics installation was heightened when holes were dug (for antenna masts?) at regular intervals within the circle as seen on Figure 3A. This theory received a setback when trees were planted in the holes. Weeks passed into months, when suddenly animals appeared within the enclosure (Figure 3B). The unidentified installation was simply a cattle feeding station.

Modern architecture with its dramatic departures from conventional design often plagues interpreters in their attempt to make identification. A case in point occurred in Cuba when four odd structures were constructed atop the highest elevations of the Sierra



FIGURE 2. These long lines of excavations seen in Iran could be defense positions in depth, but in parts of the Middle East they are evidence of underground water conduit systems known as *qanats*.



FIGURE 3A. The circular configuration of the unidentified installation in Cuba suggested that an electronics installation was under construction.



FIGURE 3B. Subsequent coverage revealed that the installation is a cattle feeding station.

Maestra mountains. As seen on an aerial photograph (Figure 4), these structures resembled large parabolic dish antennas. A missile or satellite space tracking role was postulated, but the necessary powerplant or electrical transmission lines for such an installation could not be detected, and this facility was carried as unidentified for more than a year. Suspicion that it was a military installation was heightened when a helicopter was observed at the site. Great was the surprise, therefore, when the Cubans, in a September 1963 issue of the periodical *Bohemia,* unveiled the installation as Castro's Museum of the Revolution (see inset on Figure 4). Because of lack of water at the hilltop location, the roofs of the buildings had been designed by the "revolutionary" architect to trap rainwater and channel it to storage tanks.

An area where physical, cultural, and historical coherence exists presents the fewest difficulties, once the parameters for the area have been established. By the same token, areas where there is extreme physical contrast, where cultures conflict, or where a wide variety of religions are practiced, present greater difficulties, and the search must be especially thorough and intense. China, a vast area undergoing cultural and technological revolution, is unique, as are the problems it presents to interpreters.

In the immediate environs of Peking and in several other Chinese cities, large circular areas, each containing a tall tower, began to appear in the early 1960s. This was of considerable concern to intelligence because it could mean that the Chinese were deploying a sophisticated microwave communications system. On one aerial photograph, however, a white circular "glob" was discerned near the tower, as shown on Figure 5. Photographic enhancement techniques, detailed analysis, and a ground photograph (see inset, Figure 5) from a newly acquired Chinese book, *Peking Under Construction,* revealed the facilities to be parachute towers.

Photographic interpreters in the Washington area have an advantage over those in the field because a large variety of libraries, both governmental and private, are available for research purposes. Also, a large number of foreign service personnel, experts on countless facts about foreign lands, are available for consultation and often provide the solution for unidentified problems. For instance, one such officer who had lived in China solved the problem of identifying the triangular patterns (see Figure 6) seen throughout an island off

FIGURE 4. These structures in Cuba resembled parabolic dish antennas, but they turned out to be roofs of Castro's Revolution Museum, shown in the inset.



FIGURE 5. This unidentified tower in a circle could have been a Chinese electronics facility, but detailed analysis supported by a picture (inset) from a Chinese publication led to identification as a parachute tower



FIGURE 6. The triangles seen on this photograph of a Chinese island puzzled interpreters but were quickly identified by a long-time resident in the Far East as fishnets drying in the sun, as shown in the inset.

the southern coast of China. The long-time resident of the Orient easily recognized the triangles as fishnets drying in the sun.

Whenever new activity is observed at a deactivated military installation, the normal surmise is that the installation is being restored for a military role. In the early 1960s, construction of buildings was observed at four abandoned airfields in the vicinity of Canton, China. These buildings, which appeared to be for storage purposes, were constructed on the runways, as shown on Figure 7. A detailed search revealed no military activity. Nevertheless, the airfields were kept under close surveillance, and research in open source materials at various repositories was maintained. Eventually, a book published in China and entitled *Peoples Communes* provided the answer. The supposed storage buildings were hogpens, and the installations were hog communes.

The world of the average Asian ends at the horizon. Except for an occasional short trip or a rare pilgrimage, his interests are centered in the village or town where he lives. Life follows a routine of stereotyped activities, mostly concerned with his quest for a livelihood. These activities are reflected in cultural patterns visible on aerial photography, and there is a similarity in the patterns of villages, towns, and cultivated areas throughout large portions of the earth's surface. When a new pattern emerges, it is studied in depth. Such was the case when white, paddle-shaped pads were observed in a small area south of the Plain of Jars in Laos. This pattern, shown on Figure 8, has not been seen anywhere else. The function of these pads has not yet been confirmed, but people who have been in the area have suggested they are pits of wet lime used by natives to catch birds. Allegedly, "Judas" birds are placed in cages on or near the pads to call their wild friends. Birds landing on the pads become mired in the mortar-like lime, and a native then appears to catch the trapped birds. Another version is that nets are suspended over the white pads. Birds are enticed with food and "Judas" birds to come under the net. At appropriate times, the nets are dropped and the birds captured.

The use of military equipment for civilian purposes at times complicates identification. For instance, Quonset huts were originally associated exclusively with the military, but since World War II the huts have been put to a wide variety of civilian uses, both at home and abroad. Many are still used for military purposes, however,



FIGURE 7. Construction on the runways of four inactive airfields near Canton, China, was suspect as renewed military activity, but pictures from a Chinese publication (see insets) showed the airfields are now "hog communes."

FIGURE 8. These white pads observed near the Plain of Jars in Laos are unique, and identification is still in doubt. There is reason to believe that they are pits of wet lime used to trap wild birds.

FIGURE 9. This fence-secured area consists of Quonset huts arranged in a military fashion, but it is actually a poultry farm.

and the criteria for determining which are used by the military are based on factors such as location, number, arrangement, and upkeep of the huts and the existence of security measures. One such Quonset installation in the USSR, shown on Figure 9, met all the criteria for identification of a military installation. The huts are laid out neatly in military fashion and are surrounded by "security" fencing. Research, however, revealed it to be a poultry farm.

Tents are like Quonset huts in that they are firmly associated with the military but are also used for a variety of nonmilitary purposes. This creates a problem in the Middle East where military tents have been used in recent years in refugee and immigrant camps. Many of the refugee tent camps are laid out in a haphazard fashion, but those built under UN auspices have been planned to insure proper spacing for sanitary and logistical purposes, and they bear a striking resemblance to military tent camps. One such camp without collateral information would probably be identified on photography as a military installation is shown on Figure 10.

The large peoples communes in China which combine industry, agriculture, education, and military affairs are relatively easy to identify. The smaller communes in the Communist Far East, however, are a different story. Some 20 small complexes built in North Korea since the Korean War give every appearance of being military installations, such as the one shown on Figure 11. They consist of barracks-like buildings, shops, and vehicle sheds, but other facilities normally found at a military installation such as firing ranges, parade grounds, and training areas are missing. These installations were carried as unidentified until a North Korean book, *Facts About Korea,* provided a photograph of a small North Korean commune. The identification then became positive that their role was agricultural rather than military.

FIGURE 10. Tents erected in orderly rows are normally associated with a military installation; however, the tent camp shown here is a UN refugee camp in the Middle East.





FIGURE 11. This small North Korean installation was thought to be associated with the military until research revealed it to be an agricultural commune.

As has been mentioned, the existence of security measures is an indicator of a military installation, and security measures discernible on aerial photography normally are items such as fences, walls, guard posts, and strong points. In certain parts of the world, however, photographic interpreters are presented with the problem of distinguishing between military and civilian security practices. In western China, for instance, most of the farmsteads, villages, and towns are walled for protection from marauders and wild animals, and fenced enclosures for animals are often found on the open plains. Much experience and study is needed by an interpreter before he can distinguished civilian from military security patterns. For a time, certain installations in the loess country of western China presented an interpretation problem because their foundations apparantly were being built within walled enclosures. Research eventually revealed that the people of the loess country often live in cave dwellings such as are shown on Figure 12, and overhead photography of groups of such dwellings (see the inset on Figure 12) often presents deceptive or illusory imagery to the viewer.

All the foregoing examples of installations or activities initially reported as unidentified, and hundreds more, have been catalogued by photographic interpretation organizations, and many have been or will be incorporated in photographic interpretation keys dealing either with regions or with specific objects, installations, weapons systems, and activities. Such "keys" are basic manuals used by photographic interpreters and are designed both to fulfill training needs and to serve as quick reference tools. A solved U/I should never pose a problem in the future.

Because of the growing importance and scope of photographic interpretation in the national and international intelligence program, all personnel who serve in overseas posts are urged to photograph where possible and report objects and installations that could be confusing to interpreters of aerial photography. Also, those who scan and review foreign literature are urged to keep the problem of the "unidentifieds" in mind and to call the attention of photographic interpreter organizations to illustrations and articles that might help solve interpretation problems and further reduce the list of unidentifieds.

FIGURE 12. Groups of cave dwellings in the loess country of western China present an illusory appearance when seen on overhead photography as shown on the inset. Whenever a natural vertical slope is unavailable, rectangular excavations are made in flat surface, and the cave homes are then dug into the sides of the pits.

Everyone his own Sputnik watcher.

THE INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET PRESS ANNOUNCEMENTS OF "COSMOS" SATELLITE LAUNCHINGS

Edward M. Hinman

In March, 1962, the Soviet Union announced the initial successful launch in a new series of earth satellite vehicles, the so-called "Cosmos" series. A number of scientific fields were to be investigated by these satellites. Very generally, they were said to have the purpose of carrying out "a program of research in the upper layers of the atmosphere and cosmic space." It was stated that there would be a series of launches in the program from various Soviet cosmodromes. Thus far,[1] 274 space vehicles have been placed in earth orbit by the Soviet Union, all of which have been designated as Cosmos launches, and which have been lumped together under the "program of research."

The format and content of the announcement by the Soviet news agency, TASS, of the launch of the first vehicle, Cosmos-1, established a pattern which has been repeated, by and large, in the announcements of all Cosmos vehicles launched since. For each subsequent launch there has been a TASS announcement which, at first glance, has seemed to conceal the real mission of the operation. Despite the Soviet pretense of putting all the Cosmos launches in a single scientific category, the fact is that different types of satellites with various missions, scientific and military, have been launched ostensibly as part of the program that began on 16 March 1962. These have included reconnaissance satellites, recoverable and nonrecoverable scientific satellites, meteorological and navigation satellites, a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), and others.

This analysis of the announcements of all 274 Cosmos launches dwells on the variations among them in content and language with a view of determining the significance to be derived from them. Most of these events can be sorted into groups solely on the basis of the

[1] As of 24 March 1969.

MORI/HRP from pg. 21-26

similarities and differences noted in TASS announcements. These groupings or types conform to conclusions derived from classified information with remarkable consistency. It is a fact, therefore, that anyone who is interested, and who knows the hall-signs, can much more often than not identify the type of any space vehicles the Soviets have launched without benefit of additional information.

The standard TASS announcement of the launching of a Cosmos satellite invariably includes the launch date, the Cosmos number, and the following boiler-plate: "On board the sputnik scientific equipment has been placed, intended to continue the investigation of cosmic space in accordance with the program announced by TASS on 16 March 1962." [2] Finally, these statements give the orbital parameters, usually including period, apogee, perigee, and inclination.

In a majority of cases, certain other elements are also present, including a statement that the vehicle carries a radio transmitter operating on a certain frequency, specified in megahertz, as well as a statement that a radio system is aboard to measure the orbital parameters. The majority of announcements has stated that a radio telemetry system was being used to transmit data to the earth on the operation of the scientific equipment and instruments, and that "the equipment on board the sputnik is working normally," as well as that "the coordinating-computer center is processing the incoming information."

The presence or absence of these elements, and variations in orbital parameters, are the indicators identifying the category of satellite launched.

Photoreconnaissance Satellites

There have been 121 photoreconnaissance vehicles designated by TASS as "Cosmos" launches. The announcements for all of these events except one [3] included a reference to the presence of a transmitter, a radio system and a telemetry system. All of the transmitters referred to

[2] The two exceptions were Cosmos 110, which carried two dogs (the only Cosmos satellite ever to have had live animals on board), and Cosmos 261, another unique operation in that it was the only one in which the allies of the USSR were said to have participated.

[3] The one exception was Cosmos 45, which had a life of less than five days. Although there is no evidence that this vehicle was unsuccessful, its abbreviated mission does set it apart from the norm. Only the reference to a transmitter was missing.

in the announcements were said to be operating on a nominal frequency of 19.995 MHz. (Two reconnaissance satellites launched recently, Cosmos 251 and Cosmos 264, were said to have transmitters on board operating on a frequency of 19.150 MHz. These two vehicles were probably test flights of a new high-resolution reconnaissance satellite being developed.) All the announcements of the reconnaissance satellites have contained the statement concerning the normal operation of the equipment and the coordinating-computer center. A final identifier for this group of satellites is the fact that in the great majority of instances, the perigee has been in the 200-220 km range and the apogee in the 200's or 300's.

SS-X-6 (FOBS)

There have been eleven tests of the SS-X-6 system announced by TASS as Cosmos launches. These announcements have consistently omitted any reference to the presence of a transmitter, radio system, or a telemetry system on board, and have not included the usual statement that the equipment was working normally, and have made no reference to the coordinating-computer center. These have been the only Cosmos announcements omitting all these elements. The parameters also provide a clue. This is the only group of satellites for which no "orbital period" is provided, and the announced perigee is always below 150 km.

Recoverable Scientific Satellites

Ten recoverable scientific satellites have been launched given the Cosmos designation by TASS. For half of these events, including four of the last five, no problem of identification has arisen since the TASS announcements have specifically referred to animals on board, special equipment, development of new systems, or docking exercises. Seven of the announcements, including one of the two satellites in both docking operations, have included references to a transmitter, radio system, and telemetry system. The announcements of four of these seven events, and the announcement on Cosmos 238 (the only one of the group not to refer to a transmitter) provide no clues as to the type of vehicle involved. The scheduled use of a frequency of 20.008 MHz on three of the most recent operations, may serve as an indicator for future events of this type. Another possible aid can be found in the parameters which have both an apogee and perigee in the 175-300 km range.

Navigation Satellites

Seven navigation satellites and three possibly related satellites with unknown missions have been announced by TASS as Cosmos events. The announcements all have included references to radio and telemetry systems, plus the elements normally associated with a standard earth satellite vehicle. The parameters given by TASS provide the tip-off for this group. These are the only satellites launched at the announced inclination of 74 degrees, and hence can always be easily identified. In addition, these satellites tend to take orbits that are either circular or near-circular.

Maneuverable Satellites

Nine maneuverable satellites have been launched by the USSR and designated Cosmos vehicles. The first two used the SL-5 (SS-6 booster plus LUNIK third stage) launch configuration while the remainder have used the SL-11 system (SS-9 first and second stages). All nine have included a telemetry system and radio equipment, according to TASS. The first two were said to carry a transmitter as well, operating on a frequency of 19.735 MHz. This unusual frequency had been listed only once before, on Cosmos 27, which was apparently a Venus probe that failed, and is the only distinguishing feature of these announcements. Except for the four most recent, announcements concerning the seven SL-11-launched maneuverable satellites have shown no common distinguishing feature. Cosmos 248, 249, and 252, which were launched as part of an exercise in the fall of 1968, had one unique element in the announcements of their launchings. Instead of the customary radio system (*sistyema*), in all three instances reference was made to the presence of radio facilities (*sredstva*). Although the significance of this change is not clear, it is unique to these three maneuverable satellites. In addition, the TASS announcements concerning the two "active" vehicles in this operation, Cosmos 249 and 252, did not contain the usual statement on normal operation of equipment nor on the coordinating-computer center. Instead, each was described as having fulfilled its scientific research. It is of interest to note that Cosmos 217, the maneuverable satellite immediately preceding the above three, also was not said to have been operating normally, nor was there any reference made to the coordinating-computer center. Thus, it may be that these omissions will be the signs to look for in the future to identify this type of vehicle.

Meteorological Satellites

Ten meteorological satellites have been successfully launched by the USSR and designated as Cosmos events. The first five were launched from Tyuratam and the remaining five from Plesetsk. All ten have had the usual elements of a TASS-announced earth satellite vehicle (radio system and telemetry system). The first two, Cosmos 44 and 58, also reportedly carried a transmitter operating on a frequency of 19.002 MHz. As is the case with the navigation satellites, the orbital parameters appear to be the only elements of the TASS announcements that may point to the identification of this group. The last five satellites of this group have been launched at an inclination of 81 degrees, with orbits that have been circular or near-circular. The orbit tends to be in the 625-650 km range. These two items jointly may permit identification of future "Meteor" satellites.

Non-Recoverable Scientific Satellites

Approximately seventy-five non-recoverable satellites have been launched on many different missions. Over eighty percent of these employed the SL-7 (SS-4 booster) configuration. This is the type of satellite originally and legitimately covered by the announcement of March, 1962. When these satellites were first launched, the TASS announcements included all of the conventional elements, including a transmitter operating on 20, 30, or 90 MHz. For the past three years, however, there have been no references to a transmitter being present. Thus, a Cosmos satellite announcement lacking any other distinguishing clue, and which omits a reference to a transmitter on board, is likely to refer to a non-recoverable scientific satellite launched by the SL-7 configuration. If launched at an inclination of 48 degrees, the launch point was probably Kapustin Yar. If not, Plesetsk is the more likely. Finally, in these instances there tends to be a considerable difference between the announced apogee and the perigee, certainly more than for other Cosmos satellite types.

Word Order

There is one other feature of the TASS announcements which seems to provide an additional clue in the identification of some satellites, although it is difficult to offer any acceptable explanation for the clue. It involves the word order of the first sentence in the announcement. The normal opening sentence reads as follows: "On _____ in the Soviet Union there was another launch of a scientific earth satel-

lite 'Cosmos' _____." However, in thirty-two instances the sentence reads as follows: "On _____ in the Soviet Union there was a launch of another scientific earth satellite 'Cosmos' _____." There is, of course, no essential difference in the meaning of the two sentences, either in English or Russian. This variation in word order may be purely accidental or arbitrary, in which case one would not expect to find any consistency or pattern in the use of the second version. On the other hand, it may reflect some stylistic habit of the individual releasing the data to TASS, in which case one might expect to find the altered wording in the announcements of all satellites of direct concern to that person.

Six of the first seven non-recoverable satellites announcements had the second word order, as have eight additional vehicles of similar character. Since May 1966, all announcements of this group have used the standard version. Five navigation-type satellite announcements have used version two, as have all those for meteorological satellites. This seems too regular to be coincidence. Almost without exception, the launches that have been accompanied by the alternate word order are events that are largely, if not exclusively, non-military. Only the announcements of navigation and meteorological Cosmos satellites have used this order of words since Cosmos 119, a non-recoverable scientific satellite launched in May 1966.

Postscript

The interesting question, of course, is why the Soviets for so long have clung to formulae which, as we have seen, are after all not very secure—if that object is what they have in mind. This contributor has no ready answer to such a question, but would be happy to entertain any and all suggestions.

Presupposition clogs the intelligence analysis of a Soviet missile system.

THE SS-8 CONTROVERSY

David S. Brandwein

On the second of February, 1961, the Soviets test-launched a rocket on the Tyuratam range which was immediately identified as a new type. Subsequent launches in March and April made it clear that a flight test program for a new intercontinental ballistic missile had indeed begun. These events were observed with great interest by the small community of missile intelligence experts—but without tremendous surprise.

After all, by then considerable knowledge had accumulated on the first Soviet ICBM (now called the SS-6). Although much remained to be discovered about the SS-6, it was known to be a very large missile, that it almost certainly was very expensive, that it used difficult-to-handle liquid oxygen as one of its propellants, and that the Soviets would in all likelihood find this monster next-to-impossible to deploy in sufficient numbers to make it a major threat. The community thus found it natural enough that the Russians should come along with a fresh design, one which was presumably smaller and easier to transport and deploy than the SS-6, possibly even an ICBM capable of being launched from an underground silo.

At any rate, by the early spring of 1961 the missile analysts had rolled up their sleeves and plunged into an examination of all the data on this new system. It was not long before there was general agreement within the intelligence community that the new ICBM, designated the SS-7, was indeed smaller and more portable than the SS-6, had a payload of about 4,500 pounds compared to one double that size for the SS-6, and burned "storable" propellants rather than liquid oxygen.

Third ICBM?

Any smugness on the part of the analysts was dissipated, however, soon after 9 April, 1961. On that day, and again 12 days later, and in the succeeding months, the Soviets launched ICBMs from Tyuratam

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which were neither the SS-6 nor the SS-7, but another new vehicle of yet another design, later called the SS-8. Why were the Russians doing this? Why had they started development programs on two new ICBMs almost simultaneously? What was there about the third ICBM that distinguished it and justified the expense of developing it?

One group of analysts came up with a plausible hypothesis. The Soviets already had a large bird in the SS-6. The SS-7 was much smaller. The SS-8 therefore must surely have been a move in the opposite direction—to a booster larger still than the SS-6. It could have a dual mission, to serve as a carrier for a truly huge nuclear payload of tens of megatons, and as a booster for space payloads larger than those which could be orbited by the SS-6. Some confirmation of this line of thought seemed to come from the fact that the trajectory data obtained on a few early SS-8 shots were of very good quality, and their backtracks ran very close to the known location of the SS-6 launcher at Tyuratam. Photographs of this facility had shown a massive firing platform at the edge of a huge excavation, and all experts agreed that the facility could probably handle boosters considerably larger than the SS-6. So it all seemed to make a pretty good story—here was a new big missile, a mission for it to fulfill, and a facility large enough to handle it.

The rest of the intelligence community, however, had reached no firm conclusion. The major effort on the part of most analysts was to examine the telemetry records to try to deduce the characteristics of this new missile. Telemetry is of course essential in such an enterprise, but it is not easy to use it to determine the size of a missile. The situation is analogous to trying to deduce information about an automobile from readings of the instrument dials on the dashboard and nothing else. Any competent engineer could determine from these readings that the vehicle was powered by an internal combustion engine and not by a reciprocating steam engine, but it would be very difficult to decide whether the engine was Volkswagen-size or Cadillac-size.

The next milestones in the SS-8 story were reached in the fall of 1961. In October the Soviets fired two missiles to long ranges into the Pacific Ocean. For one of these firings a brief span of optical data was obtained during the time the incandescent re-entry vehicle was dropping through the atmosphere. Shortly thereafter, during the October revolution celebrations, Khrushchev started talking about

his "global rocket" and Marshal Moskalenko said that "for the Pacific trials, Soviet scientists have developed rockets that could deliver 100 million tons" (apparently referring to the yield of a nuclear warhead).

Some scientists working under contract to the Air Force were able to combine the optical data with data telemetered during re-entry to calculate the drag of the re-entry vehicle as well as other ballistic parameters related to size and shape. The net results of these calculations indicated a nose cone weighing in the neighborhood of 25,000 pounds. A re-entry vehicle that large could very nicely carry a bomb in the 100 megaton class.

This conclusion seemed to support the "big missile" synthesis of the available data on the SS-8. The Russians had started with an ICBM too clumsy to be deployed (the SS-6). They needed and had developed a smaller missile, the SS-7. Now they needed a very large, efficiently designed ICBM to carry very large bombs. Khrushchev and Moskalenko had advertised that they had such an ICBM a half-year after the start of the flight test program, presumably at about the time the development program was seen to be a success. The optical data gave a measurement of the re-entry vehicle size, and it looked to be very large indeed.

Doubts about all this were beginning to emerge, however, in the rest of the intelligence community. It was observed that there were some remarkable similarities between the propulsion telemetry of the second stage of the SS-8 and that for an upper stage of another space vehicle, the so-called "Venik" stage, used by the Soviets in 1961 as part of an interplanetary vehicle which launched their Venik probe. The significance of this association was that the Venik-stage engine was firmly estimated by the intelligence community to have a thrust of about 65,000 pounds, and this was much too low a value to be compatible with a payload in the neighborhood of 25,000 pounds.

Other analysts pointed out that the firing rate of the SS-8 seemed to be too rapid to be compatible with a very large rocket. The intervals between several of the tests seemed to be too short to be reasonable for such a rocket—in April, 1961, the third SS-8 launch came only six days after the second launch, and in June the fifth SS-8 came off the pad only three days after the fourth one. Even more perplexing was the fact that the first orbital flight by Gagarin in Vostok I took place only three days after the first SS-8 launch on the 9th of April. Was it after all reasonable to assume that the

Soviets could prepare and launch this vehicle from the same pad which had been used to launch a totally *different* vehicle only three days earlier?

Some scientists under contract also raised doubts about the validity of the analysis of the re-entry vehicle data. They pointed out that the analysis was based on the assumption that the re-entry vehicle was conical in shape with a hemispherical tip. If the nose cone were in reality more complex in form, such as the cone-cylinder-sphere shape favored in this country, then the rest of the analysis could not hold water.

Battle Joined

By the winter of 1961 the controversy had started in earnest. In some ways it came to resemble the sort of debate that peppers much scientific and scholarly literature. "A" publishes a paper giving his reconstruction of some little known event. "B" sends in a letter to the journal applauding "A's" efforts, but nevertheless pointing out that his reconstruction is somewhat naive in certain areas, and proceeding in the politest possible way to demolish "A's" thesis completely. Stung, "A" sends out a tart response attacking "B's" development. When "B" receives this he gets pretty hot under the collar and determines to squash "A", even if it means devoting all his time to the debate. By this time, the argument has attracted "C", who proceeds to propose a theory which is altogether different from those presented earlier. Meanwhile "A" and "B" have long since lost their objectivity, and have reached the point of considering the argument a personal crusade.

During 1962 each side performed exhaustive analyses of every scrap of data concerning the SS-8, and each side kept finding bits of evidence to reinforce its case or to negate that of the other side. Unfortunately, the volume of data available was too small to permit any but very tentative conclusions after making a number of unverifiable assumptions. Nevertheless, as the year 1962 wore on, positions on each side hardened considerably, and the SS-8 sizing problem became the focal point of a major analytical effort.

On one hand, it was argued that the Soviets had a requirement for a very large ICBM, and that the analyses which came up with indications of a small SS-8 were based on unverifiable assumptions, were subject to many errors, and could therefore be discounted. Opponents of this view admitted the weaknesses of each of the analyses leading

to a small SS-8 conclusion, but felt that there were enough different indicators, all pointing the same way, to permit high confidence in their judgment on the question.

Typical of the arguments which took place was the one which centered about the examination of the pressure decay of the SS-8 second-stage engine. Contract analysts had observed that the time it took for the pressure in an engine chamber to drop from its operating level to zero seemed to be proportional to the size and thrust of the engine. They collected data on a wide variety of US engines, as well as on some Soviet engines whose thrusts were known, and found that a plot of shut-down time against thrust showed a relatively smooth curve, running from 0.09 seconds for the 16,000 pound thrust Agena chamber to 0.54 seconds for the 1,500,000 pound thrust Apollo booster engine. Now, numerous measurements from telemetry of the SS-8 second-stage engine shut-down time showed it to be always between 0.16 and 0.18 seconds, and entering these values on the curve gave a thrust range for the engine between 45 and 100 thousand pounds, i.e., a *small* engine.

The advocates of the "big missile" hypothesis countered this one by pointing out that there was no physical law which governed the relationship between shut-off time and thrust, that it depended on the design of the valves used to terminate propellant flow to the engine, and that if one wanted to shut off a large engine rapidly one could do so easily. As proof they displayed some actual captive test records of an Atlas thrust chamber which had been shut down in a fraction of the normal time by substitution of a new valve design. And so it went.

Various other points of view were put forward. Telemetry analysts found a few very tenuous indicators that the SS-8 was a small missile. Still another group was unconvinced by either side, and maintained that the data were inadequate to support any conclusion. They pointed to the fact that the SS-8 displayed certain anomalous characteristics not typical of any ICBM seen hitherto. They felt that whether the SS-8 was big or little, it was certainly a different kind of missile, and that if greater efforts were given to understanding the "why" of these anomalies, then perhaps the mystery would clear up. [redacted] analysts [redacted] were concerned about some of these same peculiarities, and kept suggesting

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in a very tentative way that the SS-8 was not really an ICBM, but rather a new space launch vehicle, and only that!

Thus by early 1963, when the Board of National Estimates put out a Memo to Holders of the previous Soviet strategic weapons estimate, the community had reached a standoff, and the memo said in effect, "We believe that the U.S.S.R. is developing a high-yield warhead ICBM (the SS-8). Evidence is insufficient to resolve the question whether the SS-8 is large or small. If it is small, the SS-8 has a gross weight of about 160,000 pounds and its re-entry vehicle carries a warhead of about 3,500 pounds. If it is large, then the gross weight is about 660,000 pounds and the re-entry vehicle carries a warhead weighing about 17,500 pounds."

Arbitration

Obviously, this was a terrible way to have to write an estimate, and during 1963 pressure was applied to resolve the issue by convening some high level panels which presumably could get all the facts laid out, do some head-knocking, and reach a judgment. There were in fact three major meetings at which the issue was debated. First there was a meeting held under the auspices of the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) of the US Intelligence Board. This took place in the spring of 1963 on "neutral ground" in Huntsville, Alabama and involved a three-day debate between the protagonists before the members of GMAIC. Nothing much was accomplished—neither side would give an inch.

For the second major meeting, held in the summer of 1963 in Los Angeles, a group of six eminent civilian scientists was empaneled under the chairmanship of Dr. Marvin Stern, then a Vice President at North American Aviation Corporation. This group heard all the evidence during a week-long session, and came out with some conclusions which pleased neither side, but which at least made a start in the direction of resolving the argument. The Stern Panel said, in effect, that they did not believe the SS-8 was as large as the Air Force suggested, even though they agreed that a Soviet requirement for a vehicle that large probably existed. They also cited indications that the second-stage engine was small, probably in the Venik class, and if so, the payload weight of the SS-8 could only be four to five thousand pounds.

A sidelight of the Stern Panel session was that they looked at SS-7 information as well, and they decided that the data on this ICBM was really not much better qualitatively or quantitatively than that which was available on the SS-8, and there was no strong basis for being so sure the SS-7 was small. However, the intelligence community had been *expecting* to see a small ICBM when the SS-7 test program was begun, and therefore no debate occurred on the point. Indeed, if the SS-8 test program had started *before* the SS-7, then there might very well have been a great debate on the size of the SS-7.

The third major meeting of 1963 was a meeting of the Hyland Panel in September. Chaired by Lawrence Hyland, the General Manager of the Hughes Aircraft Co., this group had been acting in an advisory capacity to the USIB for a number of years. The meeting was timed to take place a little before formal consideration of a new Soviet strategic weapons estimate by USIB. Although other subjects were discussed, the major focal point was the SS-8. Dr. Stern participated and presented the prior findings of his panel, and briefers from Air Force, CIA, and other agencies ventilated all the old arguments as well.

The result was that the Hyland Panel concurred in the previous finding that the SS-8 was small. By this time, the Army had also decided that the SS-8 was small, and the new estimate draft reflected these judgments.

Thus, in mid-October 1963 the USIB approved a new Soviet strategic weapons estimate in which the SS-8 was described as having about the same payload capability as the SS-7 (i.e., a small missile). The Air Force and DIA took exception to this in a footnote, insisting that the evidence did not exclude the possibility that the SS-8 carried a nose cone weighing 10,000 pounds or a little more—in effect, a retreat, but not total surrender by the proponents of a big SS-8.

From this point on, the SS-8 controversy gradually died down. It had become apparent by the end of 1963 that the SS-8 was being deployed by the Soviets in only token numbers compared to the numbers of SS-7 ICBMs being fielded, and this meant that the question of the size of the SS-8 was becoming somewhat academic. Furthermore, in November, 1963, and April, 1964, the Soviets began flight testing two new ICBMs, the SS-9 and the SS-10, and the study of these new systems naturally preoccupied the analysts.



The SS-8 unveiled. Moscow, November, 1964.

The final episode came in November, 1964. For their annual October Revolution Parade, the Soviets introduced a new missile which they described as an ICBM (See photograph) and which was given the name "SASIN" by NATO. A comparison of the size and shape of the SASIN with the estimated characteristics of every known Soviet ICBM made it perfectly clear that the SASIN could only be the SS-8, and that its re-entry vehicle weight had to be between 3,000 and 4,000 pounds. The "big missile" advocates threw in the towel at last, and estimates written in 1965 and since have indicated no disagreement on the SS-8.

Postscript

Two observations suggest themselves about the SS-8 story, one concerning the analysis process, and the other the use of high-level panels. Reduced to essentials, the argument was between one group which insisted that the most important consideration was the Soviet requirement for a new weapon system, and a second group for which indications from the data without regard to a presumed requirement were the most important factors. In this instance, the latter approach was clearly the better one, and this author is inclined to think this is

generally the case. Even if the data seem to point in a direction contrary to preconceived notion, the analyst usually is better off to pursue his leads from the data as objectively as he can.

Second, here was a case in which an outside panel performed a definite service. When two strong-willed groups divide over an issue and debate it over a long period of time, it is too much to expect that either side is going to be converted easily by reviews of its own or the other side's arguments. An objective group needs to be called in to arbitrate. Such a group should be composed of individuals whose judgments will command respect. It is equally as important to give such a panel enough time to allow it to dig into the data. This is not possible in a session lasting only a day or two. Moreover, the panel members should be shielded from distraction by other matters during their deliberation. This was the situation for the panel headed by Dr. Stern—they stayed in session for a whole week, and all the members dropped virtually all "outside" activities during this time. And the deadlock was broken.

Notes from the literary underground.

THE CASE AGAINST SOLZHENITSYN

Roger W. McGuffey

The Russian terms "intelligentsia" and "opposition" have long been synonymous. Under both tsarist and Soviet rule, the intelligentsia has therefore been an object of repression aimed at eliminating real or fancied threats to the authoritarian order. Yet the call for an end to injustice, censorship, and the deprivation of rights has never been entirely stilled in the pages of Russia's literary classics and underground journals. Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and Pasternak were the chroniclers of the evils of an oppressed society. Often, their message was cloaked in allegory, but they wrote about Russia for Russians, and no Russian could fail to understand what they had to say. During Khrushchev's years another Russian literary giant emerged to assume the mantle of Tolstoy and Pasternak, and is today acknowledged as Russia's only living "classic." His name is Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn.

Downfall and Rehabilitation

Solzhenitsyn's literary genius was forged in Stalin's camps. After graduating from the University of Rostov in 1941 with a degree in mathematics and physics, he joined the Soviet Army, was sent to military school, and eventually rose to the rank of captain at the front. Decorated twice for bravery, Solzhenitsyn made the grave error of criticizing Stalin in a letter to a comrade. The letter was intercepted, Solzhenitsyn was denounced, and in 1945 was sentenced to eight years at hard labor. He completed his term, but was sentenced without trial to an additional three years of Siberian exile. Solzhenitsyn is quite sure that his imprisonment would have continued forever had he not been granted amnesty (along with thousands of others) after the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956.

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Solzhenitsyn experienced a personal catharsis in the camps: he witnessed how human beings could be stripped of integrity, moral code, and hope, yet find their souls. He emerged from the hell of

the camps with an obsessive need to tell the truth as he had seen it, to reveal the horror to its full extent, and to paint a picture so terrible yet so real that the Russian people would never allow Stalinism to be resurrected. Rehabilitated in 1957, he settled in Ryazan and found a position as a teacher of mathematics. Until quite recently he continued to live there, in a small flat above a garage which he himself converted into living quarters. There he began to set down the words of his first novel, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,* words he had memorized while in the camps and carried with him ever since. *Ivan Denisovich* is a short novel about everyday life in a typical Stalinist labor camp of the late forties. It is also the portrait of the simple Russian fool caught helplessly in the machinery of corrupt power, who through his own eternal innocence, manages to find happiness in being allotted an extra slice of bread on one sunny day.

Solzhenitsyn's manuscript was submitted to Alexander Tvardovsky, editor-in-chief of the most liberal of sanctioned Soviet journals, *Novy Mir.* Tvardovsky has the ability to sense the limits of what will be tolerated, and he has championed the works of some of the most talented writers in the Soviet Union. During the freeze and thaw of Khrushchev's cultural policy after the Twentieth Congress, Tvardovsky managed to introduce such now-famous figures as Yevtushenko by publishing their works at propitious periods. Tvardovsky has caused sensations by printing unorthodox stories and essays in *Novy Mir,* reportedly without submitting them to the official organ of Soviet censorship, *Glavlit.*[1]

Tvardovsky knew at once that he had read a modern Russian classic in *Ivan Denisovich.* He also knew that Khrushchev was then fighting a battle in the party against opponents of his de-Stalinization program. Tvardovsky sent Solzhenitsyn's manuscript to Khrushchev himself, who sensed an opportunity to further his own political aims, and personally authorized the publication of *Ivan Denisovich* in the November, 1962 issue of *Novy Mir.* It caused an immediate sensation, and the original printing was sold out within days. For the first time, a novel describing actual conditions in Stalin's camps had been published in the Soviet Union.

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[1] According to a well-informed source, Tvardovsky has done this on several occasions, including the case of Kardin's exposé of the Aurora incident, *Legendy i Fakty* (Legends and Facts), in 1965.

For a time after the appearance of *Ivan Denisovich,* Solzhenitsyn's lot improved. Several of his short stories were printed. *Ivan Denisovich* was published in the West in many translations, and he even received foreign royalties on the book. Yet Solzhenitsyn cannot have been deceived by the sudden improvement in his fortunes; he of all people had reason to know all too well the reactionary nature of the Soviet party and government hierarchy. He must have realized that powerful forces within the country, particularly the organs of state security, had immediately recognized the dangerous consequences of the publication of *Ivan Denisovich* and had singled him out as a target for repression. His camp experience had acquainted him with the basic *modus operandi* employed by the KGB against intellectuals—the network of informers, provocateurs, surveillants, and plants. Moreover, many of the men who had served Stalin's terror still served in high positions. The mail censor during the forties who had denounced Solzhenitsyn and caused his imprisonment, Aleksey Romanov, now headed the State Committee for Cinematography.

The Gathering Storm

After 1962, conditions for Soviet intellectuals became worse and worse. Khrushchev's failures in the Cuban missile crisis and the virgin lands program helped persuade him to reverse his cultural policies once again, and he denounced many of the liberal writers and artists he had earlier endorsed. Within two years after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, it became apparent that the regime of Brezhnev and Kosygin intended to repress entirely the liberalism that 1956 had touched off. In 1965, Brezhnev made a positive reference to Stalin in a speech. Histories, fictional works, and ideological treatises which cited Stalin unfavorably were suppressed. Many frightened intellectuals, among them prominent cultural and scientific figures such as Maya Plisetskaya and academician A. D. Sakharov, appealed to the Politburo on the eve of the 23rd Party Congress in 1966 against any rehabilitation of Stalin.

The Soviet intelligentsia reacted to increased waves of repressions and reprisals with creative vigor and talent. They discovered loopholes in the supposedly impenetrable wall of official censorship. Writers found they could get articles published in Central Asian literary journals which would never have gotten past the Moscow censors. Since unauthorized reproduction of literary material on presses or mimeographs was forbidden, intellectuals reproduced their

unpublished manuscripts on typewriters or even by hand, a process which came to be known as *Samizdat*.[2] Trustworthy individuals collected stories of *Samizdat* manuscripts, harbored them in secret rooms, and permitted friends to visit these "libraries" for short periods of time each day.[3] Realizing that their mail was opened, their telephones tapped, and their movements constantly watched, some of the most active dissident intellectuals developed open codes by which to communicate news of recent manuscripts, arrests of friends, and messages from abroad to their compatriots.

Solzhenitsyn has had nothing published in his homeland since 1964, but he remains by far the most important writer in the Soviet Union. Though his latest works remain unpublished at home, they are widely read, and are the most frequently reproduced works of *Samizdat*. His novels, *Cancer Ward* and *The First Circle*, circulate in hundreds of typewritten copies and are avidly sought after by Soviets of all classes and callings. Both were published in the West in 1968. In *Cancer Ward*, completed in 1967, Solzhenitsyn describes the fates of the patients in a Central Asian hospital society. The novel, like all of Solzhenitsyn's work, is intensely autobiographical, and is based on the author's own experiences in a Tashkent cancer hospital after his Siberian exile.[4]

The First Circle, believed to have been completed in 1964, is an acknowledged masterpiece, a realistic novel by a writer who possesses rare insight into the minds and souls of his fellow men. The myriad characters of *The First Circle* reflect most of the prototypes of the Stalin era—the Communist whose unjust arrest fails to dim his ardor for Marxism-Leninism; the party official who serves the terror only to be swallowed up by it; the intellectual who finds his spiritual freedom only after he has been deprived of personal freedoms; the informer; the girl camp-employee, who falls in love with a prisoner because he represents humanity in a dehumanized world; the list goes on and on. The scene of the novel is a special camp, a "sharashka,"

[2] Literally, self-publishing; a play on the official term *Gosizdat*, or State Publishing House.

[3] One of the largest of the *Samizdat* libraries is said to be in the apartment of Korney Chukovsky, one of the oldest and most respected liberal Soviet writers.

[4] Reports concerning Solzhenitsyn's cancer are conflicting. Some sources claim he was cured at Tashkent; others maintain that the tumor was not completely arrested, and that Solzhenitsyn still suffers from the disease.

where political prisoners possessing technical skills are put to work developing special devices for the MGB (now the KGB). The system is self-serving; the prisoners earn the right to the privileges of the sharashka, e.g., better clothing, more nourishing food, by developing means to catch more prisoners for the camp apparatus. The camp, as described by Solzhenitsyn, closely resembles the MGB technical laboratories at Pushkino near Moscow, which were described by a CIA source who had been imprisoned there.[5] Solzhenitsyn himself served the first part of his sentence in such a camp, and all of the characters in his novel are drawn from life. The character Rubin, for example, was modeled on Lev Kopelev, Soviet literary critic and Germanist, who was ousted from Party membership in 1968 when the Austrian Communist journal *Tagebuch* published his letter attacking the signs of resurgent Stalinism in the USSR.

As a novelist, Solzhenitsyn presents a special danger to the forces of repression. More than any other writer in today's Russia, Solzhenitsyn "tells it like it was" and is. His novels, though set in the late forties, and early fifties, reveal that the virus of Stalinism did not perish with Stalin's death, but infects the whole of Soviet society today. People resembling the most despicable characters in his novels can be found in the highest organs of Soviet party and government. There is hardly a Russian family today that did not lose a husband, son, or brother to the camps. Countless Russians can identify and empathize with Solzhenitsyn's characters, reliving the agonies of an era they might otherwise wish to forget. This is in fact Solzhenitsyn's crusade—to reveal the truth about Stalinism, to arouse the Soviet masses from their torpor, and alert them to the growing dangers that today's trials, arrests, and imprisonments portend. As Solzhenitsyn stated in a letter to the Writers Union in November 1967, every Russian to some degree must bear responsibility for the Stalin era.

Solzhenitsyn presumably realizes, of course, that in order to further his cause his works must be published. At present, however, and probably for years to come it is unlikely that any of his works will be published in the Soviet Union. It is not only the subject matter of his novels that has forced the authorities to proscribe his books. Solzhenitsyn is the champion of the dissident intelligentsia, the restless youth, and the literary underground. College students risk arrest in

[5] Among Pushkino's many prisoners of note was Alexander Rado, one of the key Soviet agents in pre-World War II Europe. See *Studies* XII, 3, p. 41.

order to reproduce and disseminate his novels. Thousands of good wishes were mailed to him on his 50th birthday. After *Literary Gazette* attacked him in June 1968, over 5,000 protest letters were written in his behalf.

Reaction

Moreover, the leadership of the USSR Union of Writers is still in the hands of party hacks like Fedin, Surkov, and Korneychuk. These reactionaries support the policy of socialist realism because it is the approved orthodoxy. Moreover, they were personally involved in wrecking the careers of fellow writers, causing them to be sent to labor camps and possibly to their deaths. A man such as Solzhenitsyn, who has never compromised his principles, who will not bend either to disease or repression, and who possesses genius, deflates their self-importance. They fear him and they will not permit his works to appear in print. As Surkov stated in a meeting of the Writers Union Secretariat in September 1967: if Solzhenitsyn's novels were to be published, "they would be used against us, and (they) would be more dangerous than Svetlana's memoirs. . . . the works of Solzhenitsyn are more dangerous to us than those of Pasternak; Pasternak was a man divorced from life, while Solzhenitsyn, with his animated, militant, ideological temperament, is a man of principle."

In order to discredit Solzhenitsyn, the regime has set the KGB against him. Since 1964, Solzhenitsyn has been subjected to a campaign of slander, harassment, fabrication, and even physical threats. In 1965, KGB agents entered the Moscow apartment of a friend of Solzhenitsyn's named Teysh, and confiscated manuscripts which the author had entrusted to Teysh for safekeeping. Among the manuscripts was a copy of *The First Circle* and the only extant copy of a play Solzhenitsyn had written in the camps in 1949, *Feast of the Conquerors*. The play was a work Solzhenitsyn had long disclaimed, and which he described as "bearing no relationship whatsoever to my present works. . . . this play was not written by Solzhenitsyn, but by nameless prisoner SH-232 in those distant years when there was no return to freedom for those arrested under the political article. . . . (it) bears the stamp of the desperation of the camps." Nevertheless, despite Solzhenitsyn's repudiation of the play, copies of the manuscript were reproduced and submitted to the board of the Union of Writers. The board members later used the anti-Soviet content of *Feast of the Conquerors* (criticism of the Soviet Army's performance in World

War II, for example) to condemn Solzhenitsyn at a meeting in 1967. Some members used the play as a basis to demand the author's expulsion from the Union. Publication of *The First Circle* was prevented by confiscation.

Rumors and lies about Solzhenitsyn were spread by KGB plants. His war record was questioned; he was branded a coward; he was said to have betrayed his country in a German POW camp. High officials slandered Solzhenitsyn publicly. Zimyanin, editor of *Pravda,* called him a "schizophrenic who was taking out his revenge upon the government through his literary works." Former KGB Minister Semichastny himself made a statement against him, asserting that "Solzhenitsyn is materially supporting the capitalist world; else why doesn't he claim his rights (i.e., collect his royalties) from someone or other for his well-known book?" Solzhenitsyn replied: "This is a farce; whoever collects fees from the West has sold out to the capitalists; whoever does not take the fees is materially supporting them. And the third alternative? To fly into the sky."

Despite his jocular remark in response to Semichastny's statement, Solzhenitsyn obviously knows full well the dangers to which Western publication of his novels has exposed him. Solzhenitsyn's works are hot properties in Western publishing circles, and the KGB has tried to exploit this fact to its own advantage. The KGB's experience in the case of Svetlana's memoirs, when they released an unauthorized version in the West and succeeded in rushing its publication there to prevent the book's appearance at the time of the 50th anniversary of the Revolution, had showed them that they could inhibit publication by creating copyright disputes.

The Tangled Story of Cancer Ward

In the case of Solzhenitsyn's *Cancer Ward,* the KGB initially hoped to prevent publication of the novel in the Soviet Union. By causing it to be published first in the West by a publisher claiming to have the author's permission, the KGB hoped to build an emotional case charging "disloyalty" on Solzhenitsyn's part in preferring foreign publication. These charges, combined with the threat of prosecution for "slander" of Soviet society as in the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, could be expected to deter both potential publishers and readers in the Soviet Union. Solzhenitsyn was aware of the game the KGB was playing, and knew how to play it himself. He had learned that a certain Yuriy

Krayskiy, an Italian of Russian descent, had obtained a *Samizdat* copy of *Cancer Ward* and was taking it to Italy. Solzhenitsyn did not trust Krayskiy and feared he was working with the KGB. Solzhenitsyn sent a letter to the Board of the Writers Union urging the immediate publication of *Cancer Ward* in the Soviet Union: (The book) "has already appeared in hundreds of typewritten copies. . . . I apprised the Board that we should make haste to publish the novel if we wish to see it appear first in Russian, that under the circumstances we cannot prevent its unauthorized appearance in the West."

Novy Mir editor Tvardovsky, himself a member of the Board of the Union of Writers, urged the publication of *Cancer Ward* in his own journal. After much haggling, authorization was obtained from the Central Committee to set *Cancer Ward* in print for the December 1967 issue. At the last minute, however, after the galley proofs were finished, Fedin appealed to Brezhnev, stating that if *Cancer Ward* were to be published, his own authority to enforce orthodoxy within the Writers Union would be undermined. The December issue of *Novy Mir* was postponed and *Cancer Ward* was eliminated from its pages. The printed pages containing the novel were piled in the courtyard of *Pravda*'s printing plant and set ablaze.

Within a month after *Novy Mir*'s December issue appeared without *Cancer Ward*, Solzhenitsyn's prediction that the novel would be published in the West came true. *Il Saggiatore*, a subsidiary of the reputable Italian firm Mondadori, published the first part of *Cancer Ward* in a limited Russian-language edition, attributing it to an anonymous author.[6] Mondadori's Russian edition was the first in a series of publications of Solzhenitsyn's novels by Western publishing houses attempting to establish copyrights without producing proof of Solzhenitsyn's authorization. All of these attempts were unsuccessful, and Solzhenitsyn himself publicly repudiated any Western claims to his authorization. In April 1968, Solzhenitsyn sent the following message to *Literary Gazette*: "I would like to state that no foreign publisher has received from me either the manuscript of this novel or permission to publish it. Thus I do not recognize as legal any publication of this novel without my authorization in present or in future, and I do not grant the copyright to anyone."

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[6] It is not certain whether Mondadori obtained its copy of the manuscript from Krayskiy or whether it obtained a copy of the *Novy Mir* galley proofs.

At about the time that the Mondadori Russian edition appeared, another manuscript of the first part of *Cancer Ward* was acquired by a British publisher from Alexander Dolberg, who writes for *The Sunday Times* of London under the name David Burg. Dolberg is a Soviet defector of the mid-nineteen fifties, who is considered by many specialists in Soviet affairs to be responsive to KGB influence. Dolberg claimed to have received the manuscript from a Slovak literary critic, Pavel Licko, who had written an article about Solzhenitsyn in a Bratislava periodical which later published excerpts from *Cancer Ward.* Licko's complimentary story about Solzhenitsyn helped to establish his credentials in the eyes of certain Western publishers. However, three unrelated CIA sources have alleged that Licko, who had been a political officer in the Soviet Army during World War II, was in fact a Soviet agent. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Licko attempted to get a Western publication to print a fabricated story about Solzhenitsyn which, had it been published, could have been used by the Soviet government to charge Solzhenitsyn with high treason. Among other things, Licko claimed that Solzhenitsyn was the leader of an organized and armed political conspiracy to overthrow the Soviet government.[7]

In February 1968, a copy of the entire *Cancer Ward* manuscript (including parts one and two) arrived in France via a channel involving Westerners and Soviets believed to be completely reliable. In view of the other, unauthorized Western editions of *Cancer Ward* (several possibly engineered by KGB operatives) it may be that either Solzhenitsyn or his friends intended a complete, uncut version of the novel to be published in the Russian language by a reputable Western firm. In contrast to the British publisher, who had obtained *Cancer Ward* from Dolberg and Licko, the French publisher made no claim to having been granted Solzhenitsyn's permission to publish.[8]

In April 1968, the Russian émigré organization NTS, via its journal *Grani,* mounted one of the most effective countermoves to thwart the KGB's efforts to use Western publication of *Cancer Ward* against Solzhenitsyn. *Grani* sent the following telegram to Tvardovsky: "THIS IS TO INFORM YOU THAT THE COMMITTEE OF STATE SE-

[7] In February and March 1968, over twenty students and professors at Leningrad University were convicted of high treason. Interestingly enough, the charges against them were quite similar to those levelled by Licko against Solzhenitsyn.

[8] This is the edition published by YMCA Press in Paris.

CURITY, ACTING THROUGH VICTOR LOUIS, HAS SENT ONE MORE COPY OF CANCER WARD TO THE WEST, IN ORDER THUS TO BLOCK ITS PUBLICATION IN NOVY MIR. ACCORDINGLY WE HAVE DECIDED TO PUBLISH THIS WORK IMMEDIATELY." The telegram evoked a stinging response from Solzhenitsyn who wrote still another letter to the Writers Union Board, demanding that they clarify the role played by the KGB in the foreign dissemination of *Cancer Ward*, identify Victor Louis, and indicate whether the telegram was in fact sent by the editors of *Grani*. Added Solzhenitsyn: "This episode compels us to reflect on the terrible and dark avenues by which the manuscripts of Soviet writers can reach the West. It constitutes an extreme reminder to us that literature must not be brought to such a state where literary works become a profitable commodity for any scoundrel who happens to have a travel visa. The work of our authors must be printed in their own country and must not become the plunder of foreign publishing houses."

In the end, the fact that a plethora of *Cancer Ward* manuscripts had reached the West probably thwarted the KGB's efforts. The one publisher to claim that it had the author's permission was the British house which had obtained its manuscript via Dolberg and Licko. The British edition, however, originally contained only the first part of *Cancer Ward*, a fact which tended to undermine the claim to authorization. Other publishers in various Western nations were more sensitive to Solzhenitsyn's precarious position, and declined to claim his permission to publish. The British publisher, however, attempted to bring suit against a competing English-language edition published in the United States. The suit was disallowed in a British court for lack of jurisdiction.

The Next Act

The First Circle, which is a much more specific indictment of the Soviet system than is *Cancer Ward*, was never considered for publication in the Soviet Union, although it continues to circulate by *Samizdat*. As far as is known, only two manuscripts of *First Circle* reached the West. Both were published by firms sincerely interested in the author's welfare, who handled their respective publications with great discretion. Neither firm appears to have acquired its manuscript via a channel controlled by the KGB. The principal publisher, Harper and Row, succeeded in keeping the fact of its forthcoming edition secret until the translation was virtually complete. This allowed the firm time to

discourage other publishers from making competing translations. It may well be that the KGB did not know in advance of the plans to publish *The First Circle* in the West and thus was unable to attempt to confound it. In any event, no complications similar to those involving *Cancer Ward* occurred.

In addition to the machinations employed by the KGB to impede or otherwise confound publication of Solzhenitsyn's works, it has since June 1968 increased its efforts to discredit him publicly and harass him privately. Licko's activities have already been described. In June 1968, *Literary Gazette*, the newspaper of the USSR Union of Writers, denounced Solzhenitsyn in a full page editorial. Solzhenitsyn's assertions that his house in Ryazan had been searched were dismissed as lies, and he was accused of allowing his name to be used against the Soviet Union by its enemies. The newspaper charged him with "attacking the principles which guide Soviet literature," violating "general norms of behavior" by circulating his works privately, and refusing "to declare openly his decision to break all relations with the provocateurs, enemies of our country." The newspaper made quite clear that Solzhenitsyn's latest works would not be published in the Soviet Union. *Cancer Ward* was dismissed as "requiring serious revision in the ideological sense." *The First Circle* was branded "a malicious libel on our system."

Rumors about Solzhenitsyn continued to be spread. He was reported at various times to have defected to England and to have fled on a tourist visa to the United Arab Republic. To make matters worse, he lost his teaching job in Ryazan. His wife, Natal'ya, whose income supported them after Solzhenitsyn's dismissal, lost her job as well and was stricken with an extreme case of arthritis. Reliable sources in the West received word that Solzhenitsyn was in dire straits. Western publishers, however, fortunately have not attempted to send him royalties from publication of his forbidden novels. To do so would be to provide the KGB a pretext for charging Solzhenitsyn as a paid agent of Western *provacateurs*. Solzhenitsyn himself has refused countless gifts and packages sent from abroad. According to one source, the post office in Ryazan has an entire room filled with packages addressed to him.

In December 1968, word reached the West that friends of Solzhenitsyn feared for his life. They said that bands of toughs constantly gathered around Solzhenitsyn's home, taunted and harassed

him, and even made threats against his life. Solzhenitsyn's friends feared he would be cut down and the crime dismissed as an incident of hooliganism. Soon afterward, Solzhenitsyn moved to a village within 50 kilometers of Moscow.

Despite its evidently considerable efforts, the KGB has been unable to discredit Solzhenitsyn's reputation in the eyes of his fellow Soviet intellectuals. The publication of his novels in the West has brought Solzhenitsyn worldwide fame. If he were now to be arrested, a great spontaneous protest from Western intellectuals, scholars, and even Communists would be directed against the Soviet authorities. Thus, in the fall of 1968, the KGB brought out another trump card, their most notorious covert action agent, the ubiquitous Victor Louis.

Victor Louis is the man who in 1967 attempted to peddle an unauthorized edition of Svetlana's memoirs, complete with pornographic photographs, to various Western publishers. Under cover as a journalistic stringer for a London newspaper, Louis travels throughout the world, to countries another Soviet could never dream of visiting. In October 1968, for instance, Louis was the first Soviet visitor to Taiwan in twenty years. While on the island he was granted private audiences with the Generalissimo and his son, and reportedly made non-official overtures to the Nationalist Chinese from the Soviet government.

Louis was arrested for blackmarketeering in the fifties (after Stalin's death) and served several years in labor camps. CIA sources who knew him in the camps say he has been, and is, an informer, scoundrel, and homosexual. It may very well be that Solzhenitsyn met him in a camp in Kazakhstan, for the despicable character Siromakha in *The First Circle* appears to be almost a portrait of Victor Louis.

Given the assignment of smearing Solzhenitsyn. Louis traveled to Ryazan in September 1968, on the heels of a *Time* magazine crew preparing a cover story on the author. When Solzhenitsyn discovered Louis' identity, he kicked him out and refused to talk to him. Unperturbed, Louis fabricated an interview with Solzhenitsyn and attempted to peddle it to British and American newspapers. Louis also offered photographs of Solzhenitsyn (obviously taken with a telephoto lens) which showed the author in several embarrassing situations. The "interview" itself is a clever, yet ill-disguised attempt to discredit Solzhenitsyn's reputation as a writer and a champion of human rights. Louis portrays Solzhenitsyn as a man obsessed with the camps, a subject Louis says he believes is better forgotten as an unfortunate aber-

ration belonging to the past. Louis cleverly seconds *Literary Gazette's* accusation that Solzhenitsyn has refused to protest the use of his name by Western propagandists. Moreover, Louis suggests that Solzhenitsyn's works have no great literary value, that their literary appeal is strictly sensationalistic, and that their author is a whining, chronic complainer with a martyr complex.

Despite his efforts, Louis' interview remained unsold for six months until the *Washington Post* fell for it and published it in its 16 March 1969 issue. The interview has not, however, received significant re-play worldwide. Moreover, most readers with a basic knowledge of the situation confronting Soviet intellectuals will not be fooled by Louis' veiled slanders.

Like the Russian novelists before him who represented the conscience of their people, Solzhenitsyn continues to write despite adversity, persecution, and ill health. There are rumors he has completed another novel, *Arkhipelag Gulag,* reportedly the third work of a trilogy begun with *Cancer Ward* and *The First Circle.* If a copy of the manuscript reaches the West, its appearance will be greeted with still another wild publishing skirmish on the part of Western firms. Soviets will read it surreptitiously, in private *Samizdat* libraries and under their pillows at night; for it will not be published officially in the USSR.

It is impossible even to surmise what fate awaits Solzhenitsyn. A careless statement by a Western publisher claiming his authorization, a plot based on circumstantial evidence alleging his participation in a treasonous conspiracy, a hooligan's "accident,"—any of these could mean imprisonment or even death for Solzhenitsyn. Yet whatever his future, Solzhenitsyn's place in Russian literature is assured; he may come to be regarded as the greatest writer the Soviet Union has produced. Ironically, he was produced not by the USSR's progress, but by its reaction. Solzhenitsyn himself outlined his course in life in a letter to the Writers Union in May 1967: "I am confident that I will fulfill my duty as a writer under all circumstances—even more successfully and unchallenged from the grave than in my lifetime. No one can bar the road to truth, and to advance its cause I am prepared to accept even death. But may it be that repeated lessons will finally teach us not to stop the writer's pen during his lifetime?"

A fresh look at an oft-told story.

THE ROTE DREI: GETTING BEHIND THE "LUCY" MYTH

Mark A. Tittenhofer

The reasons for re-examining the 25 years old matter of the Rote Drei and Rudolph Roessler—the "Lucy" of the Soviet espionage operation in Switzerland during World War II—are not simple.* To be sure, *Studies* reviewers have pointed out that much of the public literature on the subject is unreliable. Concern for historical rectitude alone, however, would not justify the expenditure of our time and effort. The profession of intelligence may owe some duty to Clio, but it cannot be said to be the general one of cleansing all confusions and deliberate disinformation from the public record about intelligence matters.

Apart from the possible substantive benefits of clearing up the story of the Red Three and its members, however, there are certain concrete circumstances surrounding it that ought to attract our notice. The first is that it continues to be treated as a matter of some contemporary concern in certain interesting quarters. The second is that the Soviets evidently think it is important. With regard to the first point, it is perhaps sufficient to recall that the 20th of July movement against Hitler—from which much of the Rote Drei's best information emanated—remains the object of deeply divided public feelings in both Germanies to this day. Moreover, for different reasons the Rote Drei is, as we shall see, regarded with considerable sensitivity elsewhere on the Continent, particularly in Switzerland.

Yet it is Moscow's attitude that is most striking. Readers of *Studies in Intelligence* will recall Louis Thomas' recent essay on the career of the Hungarian collector of cartographic intelligence, Alexander Rado,[1] in which we were reminded that Rado was resident director

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**Editor's Note. This article is an abridgement of a longer study of the Rote Drei. The portions omitted in this version mainly concern biographical and other details relating to the sources and sub-sources of the principals in the organization.*

[1] *Studies* XII, 3, p. 41.

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of the Soviet apparatus in Switzerland while the Rote Drei was operating. Rado has publicly indicated the intention to publish a personal memoir that will lay to rest the "stab in the back" theory of the Nazi debacle. Thomas correctly infers that this curious announcement must have had some direct relationship to thinking in Moscow. We are therefore surely right to believe that we are to hear more about the Rote Drei, and that we would be wise to equip ourselves in advance with the appropriate intellectual baggage. Whatever Rado places on the record is likely to be elaborately confusing.

The Radio Messages Examined

Any useful, accurate account of the Rote Drei must start with the radio traffic exchanged between the Center in Moscow and the network in Switzerland. The first question is quantitative: how many messages did the traffic contain?[2] Wilhelm F. Flicke, a German cryptanalyst who worked on the traffic during the war, estimated the total at some 5,500, about five a day for three years. This estimate is not unreasonable. When Edmond and Olga Hamel, two of the Rote Drei operators, were arrested by the Swiss police on 9 October 1943, a total of 129 messages was found in their flat. A comparison of these with those in other holdings has shown that 40 appear elsewhere and 89 are unique. The 40 matching messages were all transmitted between 3 September and 5 October 1943. If it is assumed that the remaining 89 were also sent to Moscow during the same period, as seems probable, then it can also be surmised that 129 is the average number of transmissions per month. There have been a number of claims that the Red Three network was functioning before the war, and that Lucy, as Rudolf Roessler was called, gave Moscow advance warning of Hitler's attack. The traffic proves, however, that Sissy (Rachel Duebendorfer) did not establish a clandestine association with Taylor (Christian Schneider) and Lucy until the late summer of 1942. Our best estimate of the life-span of the Rote Drei operation—that is, the period during which the Swiss net exchanged W/T communications with Moscow—is 33 months, from August 1941 to May 1944. If 129 was a typical month's total, the sum of all messages sent

[2] There is some difficulty with the term message, because some holdings present as one unit what others treat as two or more.

was about 4,250.[3] For the reasons given in the footnote below, 5,000 seems an acceptable estimate of the total volume.

From various sources we have pulled together 437 messages that appear authentic.[4] This collection, unfortunately, contains only 8 per cent of the presumed total. For this reason we are obliged to be circumspect when drawing from the traffic any quantitative conclusions. What is more important, the riddles resolved by the 8 per cent are cause to believe that the remaining mysteries, or most of them, could be solved with the aid of the missing 92 per cent.

This account of the Rote Drei is drawn chiefly from the radio messages. Supplementary research in classified files has yielded additional information. Although there are still gaps in our knowledge, we can at least present the first account of the Red Three that is not based chiefly on speculation, fantasy, and falsification.

Our collection of messages contains references to 55 sources. Most of them, of course, are listed only by a cover name. Of these 55 we can identify 15 with certainty and make educated guesses about 16 more. The remaining 24 appear rarely and inconspicuously. We also know the identities of some persons associated with the Rote Drei who do not appear in the traffic.

Digging out the facts and telling the story would have been decidedly easier if so much misinformation about the subject had not been published in the past. Even the name "The Red Three," a German appellation based on the number of transmitters or operators serving the network, is misleading, because at times there were four and even five.

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[3] Our holdings indicate that September 1943 was a busier month than most for the Rote Drei transmitters; if the traffic had been all one way, the figure of 4,250 would be high. On the other hand, no messages from Moscow to Switzerland were found at the Hamels'. An analysis of all traffic presently available has suggested that about two-fifths originated in Moscow. If therefore we add 1,700 to our projection (40 per cent of 4,250) the total becomes 5,950.

[4] In his *Agenten Funken nach Moskau,* 1957 edition, Neptun Verlag, Kreuzlingen, Switzerland, Flicke presents 68 messages, of which 57 are matched in our holdings and 5 more are partial matches (Flicke's versions being incomplete). It is suspected that the remaining 6 messages are spurious, the creations of Flicke or someone else. These messages differ from those known to be authentic in certain minor ways but consistently. All of these messages, if they were genuine, would have been transmitted before the sending date of the earliest authenticated message. One of them is the early warning of Hitler's attack, a message that later commentators accepted as genuine.

Vera and the Beginnings of the Red Three

The story of the Rote Drei begins with Maria Josefovna Poliakova, a highly intelligent Russian Jewess and a dedicated Communist, born about 1910. When she was 21, she was a very active member of the central committee of the Komsomol. She was recruited at that time by the IVth Department of the Soviet General Staff. Her aliases were Mildred, Gisela, and Vera. She was fluent in German, French, and English. Her brother, father, and husband were all executed in Communist purges; yet her devotion to the cause was unshaken.

In 1936-1937 she headed the Soviet military intelligence network in Switzerland. She made a quick trip back in 1941, when she ordered certain changes in the command structure of the Rote Drei. But mostly she spend the war years in Moscow, where she specialized on the Rote Drei operation. (She was not the "Director," however. All of the messages from Moscow to Switzerland were signed "Director," an indicator showing that they came from the Center. It is probable that Poliakova was the originator of many of these; her informal, fervent, Marxian style is distinctive. But this tone is often replaced by that of superiors who are much more authoritative and brusque.) At the end of 1944, when the Swiss operation had ended, Poliakova, then a major, became chief of the GRU's Spanish section. Foote suggests that she was purged less than two years later. "The Director and Vera were removed from their posts and replaced in about May 1946. I never saw them again, nor were they ever mentioned. The Centre has only one penalty for failure." [5]

Sonia

Foote also recounts that in Switzerland he was first directed by a lady whom he calls "Sonia." Her true name was Ursula Maria Hamburger, née Kuczynski. She was born on 15 May 1907 in Berlin, one of four sisters.[6] She also had a brother, Professor Juergin Kuczynski, who introduced Klaus Fuchs to Soviet intelligence officers. Ursula and Rudolf Hamburger were Red Army espionage agents in Shanghai in 1930-1935. She went to Switzerland in the latter 1930's, travelling

[5] Alexander Foote, *Handbook for Spies,* Museum Press, Ltd., London, second edition, 1964, p. 161.

[6] Another of whom was Brigette Lewis (Long).

alone because her husband had been ordered to stay in China. In 1939 her position was jeopardized by the arrest of Franz Obermanns, a German Communist with false Finnish documents and a transmitter. On 23 February 1940 she married Leon Charles Beurton, an Englishman whom Foote called "Bill Philips." Beurton, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War, was recruited for Soviet espionage by Brigette Lewis, who turned him over to her sister Ursula on 13 February 1939. Ursula Hamburger trained both Beurton and Foote in W/T. The marriage to Beurton gave Ursula British citizenship, and she left Switzerland for England in December 1940. Her husband remained in Switzerland, where he trained Edmond Hamel in operating a W/T set. In July 1942, provided with a British passport in the name of Miller and the blessings of the Red Army Staff, Beurton went via Portugal to England and his Ursula. In 1947 the Beurtons left England hurriedly for East Berlin.

Sissy and Paul

A third person of importance in the swaddling days of the Red Three was also a woman, Rachel Duebendorfer. Born on 18 July 1901 in Danzig, she became an active Soviet agent in 1920. Soon thereafter she married one Curt Caspari, and on 8 July 1922 she gave birth to a daughter, Tamara, who eventually married a Frenchman and who helped her mother with the housework, as did her husband, by serving as a Rote Drei courier. In the late 1930's Rachel contracted a marriage of convenience with a Swiss citizen named Duebendorfer.[7] She took up residence in Bern, where she lived as the common-law wife of a German Communist named Paul Boettcher, alias Paul, alias Hans Saalbach. Boettcher was born on 2 May 1891 in Leipzig. Before fleeing Germany he had been a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Minister of Finance in Leipzig, and editor-in-chief of the *Arbeiterzeitung* in Leipzig. Escaping to Switzerland from Germany after the Nazis came to power, he was twice expelled from Swiss territory, in 1941 and 1944, but managed to survive. Sissy not only took him into her flat but also gave him the papers of her Swiss husband, whose identity Boettcher assumed. Boettcher, Duebendorfer, Tamara Vigier (née Caspari), Roessler, and Christian Schneider were all

[7] Our notes fail to reflect what happened to Caspari.

arrested in May 1944.[8] Neither Sissy nor Paul was present in the courtroom on 22-23 October, 1945, when a Swiss military court sentenced each to two years. Both had escaped to France in July of that year. Boettcher went back to Saxony and in 1947 became editor of the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*. For a time he was a professor of Russian in Halle. By 1958 he was again an editor in Leipzig. Sissy's fate is not known to us.

In our collection of W/T messages Sissy appears 28 times between 8 October 1942 and 28 November 1943. These are the highlights:

8 October 1942, Director to Dora (Alexander Rado) for Sissy:

> "You must learn a code and receive additional instruction. . . . Your new people Marius and Taylor are not bad workers, but one must always control them and keep them busy."

Two characteristics of this message are interesting. The first is that Sissy is the only one of Rado's sources to whom the Center directed messages by name and through Rado. Later, as is noted below, Moscow even eliminated Rado, the resident director, from the communications channel for certain messages, which were sent to Sissy in her own code. The second important element in this message is its reference to Taylor (Christian Schneider) as a new source. As we shall see, Taylor was first recruited by Sissy in the summer of 1942. Because Lucy reported only through Taylor, this fact means that Moscow received no messages from Lucy and his sub-sources until that time. (Foote claimed that Lucy's material began going to the Center in early 1941 and that he warned the Russians of Hitler's impending attack some two weeks in advance. Others, including Accoce and Quet,[9] have copied the claim. But the traffic proves it false.)

20 November 1942. The Director instructed Dora to have Sissy determine and report the identities of the sources in the Lucy-Taylor group.

12 January 1943. Before this date Sissy had sent her first message in her own code, because the Center answered, "We greet your first telegram. Try to work attentively and to be careful when working. Destroy immediately all notes and working papers."

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[8] Foote, *op. cit.*, p. 133. Although Foote says of Boettcher, "I cannot speak for the British, but he certainly was not connected with our network" (p. 67), he is as wrong here as at many other points. The traffic leaves no doubt that Moscow regarded Sissy and Paul Boettcher as a team and often addressed them jointly.

[9] *A Man Called Lucy*, Coward-McCann Inc., New York, 1966.

The ordinary traffic continued to be channeled through Rado. But on 23 April 1943 Moscow sent its second message in Sissy's code, this one addressed to her and to Paul.[10] It read as follows:

> "1. Dear friends, since the summer of 1942 you have worked with the Taylor-Lucy group, which has provided us with a great deal of varied material, some of it valuable. But despite the long cooperation this group remains wholly unclarified for us. . . .
>
> "2. Determine and inform us by radio: exact reports on Taylor, Lucy, Werther, Anna, Olga. Especially important is a personality sketch of Lucy. Who is he, what is his name, what were his circumstances earlier and what are they now, for what motives does he work for others and for us? . . .
>
> "3. Answer this telegram in your own code. You do not need to inform Albert of our telegram or of your answer. He has received directions, as well as telegrams coming directly from Sissy, without sending queries back [i.e., to Moscow]. . . .
>
> "4. To Sissy only. We send you the title of a new book for your code; buy it; we shall give you instructions about how to work according to the book. Albert is not to know about the new book. It is called 'Tempete sur la Maison'. . . .
>
> "5. How are you? What is Mara doing? Greetings to her and both of you from Gisela."

Although Sissy and Paul had their own code, it appears that they did not have their own radio operator at this time and had to go through Rado; hence Moscow's assurances that Rado was not being curious or testy but rather was accepting this traffic, in a code that he could not read, without demur. Gisela was one of three code names for Maria Josefovna Poliakova, the other two being Vera and Mildred. Mara was Sissy's daughter, Tamara Vigier.[11]

18 May 1943, Dora to Director:

> "Sissy has just reported that Maurice has been arrested by German authorities. She fears that the Gestapo will thus come across her trail. Maurice knows Sissy's true name. I have initiated discrete inquiries and shall report further."

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[10] Moscow did not usually use the true first name of an agent as his radio cover name, but evidence in the traffic itself makes it plain that "Paul" was Sissy's common-law husband Paul Boettcher.

[11] Tamara had her own code name, Vita, and one may wonder at Poliakova's indiscretion in not using it; but such lapses were not rare. On 6 December 1943 a message from Dora informed Moscow that Foote had been arrested. He was named openly as Foote instead of being designated as Jim.

24 May 1943, Director to Dora:

> "Sissy is to let us know immediately: how did she learn of Maurice's arrest and to what extent can his arrest be dangerous for her?

4 July 1943, Director to Dora:

> "We have been able to determine, just in the past few days, that the courier from France, who was supposed to pick up the money from Jim, was arrested; and in his place a Gestapo agent came to Jim and, it appears, followed him to his apartment and in this way was able to learn his name. At the same time but independently in this event, Maurice was arrested in France. . . . For the time being, you must break off your connection with Sissy completely. . . . She can be persuaded that it is in Taylor's interest to have a connection with someone else for a while. . . . Try to convince Sissy. Tell that it will be for only three months. . . . Sissy could say it is because of Paul, who is under observation. . . . She should keep her apartment absolutely clean and, above all else, not say a word too much. . . . It is best that Paul not sleep in the apartment."

It has been suggested that "Maurice" was Maurice Emile Aenis-Haenslin, born 20 September 1893 in St. Denis, France. Aenis-Haenslin, a Swiss citizen and an engineer, was a member of the Central Committee of the Swiss Communist Party and later joined the French CP. He was involved in courier and funding activity on behalf of Soviet intelligence during World War II. There are conflicting reports about the date of Maurice's arrest by the Germans, one account dating it 1943, another 1942. The latter is both more detailed and less derivative. It is therefore concluded that the Maurice who knew Sissy and whom the Germans arrested in France may have been someone other than Aenis-Haenslin, who was released from a German concentration camp in Brandenburg in response to a Swiss demand.

At any rate, the traffic continued to mention Maurice and to reveal conflicting views about his arrest. On 8 July 1943 Poliakova repeated to Sissy, in the latter's code, some of the instructions radioed to Dora four days earlier.[12] She directed Sissy to leave Bern and go to Tessin (Ticino) or a spa for two or three months. Taylor and Lucy were to be turned over to someone else.

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[12] In so doing Poliakova referred not to Maurice but to Marius, so that there is a possibility that the two were identical. It has also been suggested, however, that Marius was Marius Mouttet, a Frenchman and former Socialist Minister. Foote (*op. cit.*, p. 92) mentions him but says nothing of an arrest.

Sissy's Fight with Moscow

Sissy's reaction was unambiguous. On 8 July 1943 Dora sent Director the following:

> "Sissy and her man do not believe that the story has anything to do with Maurice and the Gestapo. They believe that the man who asked about them came from the Center and just handled himself clumsily. They assume that the Center wants in this way to take away the Taylor group, and in such a manner that I too shall know nothing about it."

Presumably there were further exchanges, with Moscow insisting that Sissy identify Lucy and his sources and that she turn them over to Dora or someone else and with Sissy adamantly refusing, but these are not in our collection. On 16 August 1943, however, the Center sent Sissy, via Dora, a stern message which substituted the formal second person for the intimate and which appears to have been drawn up not by Poliakova but by her superiors:

> "Dear Sissy,
>
> "We, the Center, which has its people everywhere and can determine what is happening in other countries and around you, have told you clearly and explicitly that we have hard evidence that the Gestapo knows that you work for us and will try to uncover your connections into Germany. You, however, deny this possibility and interpret it as an attempt to take the Taylor group away from you. You must understand, inasmuch as you assume this position, that you know nothing of the danger which threatens you and Taylor's people, especially those in Germany. Your behavior is frivolous and irresponsible. We demand that you recognize the seriousness of the situation and place full confidence in our statements. We repeat: the Gestapo knows that you have or had a connection with us and will attempt all possible provocations. . . ."

But Sissy stayed tough. On 22 September 1943 Dora radioed to Director,

> "In answer to your No. 157 and No. 158. Many thanks for your advice. I am myself convinced that much more could be gotten out of the Lucy group. However, I have no direct contact with this group, as you know, and every time that I try to intensify the group's activity I encounter in Sissy and her man [13] a resistance that I do not understand. I remind you that when I noted the possibilities of this group a year ago, I had to hold with Sissy discussions that continued for months before she was prepared to take it over and use it. . . . Sissy and her man . . . say that they cannot transmit criticisms to Taylor and Lucy because both would consider it an insult and

[13] This literal interpretation of *Mann* has been used because Sissy at this time was still married to Duebendorfer, a Swiss citizen.

> would stop working. In accordance with your advice, I wrote Lucy a very friendly letter, but Sissy declared that Taylor could not pass it on because Lucy, beyond doubt, is already doing everything that he can. Apparently Sissy and her man view the letter as an attempt by the Center or by me to set up a direct contact with the Lucy group. . . . Your telegram was handed over to Paul. . . . Again he boasted in such a way that I had a hard time of it controlling myself. He refuses to come to Geneva for meetings. . . . Again I beg you to release me from further contact with Paul. . . . [who] tried to establish contact for the transmission of his material through Pierre and Ignatz. . . ."

In other words, Sissy and Paul still had no radio operator of their own but did not want to turn over their encoded messages to Dora for transmission by Edward (Edmond Hamel) and Maud (Edmond's wife Olga), by Rosa (Margarete Bolli), or by Jim (Alexander Foote). One report identifies Pierre as Roger Vauthey of Lausanne, supposedly a courier or cut-out between Rado and "Mario" in France. Foote, however, in a private interview held in 1953, said that Pierre and Vita were Pierre Nicole and his wife. Our own view is that Pierre was indeed Pierre Nicole but that Vita was Tamara Vigier. Pierre Nicole, born in 1911, served as a cut-out between the Rote Drei and the Swiss Labor Party, which was extremely left-wing though not officially Communist. The head of this party was Pierre's father, Leon, born in 1897 in Montcherend, Vaud. Leon Nicole had recruited several members of the Rote Drei on behalf of the GRU. He and Pierre were in touch with Dora, Sissy, and Jim. The identity of Ignatz is not known. He could have been Leon Nicole or any one of several other Swiss Communists.

By 5 November 1943 the danger signs had multiplied, and Moscow feared that Rado might be arrested, leaving the Center cut off from Lucy's information. It therefore repeated the proposal that Sissy and Jim be placed in direct contact, so that if anything happened to Dora, Jim could still maintain the flow of intelligence. On 10 November Dora replied that Jim was in serious danger. The reason, although the cited message does not say so, was that Edmond and Olga Hamel had been arrested by the Swiss police on or about 8 October 1943, as had another W/T operator, Margarete Bolli.[14]

On 28 November 1943 the Director instructed Dora to tell Sissy and Pakbo to work independently for a time. The most important information was to go through Jim. What Moscow obviously did not know was that Jim had been arrested eight days earlier.

[14] Sissy, Paul, and Vita were arrested later, in May 1944.

Dora

The fourth key personality in the Red Three was Alexander Rado, the Hungarian cartographer who took over the direction of the net from Maria Poliakova and who assumed contact with Ursula Hamburger's sources after she left Switzerland for England at the end of 1940. Rado's story is well-known and is retold here only in the barest outline. He was born 1 September 1899 in Upjest, Hungary. It is almost certain that he was already working for Soviet military intelligence when he left Paris for Geneva in 1936. Rado and Ursula Hamburger worked independently of each other until the fall of France in June 1940 because Rado had been able until then to send his reports to Moscow via microfilm carried by couriers to Paris. When the Germans occupied France, Moscow ordered Hamburger to make contact with Rado and place the transmitter of her new husband, Leon Charles Beurton, at Rado's disposal. Hamburger had trained both Foote and Beurton in operating a transmitter, and they in turn trained the Hamels and Margarete Bolli. In 1941 Moscow resolved a struggle for power by subordinating Duebendorfer to Rado. (One report has Poliakova going to Switzerland for the purpose.) But Rado's authority was not absolute, and the fact that the Center gave Duebendorfer a code of her own and sometimes by-passed Rado when communicating with Sissy shows that the Soviets did not intend to let Rado consolidate his position completely.

Dora, a simple anagram for Rado, is the sender or recipient of almost all the Rote Drei messages. The only exceptions are those sent or received directly by Sissy and those sent by Albert or by the Center but mentioning Albert in the text. There is no doubt that Albert, like Dora, is Rado; but efforts to find a pattern or significance in Rado's choice of cover name for a particular message have not been successful. Albert, like Dora, sends standard OB messages. The shift in names does not indicate a parallel shift in transmitters, because both "Dora" and "Albert" messages were found at their flat when the Hamels were arrested. The possibility that "Dora" is Rado as chief of the Rote Drei and "Albert" is Rado as an individual disintegrates when checked against the traffic. Flicke postulated a secretary who as Albert signed messages for Rado when he was away; but no one else ever heard of such a secretary, and Dora and Albert messages were sometimes transmitted on the same day. So the mystery is unsolved.

All concerned should be aware that Foote—who disliked Rado—minimized his role in the Rote Drei, attacked his personal integrity on dubious grounds, and erroneously believed him executed in the USSR, whereas in fact Rado is flourishing as a cartographer in Hungary and Foote is dead.

By the beginning of 1941, then, Ursula Beurton, née Hamburger, was in England; the desk chief for the operation, Poliakova, was in Moscow; Rado was in Geneva as the chief Red Three member in Switzerland; and Sissy and her friend Paul were in Bern (not Geneva, where Foote [15] erroneously places them).

Dora had two other key sources who, like Sissy, provided him with intelligence from sub-sources. But Sissy was more important than either of them, for one reason only: Lucy and his sub-sources.

The cut-out between Lucy and Sissy was Taylor, whose true name was Christian Schneider.

Lucy and Taylor

The Center thought highly of Taylor, chiefly because Moscow misunderstood his role. The first reference to him in our holdings is in a message sent by the Director to Dora on 8 October 1942. The message terms him a new source, although in fact he was merely a go-between. On 20 October 1942 the Director told Dora to identify Taylor's sources, not knowing that the sources "belonged" to Lucy, not Taylor. Another Moscow to Dora message, sent the same day, refers to "Taylor's information" about OKW (German High Command) plans. A week later Moscow again asked for the identities of Taylor's sources. In December 1942 and January 1943 the Center began to speak of Taylor and Lucy jointly. By February 1943 the Center's follow-up questions were directed to Lucy, with scant mention of Taylor. That the Soviets continued to overestimate Taylor's importance is nevertheless evident in a Director-to-Dora message of 6 October 1943 which suggested that the work of the Lucy-Taylor group might be continued after the war ended and which promised Taylor an income for life if he agreed. Perhaps Sissy misrepresented to Moscow the insignificant role that Taylor actually had, perhaps she merely kept stubbornly silent about such facts, or perhaps she misunderstood the true situation because she was in touch only with Taylor and not with Lucy.

[15] *op. cit.*, p. 66.

In only one sense was Lucy important. If Rudolf Roessler had not been living in Switzerland during the second world war, his sources in Germany might have found it troublesome or even impossible to get their reports into Soviet hands. In fact, they might not have cared much one way or the other about Soviet reception of their material, as long as it went to the Western allies. But as was pointed out in the recent review of Accoce and Quet,[16] the widely accepted story that Lucy was a master spy is nothing but a myth. As we have seen, the Center tried to eliminate Sissy and put Dora in direct contact with Taylor and Lucy. If this maneuver had succeeded, it is probable that Dora would have been instructed to pressure Lucy to divulge his sources, whose identities Moscow had already requested again and again. And if Lucy had yielded, then the truth would have been apparent: Lucy's true function was no different from that of Taylor. Both were mere cut-outs. What made Lucy and Taylor important and what made Sissy important was a small band of Germans, Lucy's sources.

Lucy's Sources in World War II

The record clearly shows that Lucy had four important sources: [17] Werther, Teddy, Olga, and Anna. Of the 332 messages from Dora to Director of which there are copies in our holdings, Werther is the source of 69 (21 percent), Teddy of 31 (10 percent), Olga of 26 (8 percent), and Anna of 11 (3½ percent). These four were probably not the only sources reporting to Lucy; Lucy was not the only source reporting to Sissy; and Sissy was not the only principal agent funneling reports from a network to Rado. Yet these four persons produced 42½ percent of the total traffic from Switzerland to Moscow.[18]

We do not know the identities of any of them. We can, however, dismiss the theory of Foote and some later writers that these cover names merely referred to the source's access rather than his identity, so that Werther stood for Wehrmacht, Olga for Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, Anna for the Auswertige Amt (Foreign Office), etc. There

[16] *Studies* XII 4, p. 104.

[17] Others who might have supplied Lucy with information but might also have been otherwise linked to the Rote Drei were Bill, Bircher, Fanny, Fernand, Schwerin, and Stefan. None of them appear often in the traffic; none reported high-level information.

[18] Assuming, as we do, that our holdings are large enough so that projections are mathematically sound.

is nothing in the traffic to support this theory, which seems to be based on speculation only. All Rote Drei code names for which true identities have been established were designators of individuals *per se*, not of types of cover or access.

Despite the printed assertions to the contrary, Rudolf Roessler *did* divulge the identity of his sources, or at least of some of them. Three and a half years before his death he provided identifying information about four of his chief sources to a trusted friend. They were, said Lucy, (1) a German major (whom he did not name) who had been the chief of the Abwehr before Admiral Wilhelm Canaris assumed command; (2) Hans Bernd Gisevius; (3) Carl Goerdeler; and (4) "General Boelitz, deceased."

General Hans Oster

Lucy's confidant garbled the first identification and may have done the same with the fourth. Canaris took charge of the Abwehr on 1 January 1935. His predecessor was not a major but another admiral, Conrad Patzig. But Hans Oster was a major in the Abwehr at that time, and he remained in the service, in which he served as the chief of staff and also as the heart of the 20th of July group which conspired to overthrow and assassinate Hitler.

Hans Bernd Gisevius [19] said that he first met Oster sometime between August 1933 and April 1934. "At that time he was . . . setting up the war ministry's counter-intelligence organization . . . known . . . as the Abwehr."

A number of commentators have noted how well-informed Oster was. His knowledge of state secrets extended even to those held by the bitterest enemies of the Abwehr, the Gestapo and the Nazi security service, called the SD (*for Sicherheitsdienst*).

"Oster was able, generally speaking through his contacts with Graf [Wolf Heinrich von] Helldorf, the Berlin Prefect of Police, and with [Arthur] Nebe, the *Reichskriminaldirektor* . . . to learn quickly what was going on in the *entourage* of Hitler and Goering and also in the Gestapo headquarters in the Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse." [20]

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[19] *To the Bitter End*, Houghton Mifflin Co., New York, 1947, p. 142.

[20] Karl Heinz Abshagen, *Canaris*, English edition, Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., London, 1956, p. 122.

The fact that Oster was prepared to provide Germany's enemies with information which was of crucial importance, even though they lacked the power to make full use of it, is also well-established. Even Accoce and Quet,[21] despite their denigration of the 20th of July group, concede that Oster told Colonel J. G. Sas, the Dutch military attache in Berlin, that Germany intended to invade Norway. Abshagen [22] reported that Oster gave Sas this warning on 3 April 1940 for relay to Norway and also told Sas of the invasion of Holland before the event. In fact, Oster had begun to send specific, factual warnings to the West as early as 1938.

The man who had become a major in 1929, a lieutenant colonel in 1935, a colonel in 1939, and a major general in 1942 was unswerving in his detestation of German fascism and in his conviction that morality necessitated action. As time passed and Hitler's power grew, Oster became convinced that the plots to eradicate the Nazis through the internal intervention of German armed forces would fail because of the waverings of the German generals. He warned the West because he recognized that Hitler could not be brought down inside the Reich until he had been defeated on the battlefields.

Most contemporary German historians boggle at this point. They write in detail about the 20th of July conspiracy but gloss over the fact that from 1938 until his discharge from the Abwehr on 31 March 1944,[23] when he was placed under house arrest in Schnaditz, near Leipzig, Oster was furnishing vital information to Germany's foes and was therefore—at least in Nazi eyes—engaged in high treason.

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[21] *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[22] *op. cit.*, pp. 176-177.

[23] Wilhelm Ritter von Schramm (*Verrat im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Econ Verlag, Dusseldorf-Vienna, 1967, p. 223) and others have made the same curious mistake about Oster and have drawn the same conclusion. They state that he was suspended from Abwehr duty on 5 April 1943. But a number of reliable sources have reported that on this date, when Hans von Dohnanyi, Josef Mueller, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer were arrested, Oster merely came under initial suspicion. He was transferred to a reserve status on 19 June 1943 but was not placed under surveillance (or house arrest) until March of the following year. The last known message from Dora which cites Werther or any other possible source of Lucy as the source of the message is dated October 1943. Accordingly, there is no basis in fact for the argument that Lucy's messages continued to flow to Moscow after 20 July 1944, as Accoce and Quet have maintained, or that General Oster could not have been one of Lucy's sources, as von Schramm has maintained.

How did Oster obtain information? Gisevius [24] said, "Oster . . . had formed a circle around himself . . . he utilized the potentialities of the *Abwehr* so cannily that he was able to establish a whole network of confidential agents. . . . Oster seemed to be organizing an intelligence service of his own, within the counter-intelligence service. . . . One of the most important of his activities was to install his own confidential agents in the most diverse positions." And Oster was on intimate conspiratorial terms with such persons as General Ludwig Beck (who, with Oster, sent Dr. Josef Mueller to the Vatican for peace negotiations with the British, negotiations at which the Pope presided); General Georg Thomas, head of the Economics and Armaments Branch of the OKW; Generals Fritz Thiele and Erich Fellgiebel, respectively chiefs of communications for the Army and the OKW; and General Friedrich Olbricht, chief of the *Allgemeine Heeresamt* and permanent deputy to the commander-in-chief of the Home Army. These men, and others like them, were active members of the conspiracy; most of them were executed by the Nazis. And they were in a position to have direct access to precisely the kind of information reported by Lucy's sources.

How did the information reach Lucy? Here too we can only speculate. A biographic summary of Oster in the International Biographic Archives [25] includes the following: "In addition to his military duties Oster was simultaneously the technical center of the anti-Hitler resistance in the Army. He spared neither effort nor risk to set up connections between military and civilian resistance groups."

Gisevius [26] adds, "He once described to me in one sentence his own conception of his function within the Resistance movement. He was standing at his desk looking down pensively at the four or five telephones whose secret circuits connected him with the most diverse authorities. 'This is what I am,' he said. 'I facilitate communications for everyone everywhere.'"

Oster had the entire communications network of the Abwehr at his disposal, and he used it to support the anti-Nazi cause. Abshagen [27] comments, "The so-called 'A-net' (consisting of independent lines of

[24] *op. cit.*, pp. 421-422.

[25] Anonymous, Munziger Archives, "ME—O: (Oster) 8.12.1962, 1128, Hans Oster (former German general)."

[26] *op. cit.*, p. 424.

[27] *op. cit.*, p. 122.

communication at the disposal of the Abwehr only) would ensure that the 'conspirators' only would be able to transmit news and orders." He adds, "The *Abwehr* organization was the nerve-centre from which lines led to the General Staff, to General [Erwin] von Witzleben . . . to Schacht, to Goerdeler, to Beck . . . to [Baron Ernst von] Weizsaecker [then Under-Secretary of State and formerly Minister in Bern] and through him to a group of diplomats abroad. . . ." [28]

As was noted earlier in this study, the timing of Rote Drei messages would have permitted sending almost all of the traffic through Abwehr courier channels from Germany to Switzerland. We know that Gisevius had access at least twice and sometimes three times a week to a courier pouch from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the German Embassy in Bern. At least every other day Gisevius was also served by an OKW courier as the result of a procedure instituted by Oster. And for urgent messages Oster or a cohort could safely use an Abwehr telephone. How the Abwehr's lines were shielded against Gestapo and SD monitoring is not known, at least by this writer; but that they were so shielded is demonstrated by the conspirators' uninhibited use of telephones and the survival of the group until 20 July 1944.

In brief, even if Lucy had not listed "Canaris' predecessor," Gisevius, and Carl Goerdeler, all key figures in the 20th of July group, as having been among his sources, the characteristics of the Lucy messages and of their transmission from Germany to Switzerland suggest that Werther and the others probably had Abwehr communications channels at their disposal. There seems to be no plausible alternative theory.

Hans Bernd Gisevius

Gisevius has told much of his own story in *To the Bitter End,* but like other Germans he stresses the resistance activity of the underground and says little about espionage. (There are a few exceptions. Speaking of the 20th of July conspiracy, Gisevius says, "We had our spies everywhere—in the war ministry, the police headquarters, the ministry of the interior, and especially in the foreign office. All the various threads came together in Oster's office." [29] But comments in this vein are rare.) Gisevius entered the Abwehr in 1939 or 1940; and when Paris fell, Canaris and Oster sent him to Zurich with the cover of a vice-consul.

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[28] *ibid.,* p. 132.

[29] *op. cit.,* p. 324.

But even before the war started, Gisevius had started to make trips to Switzerland to meet with representatives of the Western Allies. He says, "We had decided to meet in Switzerland after the 'March Madness.' [The term is a reference to Hitler's seizure, with Western acquiescence, of the Sudetenland in March 1939.] We wanted to establish closer connections with the British and French, and it no longer seemed advisable to do this in Berlin. [Hjalmar] Schacht had business in Basle in any case. I was glad of the opportunity to complete my notes on the French crisis. Goerdeler intended to stay around Berlin until the end of the Czech crisis; then he planned to follow us as soon as possible."[30] In Ouchy Gisevius met Goerdeler and an unidentified companion who is mentioned only as a person of considerable influence in London and Paris political circles.

Ex-Chancellor Josef Wirth

Gerhard Ritter[31] tells of another, similar meeting which occurred some months later, in February 1940. He says that the ex-Chancellor of Germany, Josef Wirth, had emigrated to Switzerland and had offered to act as an intermediary between the British and the German anti-Fascists. "In a document which Dr. [Reinhold] Schairer took to London he called Chamberlain's attention to the existence of an important Opposition group. . . . In mid-February two Foreign Office representatives, friends of [Sir Robert] Vansittart, met Wirth at Ouchy and another man well-known in London who had, since war broke out, lived in Lucerne and from there had kept up his connections with friends in Britain."

The other man could have been Michel, Freiherr von Godin, or Lucy himself, or any of several other Germans who, like Wirth, were living in Lucerne.

Wirth also appears in Rote Drei traffic. On 14 January 1943 the Center sent the following message to Dora:

> "a) Request reply about exact substance of talks between Long[32] and Wirth. Especially interested in contents of Wirth's negotiations with the Anglo-Saxons and his intentions regarding negotiations with the USSR. What does he plan to do, as a practical matter, to establish contact?

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[30] *ibid.*, pp. 344-345.

[31] *The German Resistance,* George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1958, p. 157.

[32] Long was Georges Blun, a French journalist and important member of the Rote Drei.

"b) What opinion does Long now have of Rot's statements? Does he believe that they are true? Long absolutely must report clearly about the intent of Rot's group to orient itself toward the Soviet Union. Is it possible that at the present time there exists an organized opposition of commanding officers against Hitler?

"c) Rot should report the location from which Germany sent 30 divisions to Italy. What is the picture in respect to reserves in Germany? How does the OKW react to the Russian offensive? What are the plans and intentions of the OKW for the next few months?

"d) Repeat, what documents does Rot intend to publish? Because of their great importance, request a good check on all these questions and a prompt answer."

Six days later the Director asked some questions about the intentions of the OKW, the German High Command. Moscow directed that the requirements be levied upon Lucy's group and added, " . . . if feasible, Long should try to get relevant information from the Wirth group."

On 20 April 1943 the following message from Dora was transmitted:

"From Rot.

"Through the Director General coming here . . . Mayor Goerdeler from . . . Bendlerstrasse [OKW Headquarters]

"a) The first fixed day for the German attack on the East Front is 14 June. Only operations of modest proportions are planned.

"b) The General Staff expects the event by the end of April at the earliest; it could snowball. The so-called second echelon of generals [literally, generals in second-best uniforms] who already wanted to take action against Hitler in January, has now decided to liquidate Hitler and also his supporters. An earlier attempt failed because Hitler was warned by Manstein."

On 5 October 1943 the following went from Dora to Director: "On 27 September Salter talked with the former German Chancellor Wirth in Lucerne. Wirth rejects the German Liberation Committee [the reference is to the "National Committee of Free Germany," created by the Russians] in Moscow because it hinders instead of hastening the disintegration of the Nazi regime. Those who feel partially responsible for the establishment of that regime will cooperate more closely with the Nazi leaders. Bourgeois German Democrats are prepared to collaborate with German Communists but not under Soviet guidance. Therefore they reject the Moscow Committee. According to Wirth the German Embassy in Bern is extremely inter-

ested in Sokolin.[33] Krauel, a former German consul in Geneva, serves as the intermediary in this matter."

On the basis of these messages and of the scanty information about the movements and activities of Gisevius in Switzerland, it is suggested that Gisevius may have been Rot. Gisevius knew Roessler, which may well explain why Lucy identified him correctly as a source but failed to list Oster, whom he had never met, by name. Gisevius also knew Wirth, whose link to the 20th of July group had been sanctioned by Generals Oster and Beck. He obviously knew Carl Goerdeler, one of the most important of the conspirators. Gisevius was sympathetic toward the Soviet cause, a fact which became more apparent after the war than it was during it. He was thoroughly trained in clandestinity as a result of his role in the 20th of July group, his three and a half years as an agent of British intelligence, and his work for OSS in Switzerland. It seems probable that people like Goerdeler and Beck, who themselves favored the Western solution—i.e., a post-war Germany oriented toward the US and the UK—believed that Gisevius felt as they did and that those members of the 20th of July who favored the Eastern solution, people like Count Klaus Philip Schenk von Stauffenberg and Adam von Trott zu Solz, thought that Gisevius shared their views.

There is one difficulty inherent in the theory that Rot was Gisevius. As was said earlier, Lucy named Gisevius as one of his sources. Rot, however, seems to have been a source of Long rather than Lucy.[34] But there may be no real contradiction here; Gisevius could have been in clandestine contact with both Roessler and Blun, just as he was in clandestine contact with many other people. Because Lucy and Sissy succeeded in concealing the indentities of the Lucy group from the Russians, the dual role of Gisevius in the Rote Drei, if he did in fact play such a role, would not have come to light.

Carl Goerdeler

The third man named by Roessler as one of his sources was Carl Goerdeler, who had been Lord Mayor of Leipzig from 1930 to 1936, when he resigned and broke with the Nazis. A conservative visionary, a Protestant monarchist, a headstrong philosopher, Goerdeler remained a civilian all his life. All of the information provided to Moscow by

[33] Vladimir Alexandrovich Sokolin is discussed later in this study.

[34] There is confirmation of the Blun-Gisevius association.

Lucy could have been obtained more readily, more securely, in greater detail, and at a higher level from leading military figures in the resistance than from Carl Goerdeler. It seems probable that Roessler named him just because he knew him personally, as he knew Gisevius. Whatever information Goerdeler provided, he must have obtained it from fellow conspirators, not from direct access. It is therefore not possible to draw any logical inferences about which cover name, if any, referred to Goerdeler.

The Unknown Boelitz

The fourth source named by Lucy was "General Boelitz (deceased)." Unfortunately, no record of a general named Boelitz has been discovered. There was a Dr. Otto Boelitz, born a pastor's son in Wesel in 1876, who became the Prussian Minister of Art, Science, and Education. In 1934 he was a *Kulturrat* (advisor on cultural matters) and a member of the German Foreign Institute. He was also the first director of the Ibero-American Institute in Berlin. Sometime during 1934 Dr. Boelitz fell into the bad graces of the Nazis and was replaced as head of the Ibero-American Institute by a general named Faupel. Thereafter, one report suggests, the institute was used by the Nazis in support of espionage and subversion in Latin America. Dr. Otto Boelitz died in Germany on 29 December 1951.

No record linking him to Roessler on the one hand, or to Oster, Goerdeler, or any other member of the 20th of July group on the other, has been found thus far. There remains, however, the possibility of another garble. A Colonel Friedrich (Fritz) Boetzel was head of the Germany military intercept office in Munich before 1933. From 1934 to 1939 he headed the ciphers department (*Chiffrierstelle*) of the OKW. Thereafter he was commanding officer of the intelligence evaluation office of the Southeast Army Group, Athens, where he remained until 1944. He had ties to Canaris and Oster. And a German first lieutenant of the signal corps, interrogated in April 1945, described Colonel Boetzel as an anti-Nazi.

To summarize: we have Werther, Teddy, Olga, and Anna as Lucy's principal sources and as the principal sources in the Rote Drei network. We have Oster, Gisevius, Goerdeler, and Boelitz, identified by Roessler as having been among his sources during World War II. We have no basis for matching true and cover names, although Oster seems the likeliest candidate for Werther.

To continue, the contacts of "Sissy"—Rachel Duebendorfer—fell into three categories. By far the most important group was Lucy's quartet of Werther, Teddy, Olga, and Anna, all in Germany. Sissy resisted strenuously every effort of Moscow and Rado to determine the identities of the members of the Taylor-Lucy team, and it is fair to conjecture that a major reason for her resistance was that had she lost this remarkable asset, she'd have had little enough left. For the second group was composed of peripheral people probably turned over to Sissy by Vera Poliakova before the War. And the third element was made up of Sissy's own family: the man with whom she was living, Paul Goettcher; her daughter and the daughter's husband; and a cousin.

Long and Pakbo

Alexander Rado had two other principal agents. One of them, Georges Blun, code-named Long, was a French journalist whose sub-sources could not match the production of Lucy's group in quality or quantity, but who was nevertheless a valuable asset for the Soviets. The other was Otto Puenter, or Pakbo.

The sources who had aliases and who are known to have been members of Long's group were Agnes, Kurz, Grau, Rot, Fanny, and possibly Feld. With the exception of the last-named, a courier, the members of the group have a certain homogeneous quality. They were not military professionals like Werther, Teddy, and the rest. Three of them, including Long, were professional journalists. Most of them worked for two or more intelligence services. Their political views and their motivation often seem ambiguous and devious, if not opportunistic.

The first of Long's sub-sources, Agnes, was a journalist named Ernst Lemmer. Some information about him is included here not because his WW II career as a spy was of any particular moment, but because his work for Lucy spanned a long period, including the second, post-war phase of Lucy's career in espionage.

Lemmer represented a Zurich newspaper in Berlin and travelled to Switzerland repeatedly. He was in contact with one Burckhardt, the Swiss military attache in Berlin who also had contacts in the 20th of July group and who served as a communications channel to Switzerland. He first appears in our holdings in a message of 22 October 1941, Dora to Director. Long is listed as the source and Lemmer, who is

said to have obtained the information from the Foreign Ministry, as the sub-source. The information concerned the siege of Moscow. The message ends with "In the future I shall call him [Lemmer] Agnes." Our files, however, contain only two more messages citing Agnes. The dates are 13 August and 18 September 1943, and the messages are merely reports of the lack of morale at the German home front. Lemmer was born on 28 April 1898 in Remscheidt, Germany (although Dallin, for some unknown reason, thought that he was born in Odessa and lived in Russia for 17 years). He attended the Universities of Marburg and Frankfurt am Main. He joined the German Democratic Party (DDP), became chairman of the Young Democrats, and was also secretary-general of a trade union. In 1924 he was elected as a DDP representative to the Reichstag and thus became the youngest member of that body. He lost these posts when the Nazis seized power, and he was forbidden to write for any newspaper published in Germany. He became the Berlin correspondent for the *Pester Lloyd* of Budapest and the *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* as well as a reporter in Occupied Belgium for the Brussels *Soir.*

After the war Lemmer was accused in West Germany of having collaborated with the Nazis. He settled immediately after the war in the Berlin suburb of Klein-Machnow, in the Soviet sector, where he owned a house. In October 1945 he became the deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) in the Soviet Zone and a member of the board of the Free German Trade Union Federation, the Communist FDGB. He was also deputy mayor of Klein-Machnow. He was in close and cordial contact with leading members of the Soviet military occupation. On 20 December 1947, however, the Soviet authorities removed Lemmer from the vice-chairmanship of the CDU, ostensibly because of policy conflicts. He moved to West Berlin in 1949 and became editor of the anti-Communist Berlin *Kurier.* In 1950 he was elected to the five-man executive of the CDU in West Berlin. In January 1952 he was elected as a CDU representative to the Bundestag, and in December 1955 he became Chairman of the West Berlin CDU. In November 1956 he was appointed Minister of Postal and Telecommunications. In October 1957 he became Minister for All-German Affairs. (One report of that period stated innocently, "Lemmer . . . is said to be opposed to the work of the Allied and German intelligence networks in West Berlin.") In 1966 Lemmer was a special representative of Chancellor Erhard in Berlin. He is currently listed as a retired Cabinet Minister who last held public office in 1965.

The same source who repeated the identities of the four World War II sources whom Lucy had named to him also said that Lemmer was a source for Lucy during the 1947-1953 period when Lucy and Xaver Schnieper worked for Czech intelligence.

The post-war charges of collaboration with the Nazis, which Lemmer denied and outrode, seem to have been true. During his interrogation after the war Walter Schellenberg said that Lemmer had been an agent of Amt VI.

Pakbo was of less value to Rado and the Soviets than was Long, just as Long and his group did not measure up to Sissy and her sources. Born 4 April 1900 in Staefa, Switzerland, Otto Puenter was a lawyer and a journalist who worked for the Socialist press in Bern. Reportedly he was a secret member of the Swiss Communist Party. He was in contact with the Swiss military intelligence service, which used him as a channel to pass to the Soviets selected items of intelligence.[35]

Dallin has devoted an entire chapter to Puenter,[36] but much of what appears therein is false. Puenter has, in fact, made many false statements. He said that information about the German General Staff which he obtained during World War II came from General Alfred Jodl. He asserted that he kept in a monastery in Switzerland the entire plan for the German attack upon Stalingrad in October 1942, which he himself encoded before passing it to Rado. He alleged that Werther stood for Wehrmacht and Lucy for Luftfahrtministerium (Ministry of Air). He said that Lucy was a Czech. He wove a complex and fascinating tale about a young Austrian radio operator who came from Dornbirn, near the Austro-Swiss border. He had promised the home folks that he would transmit his location every night, just so that they would know where he was. He chanced to be assigned to Hitler's headquarters, with the result that Pakbo always knew the Fuehrer's whereabouts. The implausibility of this fable is, however, no greater than that inherent in his explanation of his cover name. He claimed that he had teams of agents in *P*ontrezina, *A*arau, *K*reuzlingen, *B*ern, and *O*rselina—hence, Pakbo. Actually, it is unlikely that he had teams of agents anywhere, and certainly improbable that they would be located

[35] The Swiss G-2 had direct contact with both Pakbo and Long but not with Sissy. This fact probably explains why she was arrested, whereas Long and Pakbo were not.

[36] *op. cit.* pp. 207-214.

at the unimportant places named. By his own account, one of his teams was at Feldkich/Dornbirn, but his cover name contains neither an *F* nor a *D*. As a matter of fact, most of his contacts lived in Bern and Geneva.

Puenter has alleged that early in 1941 a Gaullist reported to him that the Swiss service had received accurate information about Hitler's plan to attack the USSR in a month or a month and a half. The Gaullist said he was looking for a contact with Moscow to pass on the information. Pakbo went to Rado to deliver the story—i.e., the attack was scheduled for 15 June 1941. Rado asked who was the source. Pakbo in turn inquired and was told that the man's name was Roessler. Rado then decided to get in direct contact with Roessler, and that connection continued thenceforth.

This is Pakbo's genius for fabrication at its best. In 1941 neither Lucy nor Pakbo himself had any connection with the Rote Drei. A Dora to Director message of 15 July 1942 included the following: "At the beginning of April a new source of information appeared; he has the cover name Pakbo . . ." As was noted earlier, Lucy also joined the net in 1942. Secondly, Puenter has said in writing that he had never been in contact with Roessler and did not know his true name. Thirdly, Lucy did not meet Rado through Puenter for the simple reason that he never met Rado at all, as the traffic shows.

The question that naturally arises, then, is this: If Pakbo has told lies about important matters after the war, did he also lie to the Soviets during the war? Apart from a challenge on 7 October 1942, the Soviets seem to have accepted Pakbo's reports as valid and to have found them useful. Perhaps Pakbo, like Jim, merely tried to exaggerate the importance of his role after the war had ended.

Pakbo appears in 22 known messages, but only 6 of these contain any substantive information. The time span is from 15 July 1942 to 8 January 1944. Apparently he learned something about the Rote Kapelle arrests in Germany and reported accordingly, because on 5 October 1942 the Director asked for more information. And he also reported the arrest of Paul Boettcher, because on 8 January 1944 Moscow said, "As far as we know, Pakbo has never heard of Paul. How does it happen that he has heard so certainly about Paul's arrest?"

Like Lucy and Long, Pakbo had direct contact with the Swiss G-2. His chief sub-source was Salter, whose identity has not been firmly

established [87] but who may have been Louis Suss, born 6 October 1890 in Beblenheim, Alsace-Lorraine. A French citizen, Suss died in Switzerland on 25 April 1955. As of May 1968 his widow Friedel, née Kirschbaum, lived in Chene-Bourg, Geneva. There were two children, Christiane and Louis Michel. Christiane married an American ILO employee named Thompson. She was observed in 1955 at a meeting with a Soviet representative to the UN who is also a suspected intelligence operative.

Salter appeared in ten messages. He was in contact with former chancellor Josef Wirth and with British intelligence. He also knew Long and Kurz; in fact, compartmentation was often breached in the Rote Drei network.

One report says that a Professor Andre Oltramare and his son, Dr. Marc Oltramare, both passed intelligence to Puenter during the war and that he relayed their information to the Soviets. Andre Oltramare was a professor at the University of Geneva, where he lived with Jeanne Hersch, a philosopher much younger than he. At one time he was president or vice-president of the Geneva chapter of the Socialist Party. In 1933 he was a member of the Geneva Relief Committee for Political Prisoners, on which Pierre Nicole also served. Among his associates in 1942 were Jean Vincent, Max Horngacher, and Maurice Ducommun, all of whom were suspected of being Soviet agents.

One Mario Bodenmann, a Swiss Socialist and journalist, has also been reported as a sub-source for Pakbo.

A probable Pakbo source was "Bruder," who appears in only two messages, both from Dora to Director, dated 27 January and 10 May 1943. Both messages provide information about the production at the Oerlikon arms factory in Switzerland. The president of Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik Oerlikon, Buehrle and Co., was Emil Georg Buehrle. In middle and late 1943, as Foote has also related, the network was extremely short of funds. Pakbo and others solicited funds from Swiss businessmen, promising profitable post-war commercial orders from the USSR in exchange. Pakbo approached Buehrle, who did business with the USSR, on this basis; and Buehrle contributed 80,000 francs. After the war the Soviets refused to honor the

[87] Our friend Flicke, with his usual horse-sense, identified "Salter" as Erwin John Salter, an English bank clerk.

obligations incurred on behalf of the Rote Drei. Most of the businessmen complained bitterly, and Pakbo has alleged that he made some effort to repay the loans that he had personally solicited. Buehrle, however, merely wrote off the loss.[38]

Despite published claims to the contrary, there is no reason to believe that a source called "Lily of the Vatican" ever existed. Pakbo has denied that he had a line to the Vatican.

Jim

Foote claimed in *Handbook for Spies* that he and Rado were equals, or nearly equals, each having his own network, code, and communications system. The truth, however, is that Foote, like Puenter, grossly exaggerated his wartime importance. The traffic does not bear out Foote's claim that he had sub-sources of his own. On the contrary, Moscow clearly regarded him primarily as a W/T operator, although the most senior member in that category, and secondarily as a support man expected to give Rado help in problems of funding. Foote, whose cover name was Jim, appears 20 times in the messages in our possession. The time span is 31 October 1942 to 14 April 1944. These messages contain no new information, but they are of value in reducing Jim's self-portrait to its true, minor dimensions.

The Structure of the Rote Drei

Now that part of the Rote Drei structure has been partially excavated and cleansed of distortions, the outline of the whole can be delineated. Alexander Rado is at the apex of the network, having inherited the leader's role from Maria Poliakova and Ursula Beurton. Rado had three principal sources: Rachel Duebendorfer, Georges Blun, and Otto Puenter, listed in order of decreasing importance. Each of these had a network of sub-agents. Through Christian Schneider and Rudolf Roessler, Duebendorfer was in touch with the most important sources in the entire network: Werther, Teddy, Anna, and Olga. Others of Sissy's known contacts, by code name, were Paul, Pierre, Vita, and Mario. Probable additional, though minor, members of her net were Bill, Bircher, Brand, Diener, Fanny, Fernand,

[38] Foote did not believe this story, for which Pakbo was the source. Foote stated that the Rote Drei never received any money from Pakbo.

Schwerin and Stefan. Among his sub-sources Roessler listed, by name or description, General Hans Oster, Hans Bernd Gisevius, Carl Goerdeler, and an unknown man named Boelitz.

The second principal agent, Georges Blun, alias Long, directed a network which consisted chiefly of Agnes, Kurz, Grau, Rot, Fanny, and perhaps Feld.

The third principal agent, Otto Puenter, alias Pakbo, headed a net that included Salter and Bruder, as well as others whose cover names are not known.

Alexander Foote, alias Jim, was the most important of the radio operators. The others were Edmond and Olga Hamel (Eduard and Maude), Margarete Bolli (later Bolli-Schatz, cover name Rosa), probably Harry and Roger, and possibly others.

The Role of Karel Sedlacek

To this point we have viewed the Red Three network chiefly as an apparatus which produced intelligence for the Soviet military service. But Lucy's information, some or all of Long's, and probably Pakbo's also went to the West. The vital product, Lucy's, reached the Allies through a Czech colonel whose true name was Karel Sedlacek and whose alias was Uncle Tom. We have his story from General Frantisek Moravec, who as Sedlacek's superior had sent him to Switzerland in the first place. In 1935 Sedlacek was working in Southern Bohemia as an intelligence officer whose targets were in Bavaria. His talents and skill caught Moravec's eye, and Sedlacek was sent to Prague for a year's training in operating a W/T set, secret writing, and encoding and decoding. He was already fluent in German. In June 1937, his training completed and his cover prepared, Sedlacek left Czechoslovakia as Karl Seltzinger, a correspondent of the Prague newspaper *Narodni Listy*. For more than a year he built his cover in Zurich; then, by the fall of 1938, his first reports, military and political, arrived in Prague. By then the Czech officer was a friend of Major Hans Hausamann, the Swiss intelligence officer who directed the conveniently unofficial "Bureau Ha." In fact, it was Hausamann who provided Sedlacek's information.

By the spring of 1939 Sedlacek had begun to feel uneasy in Zurich, which was swarming with German agents. He moved to Lucerne, where Lucy was living. The two met because both used journalism as

cover. Beginning in September of 1939, Sedlacek was reporting by W/T to the London Czechs on German OB, movements, weapons, etc. His information came from Hausamann, who got it from Lucy, who in turn decided what information would go to which recipients. From 19 May to 6 September 1944 Lucy was under arrest, charged with passing intelligence to the Soviet and British services. From the date of his arrest, the flow of Lucy's information from Sedlacek to London stopped completely and finally. (It is thus established that information from Lucy to both the East and the West had ceased before the 20th of July 1944 and that therefore Lucy's sources could have been among the conspirators.) Sedlacek did continue to transmit other information to London until the war ended, but after Lucy's arrest Sedlacek's reporting deteriorated rapidly in both quality and quantity. Promoted to lieutenant colonel after the war, Sedlacek became the Czech military attache in Bern, where he remained until recalled to Prague in early 1947. How he was instrumental in launching Roessler upon the second phase of his career in espionage is reported below.

Earlier in this account, in a section dealing with Dr. Josef Wirth, a message of 5 October 1943, Dora to Director, was cited. Included therein was this statement: "According to Wirth the German Embassy in Bern is extremely interested in Sokolin." The remark appears in a context chiefly concerned with the Free Germany Committee, conceived in and directed from Moscow.

Vladimir Sokolin

Vladimir Sokolin (spelled Sokoline in some accounts) may have been the alias of one Vladimir Shapiro or Schapiro. Or Shapiro may have been alias, and Sokolin the true name. We shall call him Sokolin. The records which concern him are extensive but have not been summarized here because all available information indicates that he was not a part of the Rote Drei. Born in Geneva of Jewish parents, the father a White Russian and the mother Scottish, Sokolin became in 1937 the Under Secretary of the USSR's Permanent Delegation to the International Labor Office, League of Nations, Geneva, as well as the Assistant Secretary General of the League of Nations. There was a seeming break with Moscow after the USSR was dropped from the League of Nations in December 1939 as a result of the invasion of Finland. But either the split was unreal, designed to strengthen cover, or it was patched up and healed, because the reports of Sokolin's war

time activities clearly indicate espionage conducted on behalf of the USSR. He was in touch with Leon Nicole, Alexander Abramson, and perhaps others who were associated with the Rote Drei. It was also reported that through one of these contacts he asked Rado if he could be of service and that Rado relayed the suggestion to Moscow, where it was rejected. There are clear indications that Sokolin was engaged in economic espionage for the USSR after the war ended. It appears, then, that in this instance as in others, Soviet intelligence tried not to mix their networks, the security of which required separation.

Phase II: Lucy's Post-War Operation

Here our account would have ended if Karel Sedlacek had not known Xaver Franz Josef Schnieper, a Swiss citizen born on 6 January 1910 in Emman, Lucerne Canton. He had attended the Universities of Koenigsberg, Berlin, and Vienna, majoring in drama and intending to direct plays, an ambition which he had to abandon when the Nazis seized power. He first met Rudolf Roessler, who was equally interested in drama, in Berlin in 1933. By the beginning of the following year he had persuaded Roessler and his wife to move to Lucerne. Schnieper also went back to Switzerland and found employment in Lucerne as a librarian. By October 1936 he was a member of a leftist Catholic group which twice a month published, a news sheet called *Entscheidung* (Decision).

Sedlacek knew Schnieper well. He also knew that by the time the war ended, both Schnieper and Roessler were plagued by financial problems. Both were struggling to make ends meet as free-lance journalists. Sometime before his departure for Prague Sedlacek introduced his successor as Czech military attache to Schnieper. The successor, in turn, introduced Schnieper to Captain Rudolf Wolf of Czech intelligence.

In the summer of 1947 Wolf asked Schnieper to ask Roessler whether he was willing to resume intelligence work. Lucy agreed. With Schnieper serving as intermediary, Roessler supplied the Czechs—and thus the Soviets—with information, mostly military, on the forces, dispositions, weapons, etc., of the US, England, and France in West Germany, as well as the budding West German military force. They were sentenced by a Swiss court on 5 November 1953 to a year and nine

months respectively; but the time already spent in detention, nine months for each, was counted. Released in early 1954, Roessler died in 1958.

This bald account sounds mundane—a trivial, almost irrelevant epilogue to the glamorous days of World War II. Yet a moment's reflection shows that such a view is unjustified. Lucy's first phase lasted for only a little more than two years, his second for six. The second phase lacks the high drama of the first, but the fact remains that Roessler and Schnieper delivered valuable classified information to the Soviets, via the Czechs, in the post-war period as well. And the intriguing question of sources looms large in both phases.

Moreover, it is not likely that the two periods are unconnected. Lucy obviously had human sources for his 1947-1953 reporting, even though his defense heavily stressed the amount of information that he had gleaned from the newspapers. If we can unearth some of these people, we can expect to find links to the sources of 1941-1944.

One contact, according to newspaper accounts of the trial, was a Mrs. Theresa Hildebrand of the staff of a Chicago magazine called *Common Cause*. Roessler asked the Czechs if they wanted to add 1,500 francs monthly to his pay so that he could extend his coverage to the USA through Mrs. Hildebrand and her contacts. The indictment of Roessler said, however, that he had merely copied the names of Mrs. Hildebrand and others from *Common Cause* and that they were not implicated.

A professional source who examined some of the microfilmed reports prepared by Roessler and Schnieper for passage to Prague concluded that part of these had come not only from the Blank office [39] but specifically from the office of Joachim Oster, the son of General Hans Oster.

Joachim Oster, usually called Achim, was born on 20 February 1914 in Dresden. He entered the army in 1933 as an officer candidate with the Second Artillery Regiment. He was promoted to first lieutenant in 1938, to captain in 1941, to major in 1943. He attained general's rank during the post-war years.

In 1949 he began work as secretary to Dr. Josef Mueller, who was a friend of his father and a member of the 20th of July group. Oster

[39] Federal Ministry of Defense, then headed by Theodore Blank.

held this position for at least six years. During this period Mueller reportedly headed a group which worked for a neutralist, pro-USSR Germany. Other members of the group, besides Mueller and Oster, included Otto John and Georges Blun, whom we have already mentioned as "Long" of the Rote Drei.

In 1950 Joachim Oster was appointed to the Blank Office. He served as chief of the security section of Amt Blank (Department IV/A/6) and in this capacity conducted liaison with the British, Americans, and French, as well as with other Germans. In January 1956 he was transferred to other, presumably less sensitive, duties in the Ministry of Defense. About September of 1958 he was posted to Madrid as the military attache. There he reportedly established contact with the old Spanish Loyalist, Gil Robles.

The Return of Agnes

The unidentified contact of Roessler who reported in 1955 that Goerdeler, Gisevius, "General Boelitz," and "the predecessor of Canaris" were World War II sources of Lucy, also said that as of the reporting date Roessler was still in contact with one Lemmer, who was either in the Blank Office or who had a contact therein. Other Phase II sources were said to be one Thormann and a man named Borchheimer, who was a professor at the University of Heidelberg.

There can be little doubt that the first of these is the same Ernst Lemmer who, as "Agnes," was a Rote Drei source during World War II.

Dr. Werner Thormann

Thormann is believed to be Dr. Werner Thormann. He was born in Germany, acquired Austrian citizenship through naturalization, but until 1933 remained mainly in Germany, where he was chief editor of the weekly *Deutsche Republik* and the *Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung*. At an undetermined time he served Dr. Josef Wirth as his secretary, probably during Wirth's 1921-1922 period. After the Nazis' seizure of power he moved to Paris, and from September 1939 to May 1940 he was an editor and speaker on the German Freedom Station there. In July 1940 the US Government granted him an emergency visa, and he spent the war years in the US and Switzerland. As of April 1947 he was the editor of *Zukunft* (Future). He died sometime before 1958.

Professor Max Horkheimer

"Borchheimer" appears to be a garble for Professor Max Horkheimer, born 14 February 1895 in Stuttgart. About 1928 he became head of the Institute for Social Research, founded at the University of Frankfurt to disseminate Marxist Studies. When Hitler came to power, the Institute moved to Geneva. In 1934 Horkheimer came to the US and there established the main offices of the Institute under the sponsorship of Columbia University. By 1948 he was attempting to reestablish a branch of the Institute at Frankfurt am Main, and by the following year he was a member of the faculty of the University of Frankfurt.

There are reports that he is or was a fellow-traveller, once closely associated with the Lenin Institute of Moscow; that he has or has had Soviet intelligence ties; and that he had been considered for the position of psychological advisor to the West German Defense Ministry (Amt Blank) although he was an opponent of the Bonn government.

There is no proof that Horkheimer provided Lucy with information after World War II. And if he did so, the system of communication remains unknown. It is noted, however, that one Emile Siegmund Grunberg was the son of Karl Grunberg, the first director of the Institute for Social Research. He and his brother Karl were translators for the International Labor Organization in Geneva. Emile and his wife knew Alexander Abramson, alias "Isaac"; Rachel Duebendorfer, alias "Sissy"; Paul Boettcher; and probably other members of the Rote Drei network.

There is, however, a difficulty, a blur in the logic, inherent in the assumption that Josef Wirth, Joachim Oster, possibly Josef Mueller, Ernst Lemmer, Werner Thormann, and Max Horkheimer were Lucy's sources, or among those sources, during the period of 1947-1953. During this period the Soviets could have established contact with any of them much more simply and directly than through a procedure whereby they met with Roessler in Germany or Switzerland, Roessler passed reports to Schnieper and thus the Czechs, and the Czech service gave the product to the Soviets. Lemmer, in particular, was far better placed than Roessler to serve as the central collection point.

The question may be partly resolved by one of Roessler's major courtroom arguments in his defense. He maintained that almost every-

thing that he sold to the Czechs was compiled from overt sources, chiefly newspapers, and that the information given to him by his German friends was much less important. The claim may be true, for people who knew Lucy considered him a truthful man. The remainder of the answer is that the act of providing Lucy with intelligence would in no way have precluded the direct provision of the same or other information by the same sources to Soviet intelligence officers, or to both German services, East and West, or to practically anyone else. For these men, Lucy included, were great equivocators, adept, as the German phrase has it, at carrying water on both shoulders.

Lucy the Mercenary

There can be no doubt that Lucy himself was motivated chiefly, if not entirely, by mercenary considerations. Here are a few excerpts from the traffic flowing between Moscow and Rado:

"12.3.1943 . . . . Agree to buy Plan Ostwall for 5,000 francs. Does Lucy know whether these documents are genuine and reliable?"

"10. and 11.11.1943 . . . . Sissy states that Lucy group no longer works when the salary stops."

"14.11.1943 . . . . Please tell Lucy in our name that . . . his group will surely be paid according to his demands. We are ready to reward him richly for his information."

"9.12.1943 . . . . Inform Lucy not to worry about the money situation."

During the post-war phase Lucy submitted somewhat more than one hundred reports. He and Schnieper were paid a total sum of between 33,000 and 48,000 Swiss francs. Lucy kept three-fourths of this sum.

The Peddlers

During his career Roessler provided intelligence to services of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and England, at a minimum.

Malcolm Muggeridge commented in *The Observer*, 8 January 1967, on Lucy's cupidity: "I seem to detect a professional touch in the assiduity with which Roessler, when the Russians at last realized his worth, screwed out of them 7,000 Swiss francs a month by way of retainer and a lot of generous supplementary bonuses besides—by Red standards, a very high rate of remuneration."

And Wirth? His record suggests that he became a Soviet agent of influence in the early 1920's. A year or two after the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo he made the first of several trips to the USSR, where he conducted financial negotiations involving forestry rights and the construction of a railroad. He was pleased that German men and officers were being trained on Russian soil, in evasion of the Versailles Treaty, even though his own regime was called the "government of fulfillment" because it was supposedly carrying out all of its obligations under that treaty. The Rote Drei traffic itself shows that Moscow at times directed Rado to obtain intelligence from Wirth during World War II.

Yet he was also in contact with Walter Schellenberg, through Richard Grossmann and perhaps in other ways as well. Was he, then, withholding from the SD his relationship with the Soviets, as well as what he knew about the 20th of July conspirators? The answer to the first part of this question is probably yes, but the same cannot be said about the second, at least not with much assurance. Himmler was prepared to listen to proposals that were treasonable from a Nazi point of view whenever he deemed the circumstances secure. There are clear indications in the record that he envisaged himself as Hitler's successor. He once told Canaris that he knew perfectly well the identities of all the anti-Hitler plotters. In short, if Wirth and others were betraying the conspiracy to Schellenberg, they were also being double-crossed by Himmler who hoped that the plan to assassinate the Fuehrer would succeed.

The Soviets, the SD—anyone else? Wirth's major Rote Drei contact appears to have been the French journalist, Georges Blun. In 1940 he made a trip to Paris in order to inform the French government personally of the military situation in Germany after the invasion of Norway. He made similar trips after the war. There is a report of contact with the Deuxieme Bureau.

And there was some contact, on the record unproductive, with the OSS during the war.

Ernst Lemmer's intelligence contacts were discussed earlier: USSR, Swiss, and SD as a minimum.

Hans Bernd Gisevius joined the Nazis, worked in the German police and the Ministry of the Interior, yet joined the 20th of July

plotters. He supplied the British with intelligence for three and a half years before the war and during its initial phase. He then became a major OSS contact.

There are only uncertain indications that he was linked to the Rote Drei. One source reported that Gisevius had contact with Rado. His relations with the Swiss police were excellent, and he was on good terms with quite a few Swiss businessmen, one of whom was Emil Georg Buehrle of the Oerlikon machine and tool works. His ties to the courier Karl Forstmann have been noted earlier in this account.

We know that Gisevius had intelligence contacts with the Western Allies. Roessler listed Gisevius as a source. There are indications that he knew some members of the Rote Drei net and may himself have been alias "Rot" of that group. But are there also valid indications that despite the confidence which Hans Oster, Goerdeler, and others in the 20th of July group seem to have accorded him, he may have been an RSHA agent too? One report stated that Himmler's secretary had so identified him. Some post-war interrogations of German intelligence officers include their comments that Ernst Kaltenbrunner, RSHA chief and Schellenberg's superior, received reports from Gisevius as late as April 1945. The record contains other references to links between Gisevius and Heydrich, as well as Gisevius and Schellenberg. Such reports, however, are likely to be unreliable. All 20th of July participants became unpopular with most Germans. When Gisevius went to the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials in 1946 as a witness for Hjalmar Schacht, he became also a highly effective witness for the prosecution, hence doubly unpopular in post-war Germany. That some denunciations were inspired by rancour therefore seems highly probable. At first blush it appears odd that he was allowed to remain as a German intelligence officer in Switzerland after the RSHA assimilated the Abwehr, despite the fact that the Gestapo issued an arrest order for him in August 1944. But it should be recalled that Goerdeler, sentenced on 8 September 1944, was not executed until February 1945 because Himmler hoped that the contacts of such men with the Western Allies might save his own skin later. On balance, then, it is considered that Gisevius had intelligence contacts with the Americans, the British, the Swiss, and perhaps the Soviets, but not with Nazi Germany, except for his major role in the resistance.

The Stage and the Actors

This account has said next to nothing about the Swiss role in the drama of the Rote Drei. Today Switzerland tends to seem just the scenery of the story: the picture-postcard, snow-frosted backdrop against which the action was played out. But this aura of passivity, of being uninvolved, is really illusory. The fact is that certain Swiss officers were very directly a part of the activity of the Rote Drei. Understandably, this involvement remains a source of some concern to the Swiss, even today, because it is at odds with that strict neutrality which Switzerland has proclaimed for centuries as buckler and breast-plate.

The traffic, however—that obdurate record on which we have tried to base as much of this account as possible—plainly reveals Swiss involvement. When arrests were made, Moscow asked why Rote Drei members in contact with the Swiss authorities—Lucy, Pakbo, Long—did not get more information from them.[40] The Swiss General Staff was a sufficiently valuable source to have been given the Rote Drei cover name of Luise. Lucy's contacts with Swiss military intelligence preceded his work in the Rote Drei, and the same is very likely true of Pakbo and certain others.

At least two Swiss officers should be mentioned here. The first is Brigadier Colonel Roger Masson, now dead, who was the chief of Swiss wartime intelligence. The second is Major Hans Hausamann. Before World War II began, Hausamann had recognized that Switzerland, already teeming with the spies of other nations, was itself sadly lacking in military intelligence and in sources to provide it. In Teufen, near St. Gallen, he established an unofficial intelligence center, funded actually or nominally by himself and certain friends. When war came, this office, known as the "Bureau Ha," was linked to the official Swiss Army intelligence structure. Quite deliberately, however, the Swiss chieftains did not incorporate the office into the army but left it largely autonomous. It is reasonable to conjecture that this preservation of unofficial or only semi-official status resulted chiefly from the significant fact that a Bureau Ha outside the official framework could be far freer of the shackles imposed by neutrality than any part of the government could be.

[40] The arrests were made by the police. It is more than possible that the Swiss General Staff was well-informed about the Rote Drei but did not share its insight with the police, for reasons of security.

Dr. Xaver Schnieper worked as a junior officer in the Bureau Ha. He introduced Lucy to Major Hausamann. Only the Swiss know today whether the vital information coming from Germany went first to Lucy and then, via Hausamann, to Masson, or whether the Swiss received the bulk of the information from their sources in Germany and passed it to Sedlacek for relay to the British and to Lucy for relay to the Russians. What we can be sure of is that Switzerland was not just part of the World War II scenery; it had a piece of the action.

The story of the Rote Drei in essence, is the tale of two firm camps, between which shuttled ambiguous and uncommitted men. On the one side stood the anti-Hitler German conspirators. There was an East-West schism in their ranks, but they were united and unwavering in their resolve to rid Germany and the world of Hitler. On the other were the Soviet armed forces and intelligence services, also committed to Hitler's destruction but only as a step toward the same domination of the earth that Hitler had longed for. Both groups, the tiny and the vast, were made up for the most part of dedicated activists. Between the two forces were Roessler and certain of his associates: Wirth, Mueller, Lemmer, Gisevius, Horkheimer, probably Thormann, perhaps Joachim Oster. These are a different breed from such 20th of July figures as Hans Oster, Goerdeler, and Beck. During the 1943-1945 period, at least, Lucy, Lemmer, *et al,* were psychologically much more akin to Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, and Schellenberg than to the heroes of the resistance, the Soviets, or even such Rote Drei figures as Rachel Duebendorfer.

These were the men who posed as arbiters, as intellectuals who had preserved their integrity by being above it all. But the truth is that they did not say, "A plague on both your houses." They dickered. They sought advantage—private material advantage—from many quarters. Roessler, Blun, Lemmer, and the rest could have been replaced by any others willing and able to live well in wartime Switzerland; their roles were essential, though not very important, but they themselves, as individuals, were not of consequence.

The true heroes of the tale are those few Germans living in an age of appalling complexity, and of rottenness at the highest levels of their government, so that they were forced not only to risk a barbaric death but to deal unequivocally with the fact that what morality demanded of them was treason.

A few of them were Lt. General Ludwig Beck, suicide; Lawyer Hans von Dohnanyi, hanged; General Erich Fellgiebel, hanged; Dr. Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, hanged; Reichskriminal-direktor Arthur Nebe, hanged; General Friedrich Olbricht, hanged; Major General Hans Oster, hanged; General Fritz Thiele, hanged; Field Marshall Erwin von Wilzleben, hanged.

Lucy and his Rote Drei associates lived on.

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Thoughts on travel not to be found in your Baedeker.

A GOOD TRIP

Mary Evans O'Keefe Gravalos

"Tony had a bad trip last time."

"That can happen. He must have been in the wrong mood when he started out. Or—maybe—he didn't use the right means of transport."

"I don't like it," David said, "I'd like to do it if I thought I'd have a good trip but how can I be sure?"

"You can't," I told him. "But before you take any trip, listen to me."

Two Kinds of Trip

There are basically two kinds of trip which come under the general category of orientation for a Washington-based analyst. You can have an official passport and visit the embassies. If you are well-prepared you can spend your days talking and listening to embassy personnel, eat in the embassy restaurant, spend your nights in the hotel where arriving embassy personnel usually stay. You will never be far from hot and cold running water, orange juice, and coffee. When you come back you will be knowledgeable about those who write the reports you read and you yourself will find it easy to write an informative and long trip report.

The rationale for a second kind of orientation trip lies in the thought that the embassy has wisdom in its ways and has already communicated on paper its views, facts, and expectations. Since this is so—and if you are close enough to the working level to read reports—the orientation trip can be used to seek the background, to meet in the countryside people who are not already familiar with Americans, and to travel even in the capital outside the rut worn by a thousand Americans before you.

Evelyn Waugh wrote in *When the Going Was Good* that he proposed to do his traveling in strange places during his years of flexibility, leaving the most common tourist attractions to the end of his life, which he visualized spending in decrepitude. This pride in flexibility is important to any good trip of the second type.

MORI/HRP from pg. 91-97

Another helpful concept is one given to me by Grace Hanks. She said, "I always tell my children that when your plans don't quite work out, when the bus is stalled or a tire is flat, then you should be alert and interested. Perhaps an adventure is beginning." Other people like the word serendipity.

A Plan Gone Wrong

In fact when I was in Vienna one cold November, my plans to book a day's tour to the Hungarian border fell through, and I was disappointed because I had never seen an Iron Curtain frontier. I wondered if I would be able to do it on my own by riding a regular bus to Morbisch on the Neusiedler See. The hotel clerk's directions for taking a streetcar to the bus station, which lay on the other side of Vienna, were kind, courteous, and incomprehensible, but that problem was overcome by taking a taxi. At the bus station I hastily rehearsed German phrases in my mind. At the window, the clerk understood me, gave me a ticket, and took my money. As I was moving away toward the bus itself, an Austrian voice asked, "Why are you going to Morbisch? Are you visiting someone there?"

I thought at first that those countries close to the Iron Curtain certainly were keeping a close watch on comings and goings, but my questioner, who had the evocative name of Frau Marx, explained that she lived in Morbisch, knew everyone there and was just taking a friendly interest. Frau Marx and her daughter traveled with me on the bus. During the hour wait at the way station of Eisenstadt, Frau Marx sent her daughter with me to make sure I saw the Esterhazy castle. They obviously enjoyed thinking of anyone being as rich as the Esterhazys had been. Eventually, in Morbisch, I was invited to visit the Marx house where the half-modern, home-built kitchen had an enormous picture window looking out over the Neusiedler See to the Hungarian barbed wire. Company came to call. We talked about the harvest, the local dialect, the evangelical church and the public school where Frau Marx's mother had had to study Hungarian, Frau Marx to study Russian and the daughter now to study English. The mother, who could read Hungarian aloud but could not understand what she read, seemed to have done about as well as any of them with the language requirement. As we sat looking out over the lake we all had new red wine and bread spread with lard and sprinkled with red pepper. The disruption of my plan to take a tourist excursion to the Hungarian border had turned into that most interesting kind

of encounter, one, that is, with the people of one's assigned country who are at the same time so unfamiliar with Americans as to think that something like lard and cayenne on bread is a plausible offer.

The Airgram is Secret

Even if you are persuaded that you can best spend your time with places and people remote from US Government installations, you will probably be asked to "check in" at the embassies and consulates en route. This will be decided before you leave the States and an airgram will be sent to the overseas posts to notify them.

With normal luck, you will know the airgram number. With good pre-trip briefing you will remember that the message is classified SECRET while most communications about travellers' itineraries are of lower classifications. If you go to as many as five posts, however, the chances are good that at least one post will have secured the secret airgram so thoroughly that it can no longer be found.

This is not necessarily bad. When a friend of mine, then in a junior grade, went to a city in Spain long ago, he had that experience. The consul general was extraordinarily kind to him. An interesting trip to a nearby military base was arranged with the base commander for personal escort. The most elaborate dinner my friend ever had—and he is not accustomed to the simple life—was arranged by the consul general's wife with my friend as guest of honor and the guest list a roster of notables.

It has never been clear what visitor the consul general thought he had.

You Have One Wish

In those cases when your airgram is readily found, there are still problems for you to solve. You are by now in the hands of State Department's Administrative Officer. When he has identified you he will probably insist on taking you to "your own people." If you have never heard the name of the chief of station or the chief of base, you will scandalize the State Department officer, giving him a picture of intra-Agency chaos. You should know the names of the State Department people, too, whose reports you have particularly liked. Finally, you should prepare for the moment when someone in the embassy or the station asks, "Is there something we can do to help you?" This is the magic moment when you are given one wish as

if you were the hero or heroine of a fairy story. Choose carefully. If you say, "Well, I certainly wish I had a box of Kleenex," you will be given kind and fully adequate instructions for acquiring such a box. Then you are on your own. You could have said, "I wish I could tour the famous steel plant," "I wish I could talk to the key local Socialist," "I wish I could see a plantation," "I wish I knew how to take a collective taxi to a mountain village," or even "I wish to see the 400-year-old bush which the natives say will die to signal the slaughter of the oligarchy." In a place where travel is as difficult as Africa, you may want to try, "If anyone in the embassy is taking a trip anywhere in the country, I would like very much to go along."

Cover is a Problem

Another problem which you have to solve is living up to your cover. Whether unofficial or official, cover requires individual preparation which you must do on your own initiative. If you are a rich tourist living on inherited money, how have you been spending your time prior to this trip? How does it happen that you don't know who the runner-up was at Wimbledon? The necessity of developing your story for unofficial cover status is easy to see.

With official cover, detailed preparation is also necessary. Suppose, for instance, that when you were given one wish, you said, "I wish for a day-long tour of oil installations in the Lake of Maracaibo." For many years, and possibly still today, this wish would have put you in the hands of an Hungarian émigré who had taken hundreds of American officials around the lake and had visited Washington. It is only normal for him to seek to establish the fact of mutual acquaintances. What work exactly do you do in Washington? In what building is your office? With and for whom do you work? What ever happened finally to Jack So-and-So? What is the pay scale? How many Assistant Secretaries are there? Has there been a reorganization lately? Unless you can cope with questions like these, your avoidance of trouble will owe more to luck than to skill.

Once you have developed your cover story, you should stay with it. Some years ago a friend of mine was in La Paz, whiling away an evening talking to an American anthropologist. She was on an orientation trip, equipped with the cover story that she was a possibly rich, but certainly idle tourist. He was in town for some study of the

local Indians. The conversation ranged over various subjects—social stratification in the Bolivian jungle, the role of the Mormon religion in the United States, the need for central heating in all hotels that are 12,000 feet above sea level—as I say, a wide variety of subjects. After a pause, such as will come in the best of conversations, she heard the anthropologist say, "You work for CIA, don't you?"

Her heart sank, her hands and feet grew cold, but she managed to laugh and even to reply: "You mean those people who wander about Washington causing dead spots at cocktail parties by their bland statements that they work for the US Government? Well, no, I don't, but if they earn their living by roaming the world like this, I'd certainly like to."

Then came the anthropologist's next question, a question which gave her certainty that he knew that her tale of being an idle tourist was false. He asked, "Are you serious?"

"I'm always serious," she answered, "serious about what?"

"Oh," he said, "serious about wanting to work for CIA. I have some connections. I could get you an interview there."

She breathed a quiet sigh of relief. The anthropologist's preoccupation with the CIA had arisen from his own background and not from anything she had said of hers.

The point of this story is the old rule—even if you are challenged, stick to your cover story.

Cheap Transportation is Better

The choice of transportation is a chance to be off the tourist path. If you travel by plane, you are in the rut. The people you see and talk to are, generally speaking, those who have met a good many Americans already. If you rent a car, you may not meet anyone but the car rental people. Of course, if, for instance, you ram another car in Amsterdam, you may well be able to establish that not everyone in the Netherlands speaks English. In this instance, you would also have contact with insurance adjustors.

If, on the other hand, you seek the cheaper forms of transportation, you will almost inevitably have better luck. For a beginning move, taking a streetcar is great. It always comes back eventually to your boarding point. A streetcar conductor in a warm and friendly place

like Lugano may be upset at what he feels is a waste of your money but you cannot get lost. Either on a streetcar or a bus if you ask someone how long it takes to get to the destination, you will almost always be noted as a stranger and will be involved in a conversation before you know it. Trains are almost as good, with second class better than first.

Language

Of course language is important. The more you know of the language the further afield you can go. But a rudimentary knowledge of grammar and pronunciation will carry you a long way. You should under any circumstances know the local words for please, thank you, left, right, straight ahead, and where. Even without the language you may establish a pleasant contact. A friend of mine offered a cigarette to an old man who came to share a plaza bench in Cliza, in the heart of Bolivia's central valley. The old man spoke only Quechua but in return he gave my friend a tour of the town with an eight-year-old grandson as Quechua-Spanish interpreter.

Discouraging Advice May Be Inaccurate

Sometimes your colleagues and acquaintances may undermine your self-confidence a little with their predictions and advice. When I booked passage on a steamer from Belem to Iquitos, for example, I heard a great variety of suggestions and recommendations. The trip had not been easy to arrange. Cook's Tours first denied it was possible to travel the 2,500 miles to the Amazon headwaters by boat. After some argument, Cook's agent wrote to Booth & Co., the most likely shipping line, to ask. The reply came that Booth indeed sailed from Belem to Iquitos every two months and had space for six passengers.

I was triumphant but my colleagues and acquaintances had questions: "Who will the other five be? Only headhunters and missionaries seek the headwaters of the Amazon where the man-eating piranhas abound. Will you enjoy your companions?" I shrugged off these questions as trivial harassment, but every once in a while I wondered.

Departure day came at last and, as planes did in the long ago days of 1954, my plane flew from New York to San Juan to Fort de France to Port of Spain to Georgetown to Paramaribo to Cayenne and, 26 hours after leaving New York, finally to Belem. It was four o'clock in the morning and "the only hotel" professed never to have heard of me, but at least I had arrived at the starting point for my boat trip.

When day had fully come I went to the Booth Line Office. The agent was cordial there, gave me the exact time and place for sailing and asked if there were anything he could do to help me.

"Well," I said, "there's nothing important but could you tell me who the other passengers are?"

"Other passengers," the agent repeated, "Other passengers? Madam, you are the first passenger we have booked to Iquitos in 25 years. There are no other passengers."

It was an all right trip, though, and I was glad I had not worried about my compatibility with head-hunters. At the destination in Peru after 14 days, the ship's crew exchanged our cargo of dynamite for one of rare poison with efficiency and dispatch. Even the piranha stayed far from me during the Belem-Iquitos stretch and posed no threat until later on when I was visiting in Western Goias.

An important intelligence resource and how it works.

BIOGRAPHIC COLLECTION PROGRAMS

Charles E. Hablas

This article is concerned with the care and feeding of the intelligence community's main repositories for positive biographic information, the Central Reference Service of CIA and the Biographic Branches of DIA's Production Center. It is by a collector, for collectors. In other words, it is an exhortation to all who anticipate assignments abroad—for all such qualify as potential collectors of the information needed by the community to ensure an adequate biographic data base for each country.

Something About the Repositories

CIA's Central Reference Service and DIA's Production Center derive their authority in the biographic field from DCID No. 1/9. The former keeps the files and produces biographic intelligence on foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, social, and cultural personalities; and the latter is similarly responsible for foreign military personalities. It is indeed a rare intelligence officer or analyst in Washington—or official concerned in any way with US foreign policy—who has not made some substantial use, direct or indirect, of the services of these two biographic repositories. These offices handle the daily flow of requests for name check data or special biographic reports on personalities of immediate concern to community members (CIA/CRS alone deals with close to 35,000 such requests each year). They provide biographic data to supplement articles appearing in the community's current intelligence publications, and prepare profiles on prominent foreign visitors and on the non-US delegations attending international conferences. They compile biographic briefing books to support top US officials on trips abroad. They issue periodic intelligence memorandum on the appearances and activities of Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders, as source material for the community's political analysts. And they are the producers of such community reference aids as the directory of key personnel in foreign governments, revised and circulated monthly;

the detailed directories of officials in Communist countries; the CIA Biographic Handbooks, containing finished biographic sketches on the essential political leadership figures in each foreign country; and the similar DIA Handbooks on key foreign military personalities.

Many of us have, in fact, paid these two offices the ultimate compliment on numerous occasions. We have simply taken them for granted. We accept without question that there should be a strong community biographic capability at our beck and call for each foreign country. The need is obvious: for who could follow and understand the political forces at work in a foreign country without knowing something of the character and proclivities of its leaders; or assess the capabilities of its military forces (for war or coup) without considering the training, experience, loyalty, and outlook of its military commanders; or estimate the likelihood of its achieving a nuclear capability without having some knowledge of its scientific community? Since CIA/CRS and the DIA Production Center are supposed to provide the biographic services of common concern for the community, we accept a prompt and full report on the foreign personage currently interesting us as only our proper due.

There are, however, those other occasions, when our request for biographic data results in a report disappointingly thin in detail, or in no report at all. If our need is not a critical one, we are merely disturbed; we merely wonder how CIA/CRS or DIA could be without a complete dossier on such a prominent Ruritanian figure. (We recall quite clearly that he attended all of the Embassy's functions when we were serving in Ruritania.) If our need is more pressing—if it's coup-time in Ruritania and a prompt assessment is needed on the new set of leaders—we are apt to be much more exercised. We may even approach outrage when we learn later that the new Minister of Interior spent two years at Amherst in the late fifties, and that the colonel whose paratroops pulled off the coup learned some of his trade from US advisors. We conclude sadly that something must be wrong with the community's biographic set-up.

There is indeed something wrong in such instances, but it is hardly the set-up. The fault is more likely to lie with us and our poor biographic banking practices. All too often we do not make the necessary regular deposits when opportunity allows, and then there is nothing to withdraw from the biographic repositories when the need is upon us.

Collection Responsibilities

DCID No. 1/9 also assigns the primary responsibilities for the *collection* of biographic information: to the Department of State for collection on political, economic, scientific, technical, social, and cultural personalities; and to the Department of Defense for military personalities, and for such scientific, technical, and economic personalities as may be engaged in military-related activities. At the typical overseas post, these responsibilities are lodged with the Chief of Mission, usually operating through the Embassy's Political Section, and the Defense Attache. The Chief of Mission usually designates one officer to serve as "Biographic Coordinator" to oversee the local Foreign Service biographic collection and reporting effort.

The collection of biographic information at an overseas post is, however, not a matter of specific assignment; it is rather one of opportunity. Virtually all officers who serve at the post will have at least some of that opportunity; in fact, it will be almost impossible for them to avoid acquiring useful biographic data in the course of carrying out their primary assignments. The Political Attache in discussing US-Ruritanian relations with Foreign Ministry officials will certainly evaluate the professional capabilities of those officials and note their attitudes toward the US, and probably pick up at least the bare outlines of their personal and career history. This he will undoubtedly do for his own benefit, to increase his effectiveness in dealing with them—even without considering the community's long-range biographic needs. Similarly, the Assistant Air Attache touring a Ruritanian Air Force base will make every effort to "get to know" his hosts and assess their flying experience and capabilities. The Public Affairs Officer will do likewise in his encounters with local press and media executives, the MAAG officer will cultivate his local contacts in the armed forces, and so forth. Each will acquire much useful biographic data during his tour without even trying, and much more will be available to him with a minimum of effort.

Both the State and Defense Departments recognize the need to draw all personnel at a post into the biographic collection effort. A forthcoming revision of the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) notes that biographic reporting is "an integral part of the activities of overseas posts," and that "all officers should submit reports or contribute information for use in reports, and furnish their impressions of foreign personalities of actual or potential influence of

whom they have knowledge."[1] Similarly, the Defense Intelligence Collection Requirements Manual (DIRM) declares its basic guidance on biographic reporting to be applicable "to all Department of Defense activities that have a basic intelligence and/or counterintelligence misson, as well as other departmental activities that have a collection capability with regard to biographic data."[2] And the community's recently established joint program with regard to potential leaders even more explicitly calls for the collection of the desired information by all "Foreign Service personnel (including USIS and AID officers), Department of Defense personnel (including Attache, MAAG, and other personnel represented on the Country Team).

Targets: The Question of Who

The key consideration for the biographic collector is not what, but who. Most of us are pretty much aware of what constitutes useful biographic data on a given personality; and, if our memory needs some jogging on that score, we can always refer to the carefully detailed rundowns on types of information needed appearing in the FAM or the DIRM. But what we really need—especially at the outset of an overseas tour (new as we then are to the area)—is some specific guidance as to who is important enough to bother with. In narrow terms, we want to know who is important enough among the contacts we will have (or can make) locally to justify our preparing and filing a biographic report.

Such guidance will be available to us through three programs designed to focus biographic collection and reporting efforts on those target personalities of essential interest to the community. The first of these, the CIA Biographic Handbook Program, covers a country's current leadership, is essentially political in its orientation, and is of prime concern to Foreign Service collectors. The second, the DIA Biographic Handbook Program, involves military and military-related biographic targets and is of main concern to military attaches and

[1] 11 FAM 311 and 313c. (State's "Biographic Information Program" is presently covered in Chapter 500, Volume 11 of the Foreign Affairs Manual, but will appear as Chapter 300 in the forthcoming revision.)

[2] DIAM 58-2, Volume II, Part Nine, Chapter 2. (Two separate sections of the DIRM deal with biographic collection: the afore-cited one covering biographic reporting responsibilities and procedures; and DIAM 58-2, Volume I, Part One, Chapter 7, which delineates military and military-related targets.

other collectors present at the post. And the third, the Potential Leader Biographic Reporting Program, deals with a country's potential leadership and is a joint enterprise for all collectors. This last program will be accorded special attention in the descriptions to follow since it is the newest of the three and the most ambitious community effort to date at developing specific target guidance in the biographic field. But first a few words about the other two.

CIA Biographic Handbook Program

The CIA Biographic Handbook Program was initiated in 1963 as the official successor to the NIS *Key Personalities* effort. It involves the preparation and maintenance of finished biographies on the "core" group of current leaders in each country. Typically the Handbook for an "average" country would comprise biographies on 35 to 50 personalities, including the heads of state and government, cabinet ministers, leaders of political parties, key figures in the country's economic life, etc. These biographies are drafted by CIA/CRS analysts on the basis of data already submitted by posts and what can be culled from open reference sources and publications, and then reviewed by the Embassy concerned. The final products are assembled and distributed in loose-leaf binder format. The Embassy also periodically reviews the entire Handbook, and recommends adding, deleting, or updating biographies as would seem called for.

For the collector, the Handbook roster of names is a prime target list in the political and economic field. He should be aware of who is on that list; and, if it contains one or more of his contacts, he should most certainly inform himself of the extent of his post's biographic holdings on those contacts. In this way, he may be able to add usefully to those holdings. Moreover, Handbook targets are of such interest to the community that an additional assessment (evaluation) of one from a qualified post officer will always be welcomed.

DIA Biographic Handbook Program

Detailed descriptions of military and military-related targets of concern are to be found in the DIRM. The thrust of that target guidance is to make the post's military-oriented biographic collection effort a highly selective one, focussing on those military and civilian personalities essential to the community's understanding and appreciation of the particular country's armed forces and avoiding coverage

of those of minor or no significance. Military targets are carefully described in terms of the key assignments, ranks, and specialties of interest. Similar descriptions are also provided for civilian personalities, including key defense ministry officials, and leading defense industry and research personnel, etc. Coordination of post collection on such targets rests with the Defense Attache.

Potential Leader Biographic Reporting Program

The PLBR Program was initiated in February 1967 as a joint community enterprise. Its aim was to overcome widely recognized weaknesses in the community's biographic data base on potential leaders in non-Communist countries, particularly in the new and emerging nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These weaknesses had become painfully apparent during the mid-1960's in a flood of instances where sudden coups and other sweeping governmental changes catapaulted new groups of leaders to power about whom little or nothing was known. Too often the community was caught short in providing the biographic data needed by officials responsible for assessing consequences of such events and determining the proper response of US foreign policy.[3]

The program was designed to replace earlier broad and open-ended collection requirements on potential leaders circulated by individual community members with a coordinated approach of high selectivity and specificity. Briefly, it calls for preparation (and periodic revision) of a target list of potential leaders for each country by the Country Team, and coordinated collection of biographic data on the target personalities by Foreign Service, DoD, and CIA collectors at the post. Responsibility for the overseas aspects of the program, including coordination of the targetting and collection efforts is lodged with Chiefs of Mission; responsibility for preparing Washington support for the program rests with CIA/CRS. To date, it has been implemented for 114 non-Communist countries and territories, and has

[3] Intelligence officers will be interested to know that the concept of the PLBR Program actually originated with a collector. It is one of the legacies of Desmond FitzGerald, the late Deputy Director for Plans. The community's pressing need was no secret and was recognized by many, but it was Mr. FitzGerald who conceived the solution, developed it and proposed it to other community members, and then gave his (and his organization's) wholehearted support to its implementation.

targetted some 17,000 personalities to be reckoned with in the political future of those areas. It has proven of broad applicability not only to the emerging and coup-prone nations, but also to those European countries with stable political systems and highly developed economies.

Each post's target list—the "PLBRL" for that country—is a unique product. The Country Team starts with the community's basic definition of potential leaders: "those individuals with a significant potential for achieving leadership positions (1) of political importance or (2) with substantial political influence attaching." It then considers the local political forms and traditions, analyzing the alternative paths to such leadership and influence, and identifies those individuals who seem clearly to be proceeding along those paths. The typical list includes targets at the secondary levels of important government ministries and the armed forces, and in major political parties, business and public media circles, and labor and student/youth organizations. It may also include such targets as regional government officials, or religious leaders, or important cultural figures—who, in the opinion of Country Team members, seem likely to play a leading role in the future of the country. In the cases of less stable and newly emerging nations, special attention is paid to identifying appropriate targets among such categories as the military and security services (which often wield the most political clout), local opposition groups, and dissident and exile elements. In effect, the PLBRL picks up where the CIA Biographic Handbook's roster of *current* leaders leaves off, and represents the Country Team's considered judgment as to the proper depth and breadth of the community's overall biographic effort for that country.

In terms of collection opportunities, the post's PLBRL will probably be more relevant to most of us than the CIA Biographic Handbook. For most of our contacts and associations abroad are likely to be something less than top-level ones—to be with those individuals presently manning the secondary positions in the local government, military, political, and economic power structure. The PLBRL will tell us which of these are of prime interest to the community; and, by referring in turn to the associated "commentary," prepared by CIA/CRS for each PLBRL, we can determine the extent of current community file holdings on such targets and hence avoid duplication in our collection and reporting efforts.

The Individual's Contribution

As we implied at the outset, there are few specialists in biographic collection to be found overseas. This is not a matter of either the limited size or importance of the job, but rather because biographic collection tasks are (or should be) a natural part of our other, primary duties at the post. In a recent circular airgram, the State Department reminded posts that Foreign Service biographic reporting was "an integral and necessary part of post political reporting." And the same can be said with respect to the responsibilities of Defense and CIA collectors. For we are all expected to be collectors of the biographic information required by the community: to collect it and report it as a natural adjunct to our primary activities. The community sees the answer to its biographic needs not in "crash" collection efforts, but rather in the long-term, systematic exploitation of the contacts we make and the access we acquire while going about our normal post business.

How important are our individual contributions? Perhaps this can best be answered from the standpoint of the Washington biographic analyst—from the standpoint, say, of a CIA/CRS analyst called upon to prepare finished biographic reports on a new set of leaders suddenly coming to power in a foreign country. The analyst may indeed find some identifying data on them in such open reference works as the national *Who's Who* (if there is one for that country), or in overt directories of government officials and the local business community (if the post has procured and submitted these). At this point, he may be able to answer the customer query of "who"—to give at least the former positions of the new leaders, and perhaps to say something about their ages, birthplaces, education, and family. But this is likely to be pretty bland stuff. The customers of the moment, the officials who must assess the implications of this sudden governmental change and determine US policy response, want to know much more than this. They want to know what political behavior to expect of the new leaders, who is likely to influence them, and if and how the US will be able to deal with them.

The analyst will be able to meet these customer needs only if we have done our part. If we have, all of the necessary source material will be there when he checks the repository files. The new leaders will have already come to the community's attention, have been listed as targets on the post's PLBRL, and be now the subjects of dossiers.

Those dossiers will have in them Foreign Service "Biographic Data Form" reports which flesh out the qualifications and careers of the subjects, comment on their appearances and mannerisms, and contain the indispensable "Personal Analysis and Remarks of the Reporting Officer" (i.e., the first-hand assessments of these individuals, in terms of their abilities, ambitions, motivations, and attitudes toward the US). In the dossiers also will be the disseminated information reports of the CIA collector on their clandestine political activities, their private views an dattitudes, their not-so-visible reputations, and what happened (or did not happen) to them on their trips to Eastern Europe. For the military members of the new leadership, the analyst will find the DD 1396-1 reports of the Defense Attache, citing their training and previous assignments, evaluating their military competence, assessing their character, and perhaps indicating just what ambitions turned them to political pursuits. To complete the records, one of us may even have collected and submitted those "recent photographs" so prized by the biographic analyst as the finishing touch to the about-to-be published profiles.

What's in a name, and what's being done about it.

THE STANDARDIZATION OF FOREIGN PERSONAL NAMES

Viktor Y. Kamenev

In 1958, the Central Intelligence Agency initiated a project to standardize the spelling of foreign personal names. Its original purpose was to give assistance in the recording and searching of foreign personal names. Since then the project has been expanded to include information and guidance on the use of names and titles in all important languages.

To date, 36 studies covering 43 languages have been published. Five are currently in various stages of production and preliminary research is continuing on other studies. (See appendix.)

The personal names studies project provides authoritative sources to which reference may be made to determine how to record foreign personal names. Problems in mistaken identities arise from the absence of a standardized spelling of a name in question. For example, the question, "What's your name?" may receive the answer "Khalid Masood Sheikh." The hearer needs aids to know whether it is "Khalid or perhaps Kaleed?", "Masood or Massud?". The recipient of a report needs an authoritative guide to determine whether a given spelling of a foreign name is correct. Only then can he proceed consistently in a manner that will permit recipients of future reports to see the pattern. In a word, standardized procedures of correct identification are necessary.

The preparation of personal names studies draws upon the assistance of qualified linguists within the CIA and in other organizations, including the Foreign Service Institute, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the United States Information Service, the Library of Congress, the universities, and other institutions. The quality of the various studies obviously depends chiefly on the availability of competent linguists possessing the professional ability and the background to deal with highly complicated and detailed material. With regard to several of the more exotic languages, in which few non-native students are recognizedly expert, the problems are often difficult.

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The personal names studies are usually composed of three sections with appendices. The first section discusses the language, its scope and characteristics. The second section discusses personal names, their patterns and peculiarities. The third section discusses the transliteration system being used for the language which provides the basis for attaining the standardization of spelling.

Each study goes through essentially the same steps in the course of its production. The Arabic study, begun in 1959, is a good example, although the problems encountered in its preparation were considerably greater than those experienced in the case of most other studies. The first step was to determine patterns and problems in recording and filing Arabic names. During this process, it was noted, for example, that Arabic names were being recorded in various way, 'Abdallah and Muhammed occurring in over 50 variations, Sa'id in over 40, Hussein in over 30, and so forth.

An outstanding linguist and scholar of Arabic languages accepted the task of writing a study for transliterating the Arabic script used in the five following languages: Arabic, Kurdish, Pashto, Persian and Urdu. One transliteration system common to all five languages was established. The transliterated Arabic names were adapted to letters on an ordinary American typewriter. About a year passed before the first draft of the paper was submitted. This draft was reviewed and rewritten over the course of the next several months. Through the transliteration system, it became possible to establish a single spelling of a personal name as the correct one and list all other spellings as variants.

Lists of names in each language involving literally thousands of entries, which had been collected from telephone directories and other sources, were then submitted along with the new transliteration system to a recognized linguist in the particular language. The names were analyzed and checked for correct spellings. Then the new lists were key punched for machine listing. This phase of the study required three years. The catalogue, reduced to 14,000 names including variations, was then typed in final form and Arabic script was added. After proof-reading of the final draft, a 434-page study on Arabic script personal names was published. In the preparation of this study, one problem especially acute in Arabic script languages, but common to all the languages, was to obtain agreement among the various linguists.

Agencies such as ONI, DIA, NSA, FBI, and INR are on the regular distribution list for copies of each study as it is printed. Copies of the studies are also provided to the Library of Congress through which they are available to the academic community. When the studies are completed, they will be offered to all agencies of the government which need to work with foreign personal names as a complete and established transliteration system incorporating all important languages.

These studies are filling a need for standardization of personal names for the whole community, a service which is not being duplicated by any other government or civilian organization. It is anticipated that in the future the reporting, indexing, and recovering of names will be greatly facilitated through the proper use of these studies.

(See appendix)

APPENDIX

I. Completed Handbooks.

Spanish	Arabic Script (Arabic, Urdu, Kurdish, Pashto, Persian)
Portuguese	Thai
Rumanian	Telugu
Chinese	Hindi
Hungarian	Bulgarian
Vietnamese	Amharic
German	Hausa
Burmese	Estonian
Serbo-Croatian	Lithuanian
Slovenian	Gujerati
Polish	Armenian
Greek	Mongolian
Swahili	Albanian
Korean	Laotian
Latvian	Swedish
Finnish	Nepali
Czech	Russian (Ukrainian, Belorussian)
Turkish	
Slovak	

II. Names Studies Under Preparation.

Italian	French
Japanese	Spanish (revision)
Danish	Portuguese (revision)
Hebrew	

III. Names Studies Planned.

Dutch	Tamil
Icelandic	Somali
Norwegian	Tshiluba
Sinhalese	Cambodian
Azerbaydzhani	Indonesian
Uzbek	Malay
Georgian	Philippine
Bengali	Tibetan

Overseeing the intelligence community.

THE PRESIDENT'S BOARD: 1956–60

Philip K. Edwards

At the beginning of 1956, in part at least as an alternative to the proposals for a congressional watchdog committee that had been so vigorously debated during the preceding year, President Eisenhower appointed a Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities to help him oversee the work of the intelligence community and especially the CIA. Composed of men both competent and nationally prominent, the PBCFIA—no *pro forma* institution—kept intelligence activities under lively scrutiny for the remainder of the Eisenhower administration. Its critiques and recommendations were the prime mover in many of the important new developments of the period, for example the creation of the USIB and the establishment of the community's remarkably fast system for "critical" communications; and they helped shape many others, such as the accomplishments in advanced reconnaissance which were to achieve a breakthrough in data on the Soviet strategic posture.

Formation and Functioning

After General James H. Doolittle had completed his investigation of the Agency in October 1954, J. Patrick Coyne of the National Security Council staff had suggested that the Doolittle committee be formalized as a permanent advisory body to the President; and in the following February Lyman Kirkpatrick (who as the Agency's IG had been "case officer" for that committee) recommended to Allen Dulles in writing that CIA take the initiative on this suggestion, formulating the charter for a President's Board, nominating the members, and preparing a presidential announcement. Then in June the Hoover Commission, in endorsing the Mark Clark task force report on federal intelligence activities, likewise recommended that such a committee be formed. It was not until November 1955, however, that Dulles sent a memorandum to the President referring to Senator Mansfield's proposal for a congressional watchdog committee, explaining that he had not expressed opposition to it only because that would have been tactically unwise, urging that a board of about seven consultants

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be named before the Mansfield bill came up, and suggesting ten names from which to choose. After another two months spent chiefly in lining up the membership, the President created the PBCFIA by Executive Order 10656, effective 13 January 1956.

The Board's first chairman was James R. Killian, and the list of members included such well-known names as Robert A. Lovett, Benjamin F. Fairless, General Doolittle, Admiral Richard L. Conolly (who had been a member of the Clark Task Force), and Joseph P. Kennedy.[1] When early in 1958 Dr. Killian was named Science Advisor to the President he relinquished the chairmanship to General John E. Hull but remained on the Board. Staff Director for the Board was first Brigadier General John F. Cassidy and from 20 July 1959 on "Pat" Coyne, detailed from the NSC. In CIA the Inspector General was designated the normal channel for contacts with the Board, and Kirkpatrick established close working relationships with Cassidy and then Coyne.

Board members had been warned prior to their appointment that they would be expected to meet for several days not less often than twice a year, but in practice they worked much harder than that requirement implied. They met somewhat more often than that, and in between meetings they traveled, singly and in groups, all over the world inspecting intelligence operations. Beginning on 2 April 1956 they were briefed at great length on all aspects of intelligence activities. They required the submission of detailed semiannual reports from each intelligence agency. They themselves reported in writing to the President at least annually, and they made a total of 37 major recommendations for improvements in the community. They followed through to see that these recommendations were acted on and that the President should know about it if they weren't.

Although, as is to be expected of any high-level, part-time advisory body, the Board's conclusions occasionally suffered from insufficient intimacy with operations—they found a big problem, for example, where there hardly was one, in coordinating USIA's unattributed (but

[1] Other original members were General Hull and Edward L. Ryerson. Later in the year C. W. Darden and David K. E. Bruce were appointed. Kennedy had resigned, officially because his son was campaigning for office; but he had in fact not felt comfortable in the work, not having had much experience with intelligence. In subsequent years resignations were tendered by Bruce, Fairless, and Killian. The last was replaced by William O. Baker.

not unattributable) propaganda with that of CIA—the recommendations were by and large realistic and discerning, and the efforts required to meet them were well spent. Certainly they concentrated on the crux of the intelligence mission—early warning, plans for wartime operations, data on Soviet missiles—and the means to these ends—signals intelligence, communications, advanced reconnaissance, and an integrated intelligence effort under a strong DCI. Only secondarily were they concerned with effecting economies by reducing duplicate activities. With respect to clandestine operations the Board's work was less productive, but it did improve the coordination of covert action programs and lent the weight of its approval to some measures undertaken by the Agency.

War and Warning

Two of the Board's first set of recommendations, submitted in December 1956, had to do with planning for wartime. One of these, asking for plans to assure the "proper functioning" of the (headquarters) intelligence community in wartime, a difficult problem because of shifting assumptions about wartime conditions and plans for continuity of command, was eventually assigned as the responsibility of a USIB committee on "emergency planning" considering a whole spectrum of types of emergency, and no further action on it was separately reported to the Board. The other, however, urging that planning for wartime activities in the field be brought "to the highest readiness" and that realistic war-gaming with the military forces be begun, required semiannual reports recounting in detail these plans for all theaters and especially the results of war-gaming and progress in correcting revealed deficiencies. Joint CIA-JCS reports were in fact submitted every six months until 1960, when it was agreed they might be made annually in the future.

The Board's persistence in seeing that measures it recommended were carried out is better illustrated in those designed to improve early warning capabilities. The President's concern about the danger of surprise attack, evidenced at the summit conference in 1955, had not been allayed; Jerome Wiesner's "Warning and Defense in the Missile Age" had pointed up the problem; an IAC subcommittee was studying it, and a recent National Estimate had not been optimistic. The matter was under consideration in the Board's meeting of 28 September 1957, but the launching of Sputnik I the following week must have contributed urgency to the language of the recommendation

made on 24 October, that under the personal direction of the DCI and with the highest priority, the total resources available to the intelligence community be concentrated on processing and communicating prior warning of Soviet attack. Another recommendation of the same date, that the IAC be merged with the US Communications Intelligence Board, singled out the National Indications Center as a particular concern of the proposed USIB. The text of the report to the President which conveyed these recommendations apparently mentioned also the need for a survey of the whole strategic warning mechanism centered on the NIC and the Watch Committee.

To the Board's next meeting, at the end of February 1958, it could be reported that the Secretary of Defense had been designated executive agent for providing a worldwide network for critical communications, that processing and relay procedures were being worked out (the CRITIC system) with the aim of getting warning messages from originator to action desk in speeds approaching ten minutes (as against the 1 to 40 hours, plus up to 5 hours shuttling around Washington, that a sampling the previous fall had shown top priority messages to be delayed), and that relay stations in the NSA network, which would form the core of the communications net, were being automated. In May a progress report noted that Defense was working on the new communications system, and in July the CRITIC procedures were put into effect.[2]

There were already signs of Board and White House impatience for more rapid progress, however. In June, when Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles had requested a second postponement for a joint progress report (with CIA) on the system, he received a curt note from Robert Cutler, presidential assistant for national security affairs, to the effect that the President would be informed of this "further deferral" and that the report would be expected by 15 August. In its next set of recommendations, in October 1958, the Board asked that work be intensified on measures for improvement without waiting for the over-all study being made of the communications system; and the NSC, passing this recommendation on to the DCI, specified that a system of tests of the CRITIC system be set up. The tests, as reported to the Board in its April 1959 meeting, showed message times greatly reduced, to an average on the order of an hour, but the goal of ten minutes could not be approached, the DCI stressed in a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, until Defense had developed the pro-

[2] See *Studies* IV 2, p. 19.

posed new communications system. In May, William O. Baker, who had headed a panel set up to help improve NSA operations, told Killian that the network Defense was trying to use was "fragmentary, uneconomic, and dangerous."

At the Board's next meeting, in July 1959, General Hull insisted that CRITIC performance be improved without waiting for new equipment to be installed in the network; and out of this meeting came recommendations devoted exclusively to critical communications—that the existing system be reorganized in a way compatible with the ultimate global network, that this be done under guidance of the Secretary of Defense, that there be frequent tests, and that procedures be improved. In December, in a report to the President that Dulles ruefully called "tough," the Board drew attention to its longstanding request for a full survey of the strategic warning mechanism and recommended that the DCI complete this, prepare specific indicator lists to supplement that covering general indicators, and bring the Watch Committee and the NIC to maximum efficiency.

The strategic warning survey was still only about one-third done when the Board went out of existence with the change in administration in January 1961, but the drive for speedy communications had produced impressive results. Throughout the government-controlled bulk of the network the lag for CRITIC messages was in fact approaching an average ten minutes, and it was only from places where commercial communications still had to be used that it had to be measured in hours.

Soviet Missiles

The putative missile gap that was a matter of genuine concern during these years and until after the Board had been disbanded was reflected in all its deliberations after Sputnik I and particularly in its attention to two collection systems, Comint-Elint and advanced reconnaissance, which spearheaded the attack on not only the warning problem but also that of missile characteristics and deployment. (The President himself was apparently more concerned in December 1958 with warning: in grumbling that people always tell him this or that reconnaissance project won't give itself away and then a lot of the balloons come down in the USSR and all the manned overflights are detected, he remarked that the U-2 didn't seem to be much good for

warning anyway; you have to have live agents in the right place for that. But a month later we find him getting briefed personally on all the latest photographic take.)

Both of these systems were on the agenda for Allen Dulles to talk to Killian about the day before the Board met with the President to make its first recommendations; in December 1956 "the Bissell project" or "Aquatone" had been operational for less than a year, and Killian's advice was to be sought. It was not until the next year, however, that Richard Bissell, along with Arthur Lundahl, whose Photo Interpretation Center was processing the take, gave the full Board a briefing at its September meeting. The Board also discussed the earth satellite program, which seemed less promising than manned vehicles for reconnaissance because satellites could not be put just where you wanted them. Its recommendation, issued in October, was that advanced reconnaissance be given "adequate consideration and handling," but more broadly that the primary efforts of intelligence be devoted to the Soviet missile program and to getting the "hard facts" on the Soviet strategic air arm.

The U-2 program was apparently kept under considerable presidential restraint, at least until shortly before it was blown by the Powers shoot-down, although by then the missile gap had become a hot political issue. Meeting in April 1958, the Board noted the standdown of Aquatone because of current international tension; and on 1 March 1960, Dulles suggested in writing to the NSC that the cardinal objective of information on Soviet missile deployment could be better achieved if the U-2 were given freer rein. This latter was counter to the Board's recommendation in the preceding December—another of the few unrealistic tangents it went off on—that the Priority National Intelligence Objectives be revised to call for national intelligence (rather than things of departmental interest, such as order of battle), a recommendation presented just after the PNIOs *had* been revised and with the oral comment that there should be only one national object of any considerable priority—Soviet missile deployment.

With respect to the development of reconnaissance by earth satellite there seems to have been little to report for a year and a half except the spending of $7 million on intelligence aspects of the satellite program as of 21 May 1958, but in March 1959 a progress report was submitted by the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency: the USIB agencies were represented on a working panel

for space surveillance; in January, Defense and NASA had signed an agreement for mutual support; an interim National Space Surveillance Coordinating Center was in operation pending the readiness of a permanent one, expected by July 1960; for ten months a satellite detection "fence" had been carrying on experimental operations to find "dark" objects in space; the Jet Propulsion Laboratory was analyzing tracking problems. Later that month the USIB took over from ARPA the direction of the panel on intelligence requirements and capabilities in space surveillance and an ad hoc Satellite Requirements Committee.

By the spring of 1960 the prospects for SAMOS satellites were sufficiently encouraging that Robert Amory, the DD/I, recommended to Dulles (two days before the Powers shoot-down) that he present to the Board, as one of three fundamental issues for intelligence for the next decade, the proposition that reconnaissance by satellite should be made wholly overt and its legitimacy established as a matter of international law.[3] During its May 1960 meeting the Board spent one afternoon in CIA's Photo Interpretation Center, and in September both the developments with respect to SAMOS and a review of the U-2 program were on the agenda of its next-to-last meeting.

In response to the Board's broader call for primary attention to the Soviet missile program, an ad hoc subcommittee of the IAC was formed under the chairmanship of Herbert Scoville, Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, to consider the problem, and early in February 1958, Scoville offered the IAC alternative charters for a subcommittee on Guided Missile Collection Activities (which he himself advocated) and one on Collection Activities generally, which the ad hoc committee had proferred.[4] In the meantime, however, the USCIB had apparently also taken up the question. On 26 February it tabled in a joint IAC-USCIB meeting the draft charter for a Critical Collection Problems Committee, and this was approved. The CCPC then became the instrument for focusing collection efforts on missile intelligence with a priority symbolized by putting the Deputy DCI in its

[3] Amory's other two propositions have fared better; they were that military intelligence should be unified and that a national photo interpretation center should be set up.

[4] This was no new project for Scoville; almost a year earlier he had proposed to Lucian Truscott, the DCI's new Deputy for Coordination, that a committee be established to coordinate scientific and technical collection activities.

chair. It was reported to the Board on 28 February that the Committee was already overseeing two projects, and a progress report of 21 May identifies two, presumably the same two, as acoustic intelligence and one concerned with the airfields of the Soviet Long Range Air Force. The Board seems never to have given any further special attention to the activities of the CCPC unless one of its very last recommendations, in October 1960, that SAC renew the peripheral collection of Elint, would have been a concern of the Committee.

The NSA

Elint-Comint was in any case the other major collection system contributing to early warning and missile intelligence, and it needed attention. In 1956, Elint activities were scattered among several agencies while Comint was shared by NSA, reporting to the Defense Department's Office of Special Operations, with the intercept agencies of the individual services. In December Allen Dulles told Killian that the NSA problem was the most serious in the community; he hoped that the Board's attention to it would maintain the impetus toward a solution that had been given by the recent appointment of General John A. Samford as NSA director. Judging by the recommendations the Board made that month, the NSA problem had two aspects—the difficulty of breaking the best Soviet ciphers, and how to make a fruitful selection from the mass of intercept traffic available—along, perhaps, with some more general managerial difficulties.

Besides a probably mistaken recommendation that Comint be put under an Assistant Secretary of Defense, presumably in order that it have more high-level attention,[5] the Board's proposals were, first, that the President himself lend his prestige to a recruitment drive for cryptanalysts to work on Soviet ciphers and, second, that Defense make a strong effort to develop better machines and techniques for NSA to use in selecting intercepts. Gordon Gray's Office of Defense Mobilization, however, under whose auspices the Board had suggested the recruitment drive might be mounted, recommended in April 1957 that a panel of ten under William O. Baker first study the problem; and the President approved this recommendation, asking for a report by 1 September.

[5] This was successfully opposed by Defense, with CIA concurrence. It was argued that NSA got more attention in the Secretary's office by being under Special Operations.

The report of the Baker panel, of which a draft began to circulate in September and was commented on by CIA only the following January, recommended among other things that a research institute be founded to study Soviet ciphers, that measures be taken to speed up the communications network for warning purposes, and that NSA take jurisdiction over Elint also. At its meeting of 28 February 1958 the Board noted that the Baker report was being implemented, and in the following April it received a DCI report on the progress of the implementation; but it was not until the end of July that State and Defense concurred in giving Elint to NSA.

The Board continued throughout its existence to give particular attention to NSA. In October 1958 one of its formal recommendations called for strong leadership on the part of the Agency's director; at its April and July meetings in 1959 it heard reports on the "noticeable progress" Samford was making; and in December 1959 it recommended that collection requirements levied on NSA be channeled through OSO for review and guidance. The DCI took strong exception to this last recommendation, even after it was explained that it referred only to the requirements of the military services, saying that the regulation of requirements was a matter for USIB, where all the military agencies concerned were represented, and the OSO should stick to management. In the NSC's follow-through on the recommendation, it was generalized to refer to the implementation of Comint-Elint fusion, and the NSC required joint DCI-Defense progress reports on 8 March and 15 June 1960 and annual reports on 1 May thereafter.

In May 1960, after Samford had left the NSA, the Board pointedly recommended more continuity in the directorship. And in December 1960, finally, it showed its concern over the Martin-Mitchell defection by recommending an investigation by an outside agency, preferably the FBI, and by proposing that the Secretary of Defense be given the same kind of authority over personnel in security matters as the DCI has.

Strong Central Direction: the DCI

One of the main themes that ran through all the Board's thinking was expressed in the very first of its first set of recommendations, that the DCI should "exercise a more comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility" and move the community's effort "in the direction of integration, reduction of duplication, and coordination." Inte-

gration under strong centralized direction, another recommendation declared, should strengthen the intelligence effort and contain its costs. In part to achieve this purpose, a third called for the revision of the NSCIDs. And a fourth proposed, in order to free the DCI to exert this central leadership, that he turn over day-to-day detail to a chief of staff or executive director.

Almost every subsequent meeting of the Board produced further needling along these lines. It met with some response, certainly, but that the Board was dissatisfied with how much is evident in the foremost of its final recommendations, submitted in October 1960. In an almost exasperated tone it recommended that the DCI say, first, what legislative or executive action was needed to centralize the direction of intelligence activities and, second, whether the DCI should also head an agency operating in competition with other intelligence agencies. Dulles replied in effect "None" to the first and "Yes" to the second. It was his disposition to lead by persuasion rather than command, and he believed that strong central direction of the traditionally competitive agencies of the community could be achieved only gradually.

In the matter of appointing a chief of staff, in particular, he felt strongly that no one should stand between him and his deputies in the functional directorates. He proposed in February 1957 to meet the Board's purposes by creating a new deputy for coordination, a position for which Lucian Truscott would be available, with no other duties than to exercise that function of the DCI's, and at the Board's next fall meeting he defended this proposal, said that he was also expanding the duties of his executive assistant, John Earman, to those of an executive officer, and suggested that an exchange of letters with the President, perhaps made public, on the DCI's coordination responsibility would help to emphasize it. No action was taken on the latter suggestion, but the President approved the new Deputy position in May 1957.

This compromise arrangement the Board found, after a trial period, to be inadequate, and in October 1958 it again recommended the creation of an executive director. The NSC, however, presumably on Dulles' urging,[6] amended this proposal in passing it on and offered

[6] He is recorded during the following December as having expressed to Robert Lovett of the Board his continued opposition to the recommendation.

as an alternative the expansion of the Inspector General's responsibilities. The latter was reported to the Board's next meeting as having been accomplished.

Directives and Coordination

Another centralizing measure that was resisted the Board pushed through with greater determination—the consolidation of the USCIB and IAC as a single USIB. It made this recommendation in October 1957, but three months later Dulles, reporting to the NSC that the service intelligence agencies were opposed, suggested that any such action be deferred. The NSC referred this response to the Board for consideration; the Board reiterated its recommendation. On 14 March 1958 the President flatly directed compliance, and six months later the USIB held its first meeting.

This consolidation required a rewriting of NSCID 1, but the NSCIDs were already in the process of revision as a result of the Board's first set of recommendations at the end of 1956. In September 1957 it had been reported that only numbers 5 and 9 were still giving trouble. No. 9, concerning Comint, touched on delicate questions with respect to the exclusiveness of the NSA charter (cannot CIA continue to do its own processing of plain-text intercepts picked up in clandestine operations? Could not some hard-to-cover NSA stations be eliminated if one took advantage of CIA liaison with friendly foreign services to get their Comint?) and whether the DCI should have membership in the State-Defense Special Committee to which the USCIB was supposed to report. Now with the unified USIB the Special Committee was eliminated altogether and the other questions presumably became easier to solve.

By October 1958, at any rate, the directives issue was one of implementing the new NSCIDs by issuing DCIDs. Here the persistent sticker became aspects of clandestine coordination not settled in NSCID 5—FBI contacts with foreign intelligence services and, more seriously, "agreed activities" in clandestine collection on the part of the military services. The Board was well aware of the latter problem, especially in its acute manifestation with respect to clandestine Army activities in Berlin; several members had brought back their own impressions from inspection on the spot. What the Army wanted was a license to explore operational possibilities up to a point without prior coordination. When the DCID was finally issued in December 1959,

almost simultaneously with another needling recommendation from the Board, it withheld any such license; but it did not lay the issue to rest. The military elements in Berlin, where most of the trouble was, were prepared to follow the directive in good faith, but their superiors in West Germany were not.

Another kind of coordination was involved in an innovation apparently pushed through by the Board's staff man, General Cassidy, and Kirkpatrick in CIA acting in concert—coordination in producing finished current intelligence. In January 1957, evidently seeking some accounting for the surprise we suffered in the British-French-Israeli attack on Suez, the Board asked for copies of all the community's current intelligence dailies for 24 October 1956 (and all weeklies for that week and monthlies for that month). In reviewing this material Cassidy found flaws in current intelligence operations—no community-coordinated product, inadequate coordination of collection requirements, bad telephone security—and in March he brought these to the attention of the DCI. Kirkpatrick, recalling how two years earlier his inspectors had recommended that the Agency's current intelligence product be coordinated to obtain the concurrence of other members of the community and that it be tailored more sharply to the needs of the President and the NSC, now recommended to Dulles that the Cassidy suggestions be acted on in this sense.

The matter was taken up at all the IAC meetings during April 1957 and a reply to Cassidy formulated, which Dulles forwarded on 1 May. It brushed off any idea of drastic change: there would be more consultation with other agencies in the course of producing the Agency's daily, and dissemination was being reviewed. In July Cassidy was reported annoyed at the failure to institute production of current intelligence endorsed by all agencies, and in September Kirkpatrick again called Dulles' attention to deficiencies in the Agency product and recommended that Truscott prepare a plan for the production and dissemination of coordinated, community-wide current intelligence. This time it worked: in November the dry run of a new, coordinated daily to be renamed Central (instead of Current) Intelligence Bulletin was being reviewed.

Costs and Duplication

A secondary benefit the Board expected to derive from a better integrated and coordinated intelligence community was the containment of costs through reduction of duplication. (This objective may

have held a higher priority with the President himself than it seemed to with his Board; Eisenhower was reported shocked to learn that intelligence agencies were spending a billion dollars a year and desirous that they economize.) No action, however, was reported taken in specific response to this suggestion in the Board's first recommendations. In September 1957 Killian suggested to Cutler, not as a formal recommendation of the Board, that the IAC's annual report on the status of the foreign intelligence program would be better as a DCI report which included figures on the budget and personnel for the whole government intelligence program; and this suggestion was apparently the nucleus of the cost-control attempts that began a year later.

In April 1959, it was reported to the Board that in response to one of its recommendations of the preceding October, to the effect that the DCI should search out and eliminate areas of unnecessary duplication, a community-wide budget was being worked on (and CIA manpower being reduced). Since July 1958 an ad hoc working group had been studying the problem, and in June 1959 the CIA Comptroller submitted to the USIB a procedure for uniform cost estimating and a USIB Cost Estimates Committee was formed. No further progress in this matter, however, seems ever to have been reported separately to the Board.[7]

Perhaps realizing that the approach through the budget held no promise of early reductions in duplication, the Board also made a more specific attack on this problem which was evidently of concern to the President. Just before Christmas 1959 it asked the USIB for an inventory of all intelligence periodicals published in the community; and when it had received and studied this it recommended, in May 1960, that the duplication among them, especially those issued by Defense agencies, be eliminated. In early October it reissued this recommendation without making special reference to Defense.

About this time Gordon Gray, who had now become the President's assistant for national security affairs, wrote to the Board that the President wanted more accomplished in reducing duplication and hoped the Joint Study Group, which had been formed in July,[8] would

[7] That progress with respect to some of the recommendations was not reported to the Board does not necessarily mean that none was reported to the NSC.

[8] As a compromise when the Bureau of the Budget proposed a survey of intelligence activities which the Board felt would encroach on its own functions.

be effective therein. At the end of October the NSC asked the DCI for a progress report by 6 January 1961 and then for another by 1 June. At last report to the Board, however, the USIB Ad Hoc Committee on Intelligence Publications, which had been formed to make the inventory and extended to study action on the recommendation, was still working with the objective of reducing the number of intelligence dailies from 13 to 1.

Covert Action

The Board was uneasy about the Clandestine Services' non-intelligence activities. One of its first recommendations, in December 1956, was that procedures be set up to insure that projects under NSC 5412 get "joint staffing"[9] and formal approval in advance and that State and Defense be kept abreast of their implementation within the principle of need to know. The rules drafted in response to this recommendation and approved in March 1957 provided that a Special Group consisting of the Under Secretary of State (Herter), Deputy Secretary of Defense (Robertson), and the President's national security assistant (Cutler) would be the policy authority[10] and would in each case decide whether it was necessary to have an ad hoc staff-level group examine the proposal in detail, except that sensitive projects with no military implications might, with the President's permission, be approved by the Secretary of State alone.

It was reported to the Board in September 1957 that the Special Group was holding meetings, but it apparently remained less than fully active. In October 1958, perhaps because of trouble with the operations in Indonesia that had been discussed at its meeting the previous spring, the Board issued three recommendations designed to restrict freedom of covert action. One insisted that the Special Group review all clandestine programs. It was pointed out that the President assumed it had been reviewing them; he directed that they be "staffed" in advance, reviewed while in progress, and analyzed on conclusion.

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[9] This phrase caused a good deal of confusion until it was explained to mean, not the planning and direction of the operations by an interagency staff, but a detailed (i.e., staff-level) joint examination before policy approval.

[10] Such a group had always, with some variation in detail, been the *pro forma* authority under 5412; under this pressure from the Board it was to become more active now.

Another recommendation asked that Defense designate one of its offices for CIA to deal with concerning operations with military implications. This call for coordination machinery outside the Special Group procedures must have referred to operations really requiring joint planning and execution, as a major operation against Cuba would. (In a curious exchange of views the President thought that the Defense office in question should be the Joint Chiefs; Gordon Gray suggested that political aspects might involve the Secretary of Defense and ISA; and the President replied that if it was a political matter it wasn't Defense's business.) It was reported to the Board at its meeting the following spring that action was being taken on this recommendation by setting up a "cold war planning group" with representatives from OSO, the Joint Staff, and the Secretary's office.

The spring 1959 meeting, most of which was devoted to a briefing in depth designed to overcome the skepticism the Board had displayed about the effectiveness of political and psychological operations, was also told that the Special Group (now Gray-Herter-Irwin and later Gray-Murphy-Gates) had instituted regular weekly meetings and would be briefed in advance on all projects. The Board continued anxious that the Group exercise real control: at its meeting the following July it quizzed Gray and Dulles as to whether the State member gave positive advice or just went along with the DCI's proposals, whether the Defense member participated in decisions on political matters, and whether the Group as a whole was doing everything the President had expected it to do.

The third recommendation of October 1958 concerning covert action was that the DD/P organization be relieved, first, of evaluating the effectiveness of its own operations and, second, of making the estimates on which its operations would be based. The first response to this was simply to note that Richard Bissell, with whom the Board had been acquainted originally as Dulles' assistant in the specialty of advanced reconnaissance and then as agreeing to take over the DD/P research organization, the Technical Services Staff,[11] was now, in his capacity as the new DD/P, undertaking a major reorganization of the directorate. Progress in the reorganization as bearing on this recommendation was several times reported both to Board meetings and in writing to the NSC, but the response was not completely

[11] Presumably in addition to his responsibility for Aquatone. No formal action in this sense was ever taken.

satisfactory: Gray once complained that a DCI report addressed itself only to the first half of the double-barreled recommendation, and Kirkpatrick pointed out to Dulles that another report claimed changes which in fact were only the formalization of procedures long since practiced.

In May 1960 the Board recorded its feeling that there remained more to be done by recommending that the reorganizing of the clandestine services be continued. At the same time it recommended that chiefs of station be given higher cover rank, a matter on which talks were then begun with State.

For all its uneasiness about the covert action programs, the Board was anxious to get something going in Cuba. In January 1960 it had to be explained at some length that while general plans could be laid and assets developed, no specific project could be formulated until policy was decided at the top. And after some operations in Tibet had been described, Hull remarked that it seemed silly to make such an effort on the other side of the world when Cuba was right on our doorstep.

Demise

The agenda for the Board's last meeting, in January 1961, included consideration of the report of the Joint Study Group, the preparation of its own report to the President, and a meeting with the President. Its members all resigned, of course, with the change of administration; but it was apparently expected that the Board itself would continue in existence and new members be appointed. On 6 February Dulles sent McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's national security assistant, a list of the former members and suggested four that it might be most desirable to reappoint (Lovett, Baker, Hull, Doolittle), along with some replacement possibilities (Sidney Souers, Frank Pace, Killian or George Kistiakowsky, Gordon Gray); and two weeks later a CIA Regulation was issued reaffirming that the IG should be the channel to the Board. It was not until May, however, after the Bay of Pigs, that the Board was reconstituted under a different name, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

A suggestion about the information explosion.

THE EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN OPEN SOURCES

Herman L. Croom

Everyone is by now aware that a virtual tidal wave of publicly printed paper threatens to swamp almost all enterprises of intellectual research. The problem manifests two principal aspects relative to intelligence. The first is the absolute growth in the volume of material of interest to us. The second is the proliferation of our means of obtaining and processing it. Our purpose here is to review what has happened and to suggest a possible course of action. The matter is far from hypothetical.

Where, for example, might the intelligence search begin to determine whether a foreign state suspected of having embarked on a nuclear weapons program had in fact done so? Experience has shown that the logical first step in any such enterprise is to survey the open literature.

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In 1963 [redacted] then Deputy Director (AE Intelligence), JIB (London), endorsed the use of open source materials in approaching just this problem: "It is a fact that no country has yet developed a nuclear weapons program in complete secrecy."[1] Mr. Potts pointed out that a nuclear weapons program is a major commitment that is almost certain to be reflected in many other activities. Even a minimum program for producing a small number of nuclear weapons would cost over $100 million at today's prices and would take at least five years to accomplish. The requirements for critical commodities and personnel would strain the resources of even the richest of the non-nuclear countries. Thus, a survey of the industrial and economic conditions and the natural and scientific resources of a country should indicate the feasibility of nuclear weapons development.

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[redacted] "Nuclear Military Power in the Hands of a Small Country," *Proceedings of the Second Conference* on Intelligence Methods, 15-19 October 1962, CIA, Washington, D.C., March 1963 (S). [redacted] is now Director of Scientific and Technical Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Staff, United Kingdom.

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A study of the suspected country's import lists might be rewarding in such a situation, according to [redacted] who stated that analysts looking back over the years recalled that at the beginning of the Soviet atomic program, the USSR imported a great deal of prospecting and mining equipment as well as specialized instruments from the United States and the United Kingdom. The implications of these purchases were not fully appreciated until several years later, after other sources had revealed the existence and large scope of the Soviet program.

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The value of open source information in intelligence is by no means limited to the detection of large, long-range, muti-million dollar projects. The foreign press in particular plays a major role in providing news of current intelligence value on political, military and economic developments. In the controlled Communist press, editorials and statements by party and government leaders are often indicators of major actions or policy developments. Foreign books and journals are major sources of basic intelligence and assist in current intelligence analysis by providing meaningful background information. Scientific and technical journals frequently furnish the first indications of research and development accomplishments of long-range military or industrial significance.

It goes without saying that the foreign press is often controlled and cannot necessarily be taken at face value. The need for competent analysis is ever present. Thus, Hungarian literary and trade union journals provided significant insights into the controversies over economic reform and individual freedom going on behind the bland facade presented by the official Hungarian press prior to the revolt in 1956. Such insights often display themselves only in the light of classified information. This, of course, is the rationale behind the established principle that the reliability of intelligence analysis is in part a function of the number and quality of sources consulted.

Intense scrutiny of the North Vietnamese press and radio has been an essential intelligence element in support of US effort in the current conflict. Among the many intelligence tasks has been the continuing study of Hanoi's propaganda claims regarding civilian casualties from air strikes as a reflection both of the impact of the strikes and of the extent and nature of the case Hanoi may be building up against the captured members of the US forces.[2]

[2] CIA. *FBIS Press Monitoring Program,* FBIS, Directorate of Intelligence, 6 May 1968.

The intelligence community has benefitted from the early recognition of the value of open source information, and the steps taken to organize the acquisition and exploitation of such information. This program has been expanded and improved from time to time to meet changing conditions. It provides the primary input to some intelligence efforts and significant support to many others. Compared with the more traditional or esoteric intelligence techniques, it is often faster, more economical, more prolific, or more authoritative. It was estimated in 1957 that roughly 75 to 90 percent of CIA's total economic, scientific, and geographical knowledge of the Soviet Bloc was based on analysis of open source material.[3] Electronic and photographic techniques probably have reduced the percentages, especially in the last two categories, but the contribution, actual and potential, from open sources is still rather overwhelming.

The amount of foreign open source material available for intelligence exploitation is increasing as would be expected. Formerly, because of restrictions imposed during the Stalin era, relatively few Bloc scientific-technical journals were available in the West.[4] However, receipts of foreign scientific-technical titles rose from 1,900 to 8,500 per year between 1950 and 1960 and will probably reach nearly 11,000 annually by 1970. Foreign sociological titles more than doubled between 1950 and 1960 and may reach 22,000 annually by 1970.

The developing international situation has brought new open foreign materials under scrutiny, including those from Africa, Latin America and Cuba, and South and East Asia. Communist Chinese open materials increased steadily in availability from 1949 to 1966. In that year, due to the Cultural Revolution, most open materials disappeared other than radio broadcasts and the voluminous propaganda literature. Both are of course indispensable to the intelligence analyst.

The Machinery

National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 2 on the Coordination of Collection Activities, revised 18 January 1961, provides that the Department of State shall have primary responsibility

[3] Joseph Becker, "Comparative Survey of Soviet and US Access to Published Information," *Studies* I 4, p. 35 ff.

[4] J. J. Bagnall, "The Exploitation of Russian Scientific Literature for Intelligence Purposes," *Studies* II 3, p. 45 ff.

for, and shall perform as a service of common concern, the collection abroad (outside the United States and its possessions) of political, sociological, economic, scientific and technical information and that the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct, as a service of common concern, monitoring of foreign radio and television propaganda and press broadcasts required for the collection of intelligence information to meet the needs of all departments and agencies which have an authorized interest therein. The directive also provides that the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct the exploitation of foreign language publications for intelligence purposes, as appropriate, as a service of common concern, and that the Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate similar activities maintained by other departments and agencies to satisfy their own requirements.

Newspapers, magazines, books, and foreign broadcasts comprise the greatest volume of open source materials. In accordance with the NSC directive, the State Department Publication Procurement Officer system, with guidance from CIA, operates through US embassies in various parts of the world in the purchase of books and journals. The most productive effort is in the Soviet Union. New books obtained through this program are announced in the *Russian Book List* (unclassified), prepared by the CIA Central Reference Service, and published by the Department of State.

Of an estimated 50,000-plus new book titles published annually in the USSR, about 12,000 are purchased selectively and shipped to CIA, where an average of nearly 1,000 a year are found worthy of partial or full translation, and intelligence exploitation. In addition, CIA receives regularly and monitors about 42 Soviet newspapers and 630 Soviet journals. The newspapers which contain highly perishable information, are obtained when possible through airmail subscription. From numerous sources, CIA also receives or purchases a wide variety of other publications including monographs, brochures, and pamphlets. After exploitation, most of the books and journals are forwarded to the Library of Congress for the use of the general public and the scholarly community. Soviet books and periodicals received in this manner and from numerous other sources by the Library of Congress and many cooperating libraries throughout the country are announced in the very useful *Monthly List of Russian Accessions*, published by the Library of Congress.

CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) has the key role in monitoring foreign broadcasts and, since 1 May 1967, has had responsibility for press monitoring and translation coordination, previously functions of the Foreign Documents Division of the Office of Central Reference. In these programs, FBIS designates priority topics in accordance with requirements by various CIA components and from other intelligence services.

The extensive radio broadcast monitoring program results in the unclassified FBIS *Daily Report* series of separate reports (issued five times weekly) for the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Communist China, Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East and Africa, and Latin America and Western Europe. The contents include a variety of fully translated texts in English, excerpts, summaries, and abstracts, mainly from radio broadcasts and press agency transmissions. These reports alert the intelligence community to important developments and statements by foreign officials and other key personalities.

The FBIS press monitoring and translation program issues nearly 80 periodicals and occasional publications for the use of intelligence and other governmental analysts. Most of the serial publications are unclassified and available to the public. There are five concerned with Communist China, and with other Asian and Pacific nations, also five. No less than 38 deal with the USSR, and 23 with Eastern Europe. Four are concerned with Latin America or Western Europe, and three with the Middle East and Africa. These publications are tailored to meet various intelligence needs, and embrace political, economic, sociological, military and scientific categories of information.

Most of the FBIS translations and unclassified serial publications are actually produced by the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), an organization established in 1957 [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted] Intelligence and other government analysts can order translations of documents, articles, or books as required. JPRS unclassified publications, including translations, are listed and made available to the general public through US Government Research and Development Reports, a journal published twice monthly by the Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information of the Department of Commerce. As a part of its coordination function, and to prevent duplication of translation, FBIS maintains and publishes monthly the *Consolidated Translation Survey* (Official Use

Only), listing the completed translations and those in progress of more than 100 participating organizations. In 1968 the index listed more than 400,000 translations.

In addition to the linguistic resources of JPRS, FBIS maintains a staff of intelligence officers with highly developed linguistic abilities and area knowledge, and foreign field bureaus with indigenous press monitors working in 17 languages.

Among the better known of the other translation and open source monitoring services and products available to intelligence analysts are those of the State Department and U.S. Information Service missions throughout the world, which publish summaries or digests relating to the host country. The Aerospace Technology Division (ATD) of the Air Force Systems Command, under the direction of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), scans numerous foreign scientific and technical books and journals as they are received in the Library of Congress or received from Air Force procurement officers. ATD disseminates special studies and English abstracts of foreign books and articles, the latter in very convenient 5 x 8 inch card format widely used by scientific intelligence analysts.[5] Currently the ATD program is being reorganized. DIA and Army translate several Soviet military journals cover-to-cover on a regular basis. The Atomic Energy Commission publishes *Nuclear Science Abstracts*, an English compilation from worldwide publications relating to nuclear energy.

The non-intelligence (non-USIB) community carries on a large and productive effort to exploit for its own benefit foreign open sources in many cultural areas, producing usually through contract organizations many cover-to-cover and partial translations of Soviet and other foreign language publications. Some of the more notable and extensive of these efforts are those by various professional societies and such government agencies as the National Science Foundation and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency. The non-intelligence effort is of considerable value to intelligence analysts.

Problems and Needs

The history of US exploitation of foreign open sources by both the intelligence and non-intelligence communities shows that the

[5] George A. Pughe, "The Dust that Isn't There," *Studies* II 2, p. 58 ff.

programs are expanding as publications have increased (one might almost say that a worldwide "publications explosion" is in progress). As time passes, more programs are initiated and new subjects added.

One of the main problems of the user (analyst), even at present, is the recovery of items whether in the form of abstracts or full translations. If an item of interest is not identified immediately, it is often lost to the potential user because the formats of many of the end products of the various systems do not readily lend themselves to a uniform filing and indexing system. The result is that some users obtain much more benefit than others from open source exploitation. The user with disposable time and the inclination sets up his own files. Others must trust to memory and do without a systematic method of retrieval. As the collection effort expands, this problem will be compounded. The use of machine records methods will be mandatory in the future.

The need for a centralized agency to administer the growing exploitation of all foreign open sources of information is thus already evident to rationalize the numerous efforts, all with similar objectives, going on simultaneously within and outside of the intelligence community.

Such an agency could operate openly, serving the nation as a whole, including the intelligence community. Uncle Sam already is footing most of the bill. Such an agency could be operated with greater net economy and efficiency than the multifarious undertakings of the present, since processing methods could be unified and a single, flexible automatic data processing system could be employed. Such an agency could still take advantage of the use of foreign and domestic field units and could maintain flexibility and comprehensive coverage through the use of contractors. Many linguists might be attracted who would not consider working for an intelligence organization. More promising professional careers could be offered. Arrangements with foreign governments for the exchange of publications could be expanded. NASA already has such arrangements with 80 countries, and the AEC also has an exchange program.

This approach might be especially efficaceous with respect to the USSR, where many publications are issued in limited numbers insufficient even for the domestic demand. Some publications, although unclassified, are never placed on public sale apparently because of their priority or sensitive nature. Under an official exchange arrange-

ment, these publications probably would still be withheld. The proposed agency would permit collection efforts to be focussed on such issuances and on classified publications, rather than on items available to the public.

Another potent argument in favor of a national agency of the type suggested is that it would allow more efficient disposition of intelligence talent and budget. Functions and selected blocs of people could be transferred from CIA and other intelligence organizations to the agency which would be funded directly by Congress. The intelligence community could with good management gain more and better open information from foreign sources under the proposed organization, which could also become a useful instrument of national policy by promoting foreign cooperation through publications and other information exchanges.

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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

THE THIRD DEPARTMENT. By *P. S. Squire.* The establishment and practices of the political police in the Russia of Nicholas I. (Cambridge University Press, 1968. 272 pp. $11.50.)

The contemporaries of Tsar Nicholas I referred to him as "the gendarme of Europe." In his era, the general political trend was towards liberalization. In order to curtail the role of secret services by confining their activities to investigations, Nicholas founded the Third Department in his Personal Chancellery. This organization proceeded to institute and direct a regime which went headlong in a direction diametrically opposed to the course of the rest of Europe. His intentions, according to Squire, were essentially benevolent, if paternalistic. Like his predecessor Alexander I, who, in emulation of Napoleon, replaced the old Russian form of Senate and Councillors as the executive branches by setting up ministries, including a Ministry of Police, Nicholas initially tried to copy Austria's Emperor Francis II, whose secret police had the questionable distinction of being second to none after Napoleon's downfall. Nicholas, however, instead of circumscribing the functions of the secret police, succeeded in making it into a powerful agency under his personal direction, and subordinated to it a newly-formed Corps of Gendarmes. Attributing the rebellion of December 1825, to his predecessor's failure to maintain a capable secret police (the Ministry of Police was abolished in 1818), Nicholas proceeded with a systematic organization in order to prevent any further uprising and to correct the misdeeds of the ministries and their central and provincial bureaucracy. His chancellery thus paralleled the ministries, and the Third Department and its executive arm, the Corps of Gendarmes became the watchdog over all government establishments and all life in Russia.

When Nicholas set up his system of policing, Russia already possessed centuries-old, dismal traditions of the same type of autocratic rule through secret chancelleries. Even the rulers like his predecessor Alexander, with recurrent spells of liberalism, never fully abolished the *Tainaia Kantseliaria.* Whether the *Ukaz* ordered or rescinded it, the secret chancellery run by the Tsar himself or indirectly by some branch of government always existed in practice,

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if not in law. Nicholas put the practices in the statute books and systematized them. By early 1826 he ordered that the Third Department be subdivided into four sections: 1) collection and depository of information on all persons under political surveillance; 2) a section for sects and dissenters, counterfeiters of money and documents, and administration of prisons and camps for state criminals; 3) intelligence on foreigners residing in Russia; and 4) censorship of mails.

Proceeding from this organization in the capital, Squire analyzes the subdivision of the political secret services by districts. These were identical with the districts for the Corps of Gendarmes, five of them in 1827, reorganized in 1832 and again in 1836, finally into eight districts. More important than this structural analysis, which the author bases on his research in the imperial statute books, is his description of the Third Department as a government within the government and its impact on the country's life. Like so many of his predecessors, Nicholas spoke of the High Police (Third Department) and the Gendarmes as "his eyes" and the "doctor of the nation's morals." As such the secret High Police and the Gendarmes, executors of the Tsar's will, were above the law themselves. Better paid than any equivalent ranks of the Empire, they served as a wedge into all other government offices. At the capital as in the provinces they penetrated the administration everywhere, for it was their task to expose bureaucratic faults and abuses. For the populace in general, the Third Department and the Gendarmes soon became the most dreaded agency of the regime. In the *Ukaz* of 3 July 1836 [1] Nicholas ordered them, in Article 8, "to collect information and submit reports on all events without exception." This decree meant that the Third Department was responsible for curbing anything that could be regarded as politically dangerous. Carrying out this task, the Third Department assumed the moral and physical authority over all phases of public life. It was both ubiquitous and omnipotent. From the very inception in 1826 it started out with feverish activity, shoving aside all possible rival organizations, such as the investigatory units of the ministries.

Acting in the name of the Tsar, the Third Department tolerated no competition from other government agencies, not even from the Ministry of Justice. All of its reports on government agencies and on the subversives and the populace in general were channeled to the Tsar's own Chancellery. Needless to say that the role of the Third Depart-

[1] Reproduced in full, p. 241 ff.

ment with its Corps of Gendarmes profoundly affected the development of Tsar Nicholas' reign and left a strong imprint on the subsequent autocratic rule in Russia.

Squire's study does not extend beyond the regime of Nicholas I, although the system continued under Alexander II and was replaced (by the Okhrana) only after the latter's assassination. The critics then blamed it for its failure to stop the revolutionary assassins, just as the Decembrist rebellion of 1825 was blamed on the inability of existing secret services to take the necessary precautions.

Squire's sources for his study are extensive and to a large extent primary. He depends heavily on such documents as imperial decrees and specific instructions from St. Petersburg to subordinate provincial authorities and secret agents. Of exceptional interest are his citations from the letters exchanged between the chief of Gendarmes, Count Benckendorff, and the Director of the Third Department, Von Vock. Also, introduced as references are contemporary commentators, especially foreigners visiting Russia in the period of Nicholas I. Thanks to the voluminous documentation, this work is possibly the most authoritative in English on the significant period when the pattern of internal secret service as a paramount pillar of Russian autocracy was formalized. The Okhrana which followed the Third Department no longer had the Corps of Gendarmes as a subordinate executive arm. A special part of that Corps belonged to the MVD structure. The pattern of Nicholas' service, therefore, is a precursor of the Soviet secret services, responsible not to ministries but to such offices as Stalin's own chancery. Soviet employment of the militia as an executive arm of the secret services likewise found its prototype in the Gendarmes of Nicholas.

Rita S. Kronenbitter

THE GREAT TERROR—STALIN'S PURGE OF THE THIRTIES. By: *Robert Conquest.* (The MacMillan Company, New York, 1968)

Extensive book reviews greeted this 633-page volume as the most comprehensive, interpretive, and scholarly treatment to date of this grim decade in Russia's recent history. The British and American reviewers, impressed by the author's command of the abundant sources, largely agreed with his version of events, and his account of the

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causes of the interminably increasing tide of the purge and its effects. Some reviewers questioned the totals of executions and deaths from privation in labor camps. Did the totals of Stalin's victims reach thirty million, which Conquest says may be probable, or twenty million, according to his conservative estimate, or, was it "only" ten million? In his *mea culpa* review *(New York Times Book Review,* 22 September 1968), Malcolm Cowley admits he was once gullible enough to accept Soviet official versions of the purge trials, and thus missed the telltale signs of fraud. Still, he now argues that the total of victims was possibly only ten million. Other reviewers do not dispute Conquest's estimates, but even those assuming the I-told-you-so attitude express shock over such statistics.

The reviewers generally have failed to regard *The Great Purge* essentially as a history of Russia under Stalin. John Ericson (London *Times,* 22 September 1968) calls it a history of the purges, and a few other reviewers admit its historiographic significance. This reader has read it as a history of Russia in the 1930's. After all, as Conquest points out, the holocaust of the decade had its historic precedent in the Red Terror which Lenin and Trotsky unleashed as an institutionalized necessity (p. 36) to force the nation into accepting the Bolshevik regime. If the Red Terror was in "hot blood," as some commentators put it, Stalin's terror was in calculated "cold blood." The former was aimed at imposing the "proletarian dictatorship," the latter at crushing the party and the nation into complete submission to the personal rule of Stalin.

Russian history is replete with precedents quite as ghastly though perhaps not so vast in scope. Efforts to cow the nation into utter subjection to the will and caprice of the autocrat were staged by Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century and by Peter the Great in the seventeenth. Endless parallels could be drawn. Stalin's ostensibly idealistic motive in committing atrocities was to purify the party. The ultimate motive in each of these instances, of course, was the consolidation of power beyond challenge by any real or fancied opposition. To elaborate the historic parallels still further, one notes that each of these autocrats made extensive use of secret services, not only to gather information on the real or possible enemies, but to arrest, try, and execute them. Such services were thus a principal instrument of government for the promotion of the absolute power of the autocrats from Ivan to Stalin. Indeed, there is a sense in which the history

of Russia under the three autocrats was largely that of the secret services. Stalin's NKVD shaped and repressed all aspects of Russia's civilization in the 1930's, just as Ivan's *Oprichnina* or Peter's *Preobrazhenskiy Prikaz* embodied the essence of the country's experience in their centuries.

The reviewers to date, concerned primarily with the immensity and impact of the Great Terror, have few comments about Conquest's description of the NKVD's operational methods. It is understandable that the author could not have at his disposal the official secrets of that agency. The very enormity of his task precluded inclusion of many details. Moreover, much as he had previously written about the Soviet Union, he could hardly qualify as an analyst of the inner workings of the secret service. His chapter on the NKVD's preparation of the first purge trial is illustrative. One of the key witnesses in that trial was Valentin Olberg. Conquest relates the essentials of how this witness was used, but misses such important aspects as the NKVD's procurement of a Honduran passport for Olberg to go from Berlin to Moscow as Trotsky's ostensible agent to kill Stalin. He omits to mention Olberg's provocational role at the Gorky Pedagogical Institute that brought about the execution of the director and several professors. The NKVD's method of using other provocateurs, Fritz David and Berman Yurin from the Comintern, and brothers Moissei and Nathan Lurye (all executed after they served NKVD purposes), likewise receives only scant mention, although these persons played the major role in the Stalin-NKVD conspiracy for the first trial.

On the other hand, Conquest gives a comprehensive account of the interdepartmental preparation of the purge trials. Stalin personally conducted the policy conferences with Yagoda, Agranov, and Yezhov, while the operational plans were formulated by the Secret Political Department of the NKVD. The Economic, Operative, Special, Foreign, and Transport Departments, as well as the Prosecutor's Office of the Justice Department, were subsidiaries to it. These NKVD departments, actually a secret service regime directly under Stalin, were supreme over all other government agencies and the party itself.

In his chapter on "Confessions," Conquest describes the methods and application of torture and the "conveyer system" of interrogation, a torture in different form by which the victim was interrogated continuously day and night without sleep, food, and water. He attributes to Stalin the institution of the use of hostages and threats to wives

and children. This was, he notes, a "new development in Russian history. In tsarist times the revolutionaries never had this problem."

Since the entire stratagem of conspiracy was initiated from the top down, not only by orders and directives, but also in the choice of target individuals and groups, as well as the timing of arrests, trials, and executions—with Stalin himself taking part in the operation—the NKVD was actually under compulsion to incriminate victims. Conquest amply clarifies how this happened. The secret service had to devise techniques of incrimination. This meant that in every major operational case it had to resort at least to provocation and often to complete invention. NKVD agents were either installed among the alleged or suspect oppositionists, or they posed as such, incriminating themselves with (false) testimonies, but with the purpose of destroying others. Olberg and the others named above fell into this large category of provocateurs. All of them, though promised freedom after their manufactured testimony, were invariably executed, together with the victims of the provocation.

Conquest points to a number of provocateurs who insinuated themselves among the alleged oppositionists and saboteurs. Unfortunately, details of such operations are for the most part missing, but certain cases indicate clearly the long range scheming and methods of the NKVD. As a preliminary to Grigoriy Pyatakov's trial, for instance, the NKVD of Novosibirsk staged a tribunal at Kemerovo against Y. N. Drobnis and others, obviously innocent of the sabotage of which they were accused. NKVD agent A. A. Shestov, posing as a Trotskyist, had associated with Drobnis long enough to make his own arrest appear justified. When on the bench among the accused, he testified enough falsehoods to send the whole "gang of saboteurs" to execution. Since Drobnis and others among the provocateur's victims were friends of Pyatakov, their sentence was the first step leading to the latter's doom.

The use of NKVD agents in the purge trials was particularly obvious in the case of I. Y. Hrasche. This man, of Czech origin, was attached to S. A. Rataichak, chief for the Chemical Industry in Pyatakov's Commissariat for Heavy Industry. Hrasche served in the Foreign Division of Rataichak's complex and was in a position to incriminate the bosses and to prove, with documents, that they had been in collusion with Japanese espionage. Foreign engineers in the Chemical Industry had always considered Hrasche as one of the most pleasant and cultured officials, a man whom they could trust. His testimony

in court, as invented by the NKVD, incriminated them all, and sent Pyatakov, Rataichak, and dozens of others to execution.

Conquest brings out how genuine Communist leaders at one time tried to expel provocateurs. Pavel Postishev, Secretary to the Kiev CP, dismissed from job and party a female provocateur named Nikolaenko. This act eventually led to his own doom. Stalin already had him marked as a liquidation target, and Nikolaenko's case served as a pretext. The woman was rehabilitated in the party. Stalin himself exonerated her in his report of 3 March 1937 by describing her as "an ordinary little person who had been signalling to us the wrong situation in the Kiev Party organization." Conquest brings out that Nikolaenko, placed by Stalin in the Ukraine, was thus instrumental in supplying him with "evidence" against the Ukrainian Communist leaders whom he had already decided to destroy.

The masterpiece of provocation and disinformation which set the stage for the sentence and execution of the Army high command could profitably have been described in greater detail. Conquest begins with the provocation role General Skoblin played for the NKVD in the kidnapping and murder of General Miller. While this role is fairly well known from other accounts, Conquest describes Skoblin as a double agent for the Russian and German services and as such the link for passing information between the *Sicherheitsdienst* and NKVD. Stalin, of course, made the first move in the business: an NKVD story was sent through Skoblin to Berlin, implying that Marshal Tukhachevsky was conspiring with the German General Staff. The SD dubbed the story as planted NKVD disinformation, but Reinhardt Heydrich, in charge of a rival service, wanted to use it to incriminate the German General Staff. Heydrich's idea was forgotten, but Hitler and Himmler (Conquest quotes Polish CP leader Gomulka) thought up a scheme to betray Tukhachevsky, and thus cripple the Red Army. The Nazis "leaked" a story about Tukhachevsky's German contacts through President Benes of Czechoslovakia. Late in 1936, Benes passed it on to the French, thus endangering the Franco-Soviet Pact, and then passed it on to Stalin—the originator of this false information. "Documentary evidence" was thus in the hands of Stalin. Conquest relates how the executions of the marshal and nearly all of the top command was followed by mass liquidations down the line, including a major portion of the officer corps. The firing squad for the general staff officers was commanded by Ivan Serov, a young officer transferred from the

Army to the NKVD, who later became the head of the KGB and subsequently the GRU.

The purge of the army included military intelligence leaders stationed abroad. Conquest relates how almost all agents were recalled from abroad and shot, e.g., S. P. Uritsky, chief of the Fourth Bureau; J. K. Berzin (Grishin), virtual commander of the Republican Army in Spain; "General Kleber," probably shot in Spain; General Skoblevsky (Gorev), the decorated "hero of Madrid"; military advisor "Grigorevich" Shtern; Lt. General Smuskevich, chief of the Soviet Air Force, etc. Conquest points out that the massacres of the officers left the NKVD in full control of the armed forces. All final authority in the provinces likewise fell to the NKVD. Before the purges, the Party secretary had been the arbiter, but now it was the NKVD chief.

Interspersed with the accounts of trials and purges, Conquest's elaboration of his thesis returns repeatedly to NKVD processes and their social impact. The NKVD Special Department charged with applying mass terror categorized the population according to its own operational branches: SP for anti-Soviet elements, Ts for churchgoers, S for members of religious sects, P for rebels, SI for people with foreign contacts. It launched campaigns to encourage or force denunciations in offices, in private life, and in prison cells. Its interrogation procedures, to which Conquest returns with an additional chapter, were designed to establish the classification of accused persons according to headings in the criminal code (Article 58). The headings read:

KRTD—Counterrevolutionary Trotskyite Activity
KRD —Counterrevolutionary Activity
KRA —Counterrevolutionary Agitation
ChSIR—Member of the Family of a Traitor to Fatherland
PSh —Suspicion of Espionage
SOE —Socially Dangerous Element
SVE —Socially Harmful Element (ordinary criminals).

The story of the NKVD purges abroad is compressed into one short chapter. Conquest shows how the Comintern leaders at home and abroad became tools and often victims of Yagoda and Yezhov. Included is a short description of the "Mobile Group," organized by Yezhov in December 1936, to carry out assassinations outside Russia.

A. A. Slutsky, heading the NKVD Foreign Department, though marked for execution, was left at his post until after other leaders were recalled from abroad. The "Mobile Group" was sent out to annihilate those NKVD officers who failed to return home. A series of assassanations abroad was the outcome: for example, Ignace Reiss in Switzerland, G. A. Agabekov in Belgium, Walter Krivitsky in Washington, D. C. The "Mobile Group" did away with a number of non-Stalinist leaders in Spain, and at the same time set out to kill Trotsky and his key retainers. Conquest's gallery is essentially that depicted in greater detail by other authors: Jack Sobel and Mark Zborovski are among the spies and fingermen, though the latter may actually have been a participant in the murder of Trotsky's secretary Rudolf Klement, and also Trotsky's son Leon Sedov. A cursory account names the major figures involved in the attacks and final blow against Trotsky: Leonid Eitingon (Leonov, aka Kotov), the Mexican artist David Diqueiros, Vittorio Vidalii, and mother and son Mercader, all working under the general supervision of Gaik Ovakimian, the Soviet Consul General in New York.

While such portions of the book as the one on Trotsky contribute nothing not previously noted in other works, they epitomize the account of the NKVD terror abroad. They add insight into the ruthlessness, inventiveness, and daring of the Soviet services at home and abroad.

The Epilogue to Conquest's book is titled "Heritage of Terror." This is essentially a philosophic statement in answer to "*Zachto?*" (Why?). Why was the Great Terror, with millions of casualties, necessary? Conquest tries hard to explain as have others, but he also fails. He seeks rationale in Dostoevsky's passage: "Tyranny is a habit; it grows upon us, and in the long run, turns into a disease. . . . The human being is drowned forever in the tyrant, and it is practically impossible for him to regain human dignity, repentance and regeneration."

Among the appendices, Conquest includes a short chapter on "The NKVD Background." This is in part chronological and in part an interpretation of terror as a Marxist necessity. Together with the chapters and sections in the book describing NKVD methods, it should be of special interest to students of Soviet secret services. As early as 1905, Lenin expressed admiration for Jacobin terror. His views became the background for the theory that the secret police "sprang from the very essence of the proletarian revolution."

The book does not close with the pre-war terror. Conquest examines the falsehoods of the post-war trials and the possible reasons why certain leading Stalinists have been rehabilitated, while others, such as Zinoviev, Pyatakov, Bukharin, and Rykov, have not. He attributes the discrepancies to the machine (NKVD-MGB) created by Stalin, which continues to function for the preservation of the monolithic state ruled by a small central body. The present incumbents of that body all rose in the old machine of Stalin's time. For this reason, the criticisms of the Great Terror which emerged during the Khrushchev interlude were general and full of reservations. Rehabilitations had to be haphazard and inconsistent. Khrushchev reaped from them political advantages, including the expulsion from public life of a number of possible contenders for power.

The NKVD and its successors appeared for a short time as possible scapegoats, but rehabilitation began even while Khrushchev was still at the helm. Since his fall, Conquest notices, a whole series of novels and plays has appeared featuring the heroes of the secret police. The criminal code again has been amended to strengthen the position of the internal and external security establishments. In this connection, Conquest quotes the Italian Socialist leader Pietro Nenni, referring to the memories of the Great Terror, saying that in Russia there are no institutional or moral guarantees against a reversion to the habits of the thirties.

Rita S. Kronenbitter

MACHT UND OHNMACHT DER GEHEIMDIENSTE. DER EINFLUSS DER GEHEIMDIENSTE DER USA, ENGLANDS, DER UdSSR, FRANKREICHS UND DEUTSCHLANDS AUF DIE POLITISCHEN UND MILITAERISCHEN EREIGNISSE IM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG. (The Power and Impotence of the Secret Services. The Influence of the Secret Services of the USA, England, the USSR, France, and Germany on Political and Military Events in the Second World War.) By *Oskar Reile.* (Verlag Welsermuehl Muenchen—Wels. 1968. 331 pages.)

Oscar Reile, now almost 73 years old, who is to all outward appearances living in retirement in a small town in Germany (Bavaria), has led a very eventful life indeed. He was captured by the British as a young lieutenant during World War I, joined the Danzig police

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in 1921 and, just one year later, began his career in intelligence (more precisely, counterintelligence) as a confidential agent of the *Abwehr*[1] center in Koenigsberg, East Prussia. Over the years his confidential activities attracted the attention and displeasure of his superiors in the Danzig police and, about two years after Hitler came to power, he was recalled as a captain and assigned to the *Abwehr* center in Kassel, later to Wiesbaden, as a specialist in counterintelligence operations. And that (except for an interruption of several years after World War II) remained his career until he was retired in 1963 from the West German Federal Intelligence Service, the BND, once more or less officially and still popularly referred to as the "Gehlen Organization."

This is by no means Reile's first venture into public print. Earlier volumes were *Geheime Westfront* (Secret Front in the West), and *Geheime Ostfront* (Secret Front in the East). The present volume, however, is of more than historical interest to an audience of intelligence professionals. In his preface, Reile writes:

> Using noteworthy, historically supported excerpts from the history of the German, American and Soviet secret services, along with a brief report on the contest between the English and Gaullist secret services and the German *Abwehr* during the Second World War, this book is intended above all to examine whether these services, with the results of their work, with their knowledge and their deeds, exerted influence on the governments of their countries, in particular on Hitler, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Stalin, and what the nature of this influence was. Was their knowledge indeed power?

Beyond that, he states that his book will go into the fundamental significance of secret services and make clear to the public that these instruments of the state do not simply conduct military espionage in potential enemy states and catch spies at home; that rather the main emphasis in their activity is on preventive measures to protect the population and defense installations, and especially on averting dangerous developments, and on counseling the government in the military, domestic political, and economic, and foreign policy fields.

This would indeed be an undertaking of considerable proportions and delicacy, calling for meticulous research, scrupulous evaluation of source material, a sense of historical values, and detachment. What-

[1] Hitlerian armed forces intelligence and counterintelligence organization.

ever else Reile is, however, an historian he is not. The book does not live up to its announced purposes.

It is not easy to write a review of *Macht und Ohnmacht der Geheimdienste* because there is much more of importance to tell about Oskar Reile than there is to say about the book. However, the book must be dealt with because it is relevant to what the US intelligence community ought to know about Oskar Max Arthur Reile, once one of the *Abwehr's* star counterintelligence officers and Gehlen's counterintelligence chief, now turned propagandist.

Macht und Ohnmacht der Geheimdienste is divided into four parts, bracketed by a preface from which we have already quoted, and a section entitled "Closing Thoughts." The content and tenor of the first part, dealing with Germany's secret service, the *Abwehr,* are conveyed by the titles of the individual sections. "Admiral Canaris' career and accession to office as chief of the military *Abwehr.*" "Canaris as a master of the situation estimate." "Canaris and the Spanish Civil War." "The Admiral's lonely fight to bring Hitler to his senses." "Admiral Canaris during the Second World War as chief of the German Military *Abwehr.*" "Canaris works for respect for the principles of general international law." (Subsections here are: the Ukrainian problem, propaganda, military executions, bombardment of Warsaw, Hitler's statements.) "Final appreciation of the life and works of Admiral Canaris as chief of the former German military *Abwehr.*"

In the last years before the war posters in German post offices displayed an erect knight in shining armor astride a white charger, lance at the ready, displaying the idealized but recognizable features of Adolph Hitler. Reile has changed the features to those of Canaris, but the message is essentially the same. And there are no chinks in his armor. "Der Admiral" was truly ten feet tall: great, good, noble, honorable, courageous, brilliant, steadfast, indefatigable, kind, warm, self-controlled, morally impeccable. He was, in short, the epitome of the German officer and patriot who was at the same time dedicated to the service and future of mankind. Under his genial leadership, we are to believe the *Abwehr* worked untiringly and valiantly against ever increasing odds to defend the nation and to bring about the downfall of the dictatorship, so that the *Abwehr* could get down to the job of being a bulwark against the evil designs of that other dictatorship to the East. What a pity it was, we are to appreciate, that

the Admiral received no help from the West in his bitter and lonely fight. Thus:

> In the fight for Germany and against the National-Socialist reign of force, Canaris could use only spiritual weapons. He was incapable of raising his hand against a human being to kill him, even against Hitler. And so, in the end, bowing to the will of God, he died for his convictions. (page 86).

Part I ends on the note of Germany's tragedy, the tragedy of the "good" Germany, which has nothing to be ashamed of in this record. It is now time to turn to the West, to find out why this tragedy happened. Part II is entitled "Noteworthy Aspects of the Recent History of the USA and Her Secret Services." Here the section subtitles are much less illuminating, so we must look more closely at the text. The theme for Part II appears in the first paragraph: "Was J. Edgar Hoover, the chief of the FBI, able to get more of a hearing from the President of the USA, Franklin D. Roosevelt, than Admiral Canaris got from Hitler?" In the following 27 pages we find bits and pieces about the NSA, spies in the sky, prewar intelligence organizations (which Reile proclaims were by no means so insignificant and ineffective as most people say), the FBI and its problems during the "Red Decade" (especially in the face of what he describes as the virtual saturation of important elements of the US government with Soviet spies and other Communists), and the assiduously cultivated wave of hysterical anti-German propaganda.

From this point on, for the next 100 pages, Reile virtually ignores his subject (with minor exceptions regarding the continuing flood of Soviet agents into the US and its government) to concentrate on the main theme of Part II: Roosevelt's blind and unreasoning hatred of the Germans; his relentless plotting to drag the US into the war against Germany; his deliberate provocation of Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor to achieve his goal while at the same time he suppressed the intelligence that would have enabled the fleet to defend itself; his repeated conspiracies with Churchhill, the "evil genius" Harry Hopkins; the hoax of the Atlantic Charter; the "summit conferences" at Casablanca, Quebec, Cairo, Teheran, again Quebec, and Yalta; and how Roosevelt was outwitted by Stalin's secret services at Yalta. Of course, the diabolic and fatal Morgenthau Plan is there, as is Roosevelt's monumental misreading of Stalin, and we may all see how Stalin must have smiled to himself throughout those years while his agents were guiding Roosevelt's mind and hand.

Throughout this account, which leans heavily for quotations and interpretations on George N. Crocker's "Roosevelt's Road to Russia" (The German title of which, significantly, is "Pacemaker for the Soviets"), the question is raised again and again, why didn't American security do something? Reile proclaims:

> A secret service can do justice to all of its tasks only if it is well organized, adequately supplied with technical equipment, and is made up of capable forces who devote themselves completely to the collection of significant information and its exploitation. This means that the leading personalities of a secret service not only must be intelligent and firm of character, but above all must make use of really important knowledge cleverly and emphatically. They must not cling to their positions. In cases which involve important requirements of the country and the well-being of the people, they must rather present their knowledge and proposals in the highest places, even if they know that this can cost them their jobs. (page 193).

And to make sure the point is not missed, Reile repeats several times that, during the war years, not a single Soviet spy was arrested in the United States, although the place was swarming with them. Briefly, he describes the painful awakening which followed the revelations of the defector, Igor Gousenko, and the development of a huge intelligence apparatus which encompasses the entire globe. The intelligence community will be interested to know that Reile has learned from his study of the American literature specializing in this subject that the following services are subordinated to the Central Intelligence Agency: NSA, G-2, ONI, "A-2" and "OSI," "BIR" of State, and the intelligence department of the AEC. He also informs us that the total strength of this gigantic apparatus, including the FBI (6,000), is about 40,000 full-timers. In closing, he returns to the catastrophic consequences of the conferences of the "Big Three," and warns: "Knowledge is power only if one knows how to use it."

Part III is entitled "Out of the History and the Practice of the Soviet Russian Secret Services." In his introductory remarks, Reile quotes "one of the best experts on the Soviet secret services," David Dallin: "The network of the Soviet intelligence service abroad today (1956) is the largest intelligence network in the world, presumably larger than the sum total of the intelligence organizations of all other countries." (Translated from the German edition of Dallin's "Soviet Espionage.") Reile adds that the Soviets began to build up their nets all over the world long before World War II. He points out that the Soviets were the first to equip their foreign nets with radio communications, although this means of communication was not introduced in

the USSR until 1927, and that the Soviets were years ahead of the great powers in the development of special agent radios which, when captured during the war, surprised even the Germans. He also reminds us that, while this apparatus was being built during the 1930's, the USSR was by no means one of the great powers.

Reile then goes on to the history, organization and operations of the Soviet services. He draws upon the standard sources and adduces the usual cases: Abel, the Trotsky assassination, the Amtorg case, Tilton and Lydia Stahl, the Dozenberg counterfeit currency burlesque, Julia Poyntz, Ignaz Reiss, Orlov, Stashynskiy, the forgeries of recent years. Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley both have their say, and Reile does not fail to draw the comparison between the kid glove treatment of Mikhail Gorin—arrested in the US in 1939, whose sentence was upheld by the Supreme Court in January 1941, and who was released a few months later (while, he points out, Stalin was still Hitler's ally)—and the drastic treatment accorded the German "submarine agents" in 1942. Six of the latter were executed, although they were arrested before they could accomplish anything. On pages 236-38, Reile rather dramatically lists 37 important Soviet agents in the US government, from Alger Hiss through Victor Perlo to William Remington. The Canadian complex exposed by Igor Gousenko is described in some detail. The Felfe case, on the other hand, merits just 11 lines.

As one would expect, Reile treats the Rote Kapelle, Rote Drei, and Richard Sorge cases at some length. There are no surprises, and nothing new is offered in these accounts. He places considerable emphasis on the tremendous importance and inestimable value of all this intelligence to the Soviet Union in the conduct of the war and the winning of the peace. He does not fail to note that Sorge has been made a folk-hero in the Soviet Union and that his assistant, Max Klausen, was given the East German "Patriotic Cross of Merit" in gold in 1965. The conclusions and the moral to be drawn from Part III are left to the reader.

Reile goes immediately from the Sorge case to his next topic in Part IV, which is entitled "Marginal Notes on the Contest between the German *Abwehr* and the Secret Services of England and France during the Second World War." It is evident, however, that Reile has already said what he set out to say, to his German audience, since he disposes of his own principal field of endeavor and achievement throughout the war in precisely five and one-third pages. In a

nutshell, his message is that the *Abwehr* fought gallantly and well against increasing odds; they were simply outnumbered. He does express his admiration for General de Gaulle's accomplishments in the field of "secret work."

In his final five pages, entitled "Concluding Thoughts," in addition to a brief summing up, Reile brings out the pipe of peace. "Never in the history of mankind have they (i.e. *the secret services of the whole world*) had so great a task as the one they now face, namely, while fulfilling a number of different duties, to have their best forces work primarily toward the prevention of an atomic war. The main mission of the secret services can no longer be just the difficult counterintelligence struggle against the secret attacks of agents against which the country concerned must protect itself. . . ."

Thus spake Oskar Reile. Let us now get to know him a little better. In the personnel file kept on him in German Army headquarters in Berlin, we find a fitness report written in Paris and dated 1 March 1944 on Lt. Col. (since 1942) Oskar Reile, submitted by the chief of the *Abwehr* Main Office for France, Col. Rudolph. Reile is rated as follows: "Good military appearance. Especially gifted officer with gift of rapid comprehension. Impeccable comrade with unquestionable National-Socialist attitude. Tested under fire as leader of an *Abwehr* detachment during the Western campaign. Excellent supervisor with a gift for handling people well. A comrade to his comrades and subordinates. His official performance is excellent and consistent. (Strong points:) High degree of intelligence, combined with great industry and great capacity for work. (Overall evaluation:) Outstanding." This fitness report reached Berlin too late to be concurred in by Admiral Canaris, who had usually done so previously: the Admiral was already on his long, lonely, painful road to the gallows.

On 1 May 1945 Reile disbanded his unit, which had meanwhile been withdrawn to the area of the Taunus mountains north of Frankfurt and Wiesbaden, and made his way to Trier to search for his family. Finding neither trace nor lead, Reile turned himself in to the police, who in turn passed him on to CIC. He was flown to the United Kingdom for interrogation by the British, who released him to the French in 1948. After several months of further interrogation by the French, Reile was released to his home of record in Trier, where in late 1949 he was approached by representatives of the Gehlen Organization. Thus began a new phase of his career.

At first, Reile worked—on counterintelligence, what else?—out of the field office in Karlsruhe. But in the summer of 1952 he was called to headquarters in Munich-Pullach to work on Soviet CE cases. At least one CIA officer put in the record his concern that Gehlen should bring into his headquarters probably the best qualified and most experienced *Abwehr* counterintelligence operator against the Western allies—ostensibly to work on problems for which he had neither background nor experience. By the following year he had in effect become the senior headquarters officer on Soviet CI. Having achieved that position, Reile undertook to bring a former subordinate from the Karlsruhe field office to headquarters as his chief assistant, then deputy, and later, as it turned out, successor. The Karlsruhe field office had become an increasingly difficult management and disciplinary problem and was phased out in the course of 1953. It had been rather extensively penetrated by the Soviets. Reile ran into a bit of trouble in arranging for the transfer of his former Karlsruhe subordinate to headquarters. Ironically, this was not because the man had been a member of the Security Service (SD) of the Nazi *Schutzstaffel* (SS), but because of headquarters politicking. Reile, however, prevailed and in the summer of 1953 his man joined him in the counterintelligence section at Pullach. The name of the new man was Heinz Felfe.

As is widely known, and as Reile himself notes briefly in his book, Felfe was arrested in 1961 in Gehlen's headquarters and convicted in 1963 on the basis of documentary evidence as a controlled agent of the KGB. According to Felfe's own admission, he was recruited in Berlin in 1950, before he was employed by the BND. There is no evidence in the record that Reile had known Felfe before the latter came to work under him in Karlsruhe. It is clear, however, that Reile was responsible for bringing Felfe into the center of the BND's Soviet CI work. Between 1953 and 1961, Felfe gradually took over the work of the section and was *de facto* chief of it at the time of his arrest, while Reile had been gradually phased out due to advancing age and concomitant inflexibility. Reile was kept more or less happy handling "special activities" for Gehlen, using some of his old assets in the West, especially in France.

Reile was forced more or less unwillingly into retirement. He then took up his writing career. For a time the BND apparently thought he was sufficiently detached from the organization and its operations that he could do no harm. Meanwhile, it has become apparent that

he has kept up some of his old wartime connections in the West, which he once exploited for Gehlen. In any case, for whatever reason, *Macht und Ohnmacht der Geheimdienste* patently follows the Soviet black propaganda line for the West German audience.

Thomas R. Winnesheik

DER 20. JULI UND DER LANDESVERRAT (The 20th of July and Treason). By *Karl Balzer.* (Verlag K. W. Schuetz, Goettingen, 1967. 325 pages.)

This book bears the subtitle "Documentation Concerning Acts of Treason in the German Resistance." The reader who turns to it in search of facts and objectivity, however, will be disappointed. Indeed, all who are familiar with the true history of life and conditions in the Third Reich before and during World War II will probably be shocked, even disgusted. For the author, the infamy of those years did not exist. Any avid fan of the *Voelkischer Beobachter,* on the other hand, will be delighted after twenty-four years of draught and famine. In the inter-war period, much was written and said about the "Dolchstoss-Legende"—the myth of the stab in the back. This book propounds a "Dolchstoss-Legende" to end all "Dolchstoss-Legenden." Recommended for strong stomachs and neo-fascists only.

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MISSION ESCAPE. By *Sydney Smith.* (New York: David Mckay Co., 1969. $5.95.)

This is the story of Wing Commander H. M. A. Day, a British RAF officer who spent most of World War II as a prisoner of war at the hands of the Nazis. Although he has appeared as a principal in many accounts of escape and evasion in those years,[1] Day's full story is told here for the first time.

As in all cases of sustained courage, the narrative is of substantial interest; but the main value of the book from the intelligence point of view lies in the data on interrogation, intelligence collecting by prisoners, mail and radio transmittal of intelligence from POW camps to home authorities, and the transmittal of escape equipment to prisoners. Some of the details on these matters have not been presented previously in open sources.

[1] Aidan Crawley, *Escape from Germany,* 1956, e.g.

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The book is enhanced by Day's broad and responsible view (he was a relatively senior officer) of the POW milieu, and by a perspective of some 25 years.

Historians tying up loose ends of World War II may find useful material in the chapters toward the end of the book wherein Day describes his enforced retreat to the shrinking heart of Nazi Germany with a party of prominent prisoners whom the Germans were holding to the bitter end for possible use in last-minute bargaining. This unbelievably mixed bag of captives included General Garibaldi, grandson of the liberator of Italy; Peter Churchill; Dr. Hjalmar Schacht; Prince Frederick Leopold of Prussia; Pastor Martin Niemoller; Fritz Thyssen; General Franz Halder; Léon Blum; and Kurk Schuschnigg, among others.

Louis Thomas



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